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Abstract 
 
Michel Foucault argues that modern scholars have inaccurately conceptualized 
ancient Greco-Roman philosophies as the pursuit of abstract knowledge. He proposes 
instead conceiving of these philosophies more broadly as sets of practices that focused  
on “the care of the self/soul.” Such care involved exercises (“technologies of the self”) 
effecting both identity formation and spiritual transformation. It is possible to re-
conceptualize the history of the early Christianities in these terms as well, particularly in 
examining the discourses circulating in the second and third centuries of the Common 
Era. Juxtaposition and close reading of texts from this period reveal that competing 
visions of the care of the soul informed by Stoic ideals were circulating among Christians. 
Specifically, these conflicting perspectives revolved around, on one hand, a dominant, 
“proto-orthodox” discourse glorifying martyrdom and, on the other, disruptions to this 
discourse by those misleadingly subsumed under the umbrella term, “Gnostic.”  Chapter 
one explores the value of applying Foucault’s framework to the history of the early 
Christianities. Chapter two explains the way in which martyrdom functions as care of the 
soul, or therapy of the emotions, in texts ascribed to Clement, Ignatius, and Polycarp. 
Chapter three demonstrates the way other early Christian texts disrupt this discourse of a 
“suffering self” while simultaneously laying out other views of self-care. Specific texts 
for examination include two texts from Nag Hammadi—Apocalypse of Peter and 
Testimony of Truth, two fragments preserved by Clement of Alexandria—one attributed 
 iii 
to Basilides and one to Valentinus, and the Gospel of Judas. Chapter four discusses how 
Mary Magdalene and Perpetua are represented in terms of the care of the soul in, 
respectively, the Gospel of Mary and the Passion of Perpetua and Felicity and what is at 
stake for women’s leadership roles in each of these portrayals. Viewing the early debates 
in this way—as conflicts regarding issues of self-identity and spiritual development—
rather than as debates about knowledge per se (doctrines defined in essentialist terms) 
provides a means of moving beyond the simplistic characterization of the richly diverse 
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CHAPTER ONE: THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CARE OF THE SOUL IN THE 
HISTORY OF THE EARLY CHRISTIANITIES 
The Care of the Self as the Main Focus of Greco-Roman Philosophies 
There are times in life when the question of knowing if one can think differently 
than one thinks, and perceive differently than one sees, is absolutely necessary if 
one is to go on looking and reflecting at all . . . . But, then, what is philosophy 
today—philosophical activity, I mean—if it is not the critical work that thought 
brings to bear on itself? In what does it consist, if not in the endeavour to know 
how and to what extent it might be possible to think differently, instead of 
legitimating what is already known?1
Foucault’s challenge to theology is to think differently by freeing theology from 
what it ‘silently thinks’, to enable Christian theology to recognize its hidden 
regimes of knowledge power beneath the rituals of its performances.
 
2
In The Hermeneutics of the Subject,
 
3
                                                   
1 Michel Foucault, The Use of Pleasure (trans. Robert Hurley; London: Penguin, 1984), 9. 
 Michel Foucault argues that since the “post-
Cartesian moment,” modern scholars have inaccurately conceptualized Greco-Roman 
2 See page 5 of Bernauer and Carrette, Michel Foucault and Theology, 2004. Though relatively little has 
been written about the application of Foucault’s work to theology and religion, various essays in the 
following works are useful in  demonstrating the relevance of Foucault’s thought in these areas: James W. 
Bernauer, Michel Foucault’s Force of Flight: Toward an Ethics of Thought (London: Humanities Press 
International, 1990); James W. Bernauer and Jeremy R. Carrette, eds. Michel Foucault and Theology: The 
Politics of Religious Experience (Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate, 2004); Jeremy R. Carrette, Foucault and 
Religion: Spiritual Corporality and Political Spirituality (New York: Routledge, 2000); Jeremy R. Carrette, 
ed. Religion and Culture: Michel Foucault (New York: Routledge, 1999); Jonathan Tran, Foucault and 
Theology (London: T&T Clark, 2011). 
3 Michel Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège de France 1981–82 (ed. 
Frédéric Glos; trans. Graham Burchell; New York: Picador, 2001). These are lectures Foucault gave in the 
latter part of his life before he died in 1984. James Bernauer, who attended Foucault’s lectures for two 
years, describes his style and the excitement generated by his lectures: “It was during his fourteen years at 
the Collège de France that Foucault achieved his greatest renown as a thinker and teacher.  The cacophony 
of foreign tongues heard before each of his classes among the hundreds of students who filled the large 
lecture hall at the Collège testified to the audience that his work had found in other countries. Although the 
major languages into which he had been translated was a sign of an interest in his writings that extended far 
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philosophies as the pursuit of abstract knowledge. He proposes situating our 
understanding more broadly in terms of sets of practices centered around the epimeleia 
heautou, or “the care of the self/soul” instead.4  In the rest of the book and in 
Technologies of the Self,5 he traces the history of this concept and discusses the means 
through which one goes about “the care of the self/soul.”6
which permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a 
certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, 
  Such care revolves around 
what he terms “technologies of the self.” Indeed, these “technologies” are simply 
practices, or exercises, which effect both identity formation and spiritual transformation.  
In a published interview done when he led a seminar on these at the University of 
Vermont, he defines these “technologies” as those practices  
                                                                                                                                                       
beyond the classroom, the best single indication of his thought’s appeal was the tangible sense of 
excitement that possessed his auditors as they heard him thinking aloud. The regular, almost monotone 
voice in which the words poured forth seemed irreconcilable with the bursts of dramatic images that 
exploded in his speech: word paintings in which Greek philosophers and Christian theologians, medical 
doctors and psychiatrists, those searching for truth and those inflicted with the passion for power found 
themselves depicted together with the figures of madmen, the dissected bodies of the dead, and the 
cowering expressions of the imprisoned and the exploited.  In hearing Foucault, many felt that the world we 
did in fact inhabit had found a craftsman to portray it.” See Bernauer, Michel Foucault’s Force of Flight, 
3–4. One cannot help but think that Foucault would empathize with juxtaposing the voices of the “proto-
orthodox” Clement, Ignatius, and Polycarp with those of the writers of the Apocalypse of Peter, the Gospel 
of Judas, and the other extra-canonical texts discussed in this dissertation even if the figures represented in 
these texts might have themselves been horrified at being lumped together. 
4 See Foucault, Hermeneutics of the Subject, 2–27 for a good overview. 
5 Michel Foucault, “Technologies of the Self,” in Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault 
(ed. Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman, and Patrick H. Hutton; Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 
1988), 16–49. 
6 “Care of the self” and “care of the soul” are used interchangeably by Foucault.  There are several 
examples on pages 25–27 of his essay, “Technologies of the Self.”  For example, when he discusses the 
way in which Socrates urges Alcibiades to take care of himself, Foucault says, “Alcibiades tries to find the 
self in a dialectical movement.  When you take care of the body, you don’t take care of the self.  The self is 
not clothing, tools, or possessions.  It is to be found in the principle which uses these tools, a principle not 
of the body but of the soul.  You have to worry about the soul—that is the principal activity of caring for 
yourself.” See Foucault, “Technologies of the Self,” 25. 
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and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of 
happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality.7
Foucault explains that in antiquity, these practices consisted of things like writing in a 
notebook, writing letters, the art of listening well, certain kinds of meditation, 
examination of conscience, dream interpretation, and practices related to medical care.
 
8
 Foucault argues that since Descartes, the modern history of philosophy has 
typically focused on the Greco-Roman love of knowledge and assumed it to be the 
primary emphasis of the ancients.  However, Foucault proposes that it is actually the care 
of the soul which is the main interest of the philosophers of antiquity. He explains that 
the emphasis on “knowing oneself” in ancient Greek and Roman thought is actually 
subsumed within the broader notion of the care of the self/soul.  The Hermeneutics of the 
Subject as a whole lays out the case for this thesis with extensive examples from the time 
 
                                                   
7 Foucault, “Technologies of the Self,” 18.  
8 See also Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault 
(Arnold I. Davidson, ed. Michael Chase, trans.; Oxford: Blackwell, 1995). Hadot became the chair of the 
department of philosophy at the Collège de France in 1983, just after Foucault gave the lectures which have 
been transcribed and translated as the Hermeneutics of the Subject in 1981–82 (see Davidson’s 
“Introduction” to Philosophy as a Way of Life, 2).  Foucault cites Hadot’s work several times in 
Hermeneutics of the Subject (23, 62, 79, 123, 146, 203, 216, 226, 312, 269, 387, 417, 418, 434) as they 
share the view that philosophy represented “a way of life” rather than the mere acquisition of abstract 
knowledge in the Greco-Roman world.  What Foucault terms “the care of the self/soul,” Hadot refers to as 
the practice of “spiritual exercises.” He gives examples listed by Philo of Alexandria: “research, thorough 
investigation, reading, listening, attention, self-mastery, and indifference to indifferent things,” and then, in 
a second list, “reading, meditations, therapies of the passions, remembrance of good things, self-mastery, 
and the accomplishment of duties” (84). Hadot does mention some points of difference which he says he 
would have liked to discuss with Foucault had he lived longer on pages 206–13 of Philosophy as a Way of 
Life. These are based on Hadot’s reading of Foucault’s three-volume, History of Sexuality, originally 
published as Le Souci de soi, Paris 1984 and translated into English by Robert Hurley which was published 
in New York by Vintage Books in 1986) rather than the Hermeneutics of the Subject as Hadot’s book 
preceded the lectures by six years.  The most important difference in emphasis is Hadot’s wanting to 
emphasize not only the ethics of caring for oneself but also the Stoic emphases on cosmology and logic. 
For Hadot, care of the self leads one to see that one is part of the greater whole. Thus, ethical reflection 
leads to cosmological reflection. Martha Nussbaum has also written extensively on these practices: Martha 
C. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Martha C. Nussbaum, 
“The Stoics on the Extirpation of the Passions,” Apeiron 20 (1987), 129–77.  
 4 
of Socrates9 to the fifth century of the Common Era.10  Foucault argues that this concept 
of self-care simply cannot be underestimated as it is the “justificatory framework, ground 
and foundation”11 for the concept of knowing oneself which has long been seen as the 
dominant concept undergirding Greek and Roman thought: “Throughout the long 
summer of Hellenistic and Roman thought, the exhortation to care for oneself became so 
widespread that it became . . . a truly general cultural phenomenon.”12  Foucault argues 
that it is a major thread for roughly a thousand years—for five hundred years both prior 
to and after the beginning of the Common Era.13
 Foucault goes on to provide justification for seeing the prevalence of this concept.  
He himself admits that it is a concept which has scarcely been thought of as significant in 
the history of philosophy.
 
14
                                                   
9 Hadot, too, discusses the importance of the care of the soul in Socratic dialogue saying that such a 
teaching exercise “is not concerned with the exposition of a doctrine, but with guiding an interlocutor to a 
certain settled mental attitude.” See Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 20. In the postscript of this same 
work, Hadot refers to Alcibiades’ description of Socrates to argue for the definition of a philosopher as 
“someone who lived in a philosophical way,” 281. On pages 89–93, Hadot discusses the role of the 
representation of Socrates in detail. William V. Harris also discusses Socrates and his focus on care of the 
soul: William V. Harris, Restraining Rage: The Ideology of Anger Control in Classical Antiquity 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 352–53.  
  To begin with, he reinterprets the famous inscription at the 
oracle of Delphi, “Know thyself,” and shows how the connotation associated with it 
would have meant something more like, “Know your limitations,” or “Understand that 
10 See also Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, especially pages 264–267. 
11 Foucault, Hermeneutics of the Subject, 8. See pages 2–27 for a good overview of several points 
mentioned in this chapter. 
12 Foucault, Hermeneutics of the Subject, 9. 
13 Foucault, Hermeneutics of the Subject, 11. See also Carette and Bernauer, Michel Foucault and Theology, 
8. 
14 Foucault, Hermeneutics of the Subject, 2. 
 5 
one should not ask for too much.”  Second, Foucault provides three examples of 
Socrates’ use of the term in the Apology.  Socrates’ whole discussion revolves around the 
fact that he has not taken care of himself in terms of trying to acquire fame or fortune but 
rather, that he sees his role as one who not only does not seek these things for himself but 
also encourages others to take care of their souls in ways that are far more important than 
these.  He alludes to the fact that if he is forced to leave the Athenians, they will suffer by 
not having someone who provides such encouragement. Socrates also says that after 
providing the guidance that he has, he deserves to be rewarded by his society rather than 
punished.15  Finally, Foucault points to the dialogue in the Alcibiades to make his case 
regarding the prominence of the notion of the care of the self for Greek thought, pointing 
out that the concept is important for the Pythagoreans, Stoics, Cynics, Epicureans, and 
neo-Platonists—in short, for all of the philosophical schools of ancient Greece and Rome 
with the exception of the Aristotelians.16
 Foucault also sees the concept of the care of the self as relevant for certain 
Christian groups—particularly those of Alexandria and the East.  He believes that this 
  Foucault then traces the history of what begins 
as a rather specific kind of activity (in which Socrates encourages only the elite young 
men who will be rulers to engage) to what becomes, over time, a process in which 
spokespeople for various philosophical schools advocate the care of the self for a much 
wider group of people.  Foucault also traces the process whereby the care of the soul 
shifts from being considered a practice one should take on in youth to being thought of as 
a life-long process.  
                                                   
15 Foucault, Hermeneutics of the Subject, 6–8. 
16 Foucault, Hermeneutics of the Subject, 17. 
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concept permeates asceticism and monasticism in the fourth and fifth centuries of the 
Common Era.  He gives an example from Gregory of Nyssa’s Treatise on Virginity in 
which he cites Gregory as comparing the care of the self to finding a lost drachma.  
Gregory says that if one loses such a coin, one must light a lamp and search diligently in 
every corner until one sees the metal shining in the dark.  He then explains this 
phenomenon as analogous to rediscovering the image which God has imprinted on our 
soul by taking care of it, shining the light of reason into and exploring every recess of it.  
In this sense, the care of the soul becomes an obligation for the Christian.17
Why Historians Have Not Recognized the Importance of Care of the Soul 
   
 Foucault discusses the reasons for this distorted focus on knowledge rather than 
the care of the self and the obscuring of the latter in modern times.  He argues that in the 
modern period, historians of philosophy have simply assumed that the emphasis was on 
knowledge.  He feels this assumption is a result of what he terms the “Cartesian 
moment,” that is, the moment “when [it came to be thought that] knowledge itself and 
knowledge alone gives access to the truth.”18
                                                   
17 Foucault, Hermeneutics of the Subject, 22, 492. 
  He does, however, qualify this by 
indicating an even earlier dissociation between, on the one hand, philosophy conceived of 
as a discourse revolving around the care of the soul and, on the other, philosophy 
conceived of as a discourse about mere knowledge, the latter occurring as practices of 
spirituality and the study of theology become separated.  He argues that this separation 
actually begins as early as the period of Scholastic theological discourse in the thirteenth 
18 Foucault, Hermeneutics of the Subject, 17. 
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century with theologians such as Thomas Aquinas who relied heavily on Aristotle.19
[t]his theology, by claiming, on the basis of Christianity of course, to be rational 
reflection founding a faith with a universal vocation, founded at the same time the 
principle of a knowing subject in general, of a knowing subject who finds both his 
point of absolute fulfillment and highest degree of perfection in God, who is also 
his Creator and so his model.  The correspondence between an omniscient God 
and subjects capable of knowledge, conditional on faith of course, is undoubtedly 
one of the main elements that led Western thought—or its principal forms of 
reflection—and philosophical thought in particular, to extricate itself, to free itself, 
and separate itself from the conditions of spirituality that had previously 
accompanied it and for which the epimeleia heautou was the most general 
expression (emphasis added).
  As 
he explains,  
20
Foucault goes on to say that until the seventeenth century, it is not spirituality and science 
which are at odds but spirituality and theology.  At that point, the “Cartesian moment” 
occurs, obscuring the emphasis on the care of the soul in pre-modern times.  
   
 Foucault also mentions one other reason.  Paradoxically, in some respects, an 
emphasis on one’s own self is at odds with the renunciation of self and the focus on non-
egoism that has permeated Western, Christian thought.21
                                                   
19 For Foucault, Aristotle is the great exception to the emphasis on the care of the soul in Greek thought:  
“Aristotle is not the pinnacle of Antiquity but its exception.” See Foucault, Hermeneutics of the Subject, 17. 
  For example, figures such as 
Gregory of Nyssa as well as Methodius of Olympus and Basil of Caesarea also associate 
the care of the self with themes of self-renunciation and freedom from marriage.  In fact, 
in the thought of these ascetics, the concept becomes related to austerity and self-restraint 
rather than being a positive activity which allows for human flourishing.  For all these 
 
20 Foucault, Hermeneutics of the Subject, 26–27. 
21 Foucault, Hermeneutics of the Subject, 13. 
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reasons, then, Foucault argues that later generations have neglected the concept of the 
care of the soul.22
Usefulness of the Care of the Self in Re-conceptualizing Christian History 
    
 The focus on knowledge in modern interpretations of Greco-Roman philosophies 
parallels the focus on doctrine in the way the story of Christianity has been told.  In fact, 
in Technologies of the Self, Foucault says that, “Christianity has always been more 
interested in the history of its beliefs than in the history of real practices (emphasis 
added)”23 and that a hermeneutics of technologies of the self “was never organized into a 
body of doctrine like textual hermeneutics.”24
 Re-conceiving the history of the early Christianities to delve more deeply into 
practices regarding the care of the self/soul rather than merely the history of knowledge, 
doctrines, or beliefs proves to be just as valuable as re-conceiving Greek philosophies in 
this way.
   
25
                                                   
22 Foucault, Hermeneutics of the Subject, 10, 13.  Hadot, too, feels that the recognition of the importance of 
“spiritual exercises” has been obscured, but he cites several “exceptions” who recognized the importance of 
such practices in the formation of self-identity and as a means of spiritual transformation (33). 
  In particular, this reconception yields crucial insights into the fierce conflicts 
between early Christians in the second and third centuries of the Common Era. We can 
apply and extend Foucault’s insights regarding the care of the self/soul in re-
conceptualizing issues of “orthodoxy” and “heresy” particularly with respect to 
23 Foucault, “Technologies of the Self,” 17. 
24 Foucault, “Technologies of the Self,” 17.  
25 Bernauer and Carrette agree, stating that Foucault’s work is not “simply a modernist critique of 
knowledge: it also continually opens up the space of theology and Christian living to new possibilities. 
Foucault offers theology the critical apparatus to find new inclusive and non-dualistic forms of living; he 
offers the possibility of imagining new ways of rethinking theology, as practice rather than belief.” See 
Bernauer and Carrette, Michel Foucault and Theology, 4.  See also Carrette, Foucault and Religion, 108–
28.  
 9 
“defining” the problematic category of “Gnosticism,”26
 Foucault himself provides a clue to the means whereby a re-conceptualization of 
Christian history in terms of its practices (or technologies of the self) might begin.  In 
describing Christianity, Foucault mentions that  
 reframing the issue as debates 
about the care of the self/soul rather than knowledge or doctrine per se (whether or not 
these disagreements were necessarily explicit or conscious).  Therefore, this dissertation 
will not attempt to catalogue and interpret a “body of doctrine” but rather to illustrate the 
ways in which various early Christian groups envisioned the care of the soul (and 
corresponding technologies of the self) and to articulate the ways in which the discursive 
strategies they used to do so involved a collision of discourses in the ever-shifting, hybrid 
conditions of the world of the early Christianities. 
Christianity belongs to the salvation religions.  It’s one of those religions which is 
supposed to lead the individual from one reality to another, from death to life, 
                                                   
26 Interestingly, Foucault himself does not necessarily seem to be aware of the problems with the 
categorization of some Christians as “Gnostics.”  Ironically, Foucault himself absorbs and expresses beliefs 
that are stereotypical of what have been continually put forth in the discourses of orthodox Christianity 
about “Gnosticism.” He himself does not see “Gnostics” as being interested in the care of the soul but 
rather as the extreme exception to this kind of concern: Foucault, Hermeneutics of the Subject, 16.  In 
actuality, the Coptic texts from Nag Hammadi which are often referred to as Gnostic were discovered in 
1945, but they were not translated and available to anyone other than a very small group of scholars until 
the 1970’s.  Thus, Foucault’s knowledge of them seems to have been understandably limited.  In fact, A. I. 
Davidson, a noted Foucauldian scholar, believes that his knowledge about them may have been based on 
reading Henry Puech, a noted history-of-religions scholar and expert on “Gnosticism” who taught at the 
same institution that Foucault did (Hermeneutics of the Subject, 23–24, n. 49). Puech’s student, Jean 
Doresse, was the first to view some of the codices found near Nag Hammadi. Puech was then one of the 
first to see them. See pages 5, 11, 13, 24, and 29 of John Dart, The Jesus of Heresy and History: The 
Discovery and Meaning of the Nag Hammadi Gnostic Library (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1988). 
However, the history of religions school would have simply assumed the texts to be Gnostic using precisely 
the kinds of typological definitions Karen King deconstructs in What is Gnosticism?, relying heavily on 
Foucauldian insights (see especially her “note on methodology,” 239–247). Foucault died before the texts 
became accessible and studied extensively.  It is thus understandable that Foucault simply did not have 
access to the insights of later scholars such as Williams, King, and Dunderberg. See Michael Williams, 
Rethinking “Gnosticism”: An Argument for Dismantling a Dubious Category (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1996); Karen King, What is Gnosticism? (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University, 2003); Ismo Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism: Myth, Lifestyle, and Society in the School of 
Valentinus (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).  
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from time to eternity.  In order to achieve that, Christianity imposed a set of 
conditions and rules of behavior for a certain transformation of the self (emphasis 
added).27
Foucault then goes on to say that for Christians, this involved exmologēsis: “to recognize 
publicly the truth of their faith or to recognize publicly that they were Christians.”
   
28  For 
Foucault, this includes “the dramatic recognition of one’s status as a penitent.”29
 However, if one who engages in exmologēsis can be defined as one who publicly 
recognizes the truth of one’s faith, it sounds strikingly similar to the definition of a 
martyr: witness.
   
30  Martyrdom means simply to bear witness.31
                                                   
27 Foucault, “Technologies of the Self,” 40. Interestingly, imposing “a set of conditions and rules of 
behavior for a certain transformation of the self” is the way in which philosophical schools functioned, and 
in the second century, Galen, the noted physician of the son of Marcus Aurelius, refers to Christianity itself 
as a philosophical school rather than as a “superstition” as earlier non-Christian writers had done.  See page 
73 of Robert L. Wilken, The Christians as the Romans Saw Them (2d ed. New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2003).  Wilken goes on to say, “In calling Christianity a philosophical school, even one whose 
dialectical skill did not impress him, Galen gave Christianity a boost on the ladder of acceptance within the 
Roman world. . . . what led him to call it a philosophy was the success Christianity had in leading men and 
women to a life of virtue” (emphasis added) (79).  
  Foucault goes on to say:  
28 Foucault, “Technologies of the Self,” 41. See also Carrette, Religion and Culture, 172–73, 179–81, 203–
04. 
29 Foucault, “Technologies of the Self,” 41.  
30 The very first definition for “martyr” in the comprehensive Oxford English Dictionary is “a person who 
chooses to suffer death rather than renounce faith in Christ or obedience to his teachings, a Christian way of 
life, or adherence to a law or tenet of the Church; (also) a person who chooses to suffer death rather than 
renounce the beliefs or tenets of a particular Christian denomination, sect, etc.”  
31 The Latin word martys referred to one who gave testimony in a Roman court of law. It acquired the 
particular connotation of suffering death for one’s beliefs in the context of the Roman persecution of 
Christians. Norbert Brox locates the first definitive usage of martys in this way in the Martyrdom of 
Polycarp. See Norbert Brox, Zeuge und Märtyrer: Untersuchungen zur frühchristlichen Zeugnis-
Terminologie. Studien zum Alten und Neuen Testament 5 (Munich: Kösel-Verlag, 1961). See also Hans 
Von Campenhausen, Die Idee des Martyriums in der alten Kirche (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 
1936); G. W. Bowersock, Martyrdom and Rome (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). Paul 
Middleton, too, argues that martyrdom functions differently in the Maccabean context and the early 
Christian context: “Sacrifice, Salvation, and Holy War in Maccabean and Early Christian Martyrdom” 
(paper presented at the annual meeting of the SBL, Chicago, November 18, 2012). Others argue that 
precedents for the willingness to suffer for one’s convictions have Jewish or Greco-Roman antecedents 
whether or not those who did so were specifically labeled as “martyrs.” See Theofried Baumeister, Die 
Anfänge der Theologie des Martyriums. Münsterische Beiträge zur Theologie 45 (Münster: Aschendorff, 
1980); W. H. C. Frend, Martyrdom and Persecution in the Early Church: A Study of a Conflict from the 
 11 
[t]he most important model used to explain exmologēsis was the model of death, 
of torture, or of martyrdom (emphasis added).  The theories and practices of 
penance were elaborated around the problem of the man who prefers to die rather 
than to compromise.32
Although Foucault refers to exmologēsis within the context of acts of self-punishment 
which constituted penance,
   
33
                                                                                                                                                       
Maccabees to Donatus (Cambridge: James Clarke, 1965 and 2008) (who begins his history of Christian 
martyrdom with a chapter on the Maccabees); Jan Willem van Henten, The Maccabean Martyrs as 
Saviours of the Jewish People: A Study of 2 Maccabees and 4 Maccabees. Supplements to the Journal for 
the Study of Judaism 57 (ed. John J. Collins; Leiden: Brill, 1997); Jan Willem Van Henten and Friedrich 
Avemarie, Martyrdom and Noble Death: Selected Texts from Graeco-Roman, Jewish and Christian 
Antiquity. London: Routledge, 2002; Arthur J. Droge and James D. Tabor, A Noble Death: Suicide and 
Martyrdom among Christians and Jews in Antiquity (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1992); Emily R. 
Wilson, The Death of Socrates (London: Profile, 2007); Candida R Moss, Ancient Christian Martyrdom: 
Diverse Practices, Theologies, and Traditions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 23–48, 174–78 
concisely synthesizes this complex debate in her excellent treatment of the subject, astutely pointing to the 
fact that a particular linguistic term and the concept of an action are not necessarily always one and the 
same. It is possible that a certain community or culture could have understood and valued a practice such as 
dying for one’s convictions without using the same word applied to such an action by later groups. 
Moreover, the definition may vary over time and geographic location. See especially pages 3–6, 169–70 of 
Ancient Christian Martyrdom. For an overview of the way that martys functions in secular Greek sources, 
the Septuagint, and the New Testament, see Allison Trites, The New Testament Concept of Witness 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); Allison Trites, “μαρτύς and Martyrdom in the 
Apocalypse,” NovT 15 (1973): 72–80. 
 such an insight resonates with a certain desire for 
martyrdom which seems to have been prevalent in some early Christian groups in the first 
32 Foucault, “Technologies of the Self,” 43. 
33 Foucault jumps rather abruptly from Greco-Roman philosophy to fourth and fifth century Christian 
monasticism.  While recognizing that both martyrdom and asceticism ground themselves in a sense of self-
renunciation, Foucault does not elaborate on the way in which the process of facing and enduring 
martyrdom is itself conceived of as a kind of care of the self.  His examples of the way in which the care of 
the self is practiced come from ascetic and monastic contexts.  He was planning to publish a fourth volume 
in the History of Sexuality series called Confessions of the Flesh.  However, this could not be completed 
before he died. See page 2, note 6 of Jeremy R. Carrette, “Prologue to a Confession of the Flesh,” in 
Jeremy Carrette, Religion and Culture: Michel Foucault (New York: Routledge, 1999), 1–47. See also 
Bernauer, Michel Foucault’s Force of Flight, 160. Chapter two of this dissertation, however, articulates the 
way in which martyrdom can also be conceived as a kind of care of the self.  See also Hadot, Philosophy as 
a Way of Life, 133.  Hadot says: “Like philosophical meditation, Christian meditation flourished by using 
all available means of rhetoric and oratorical amplification, and by mobilizing all possible resources of the 
imagination. Thus, for example, Evagrius Ponticus used to invite his disciples to imagine their own death, 
the decomposition of their bodies, the terrors and sufferings of their souls in Hell, and eternal fire; then, by 
way of contrast, they were to picture the happiness of the just.” One can well imagine how such an exercise 
could have functioned in earlier times when a Christian might actually have been facing martyrdom.  
Interestingly, though, Hadot, too fails to apply his insights regarding philosophy as a way of life 
specifically to the context of Christian persecution.   
 12 
three centuries prior to the Edict of Milan in 313 when the Roman Empire legally 
declared the toleration of Christianity.  Thus, an examination of discourses related to 
martyrdom can yield important insights regarding practices in the early Christianities.34
Martyrdom as a Discursive Formation  
 
 Judith Perkins has utilized a Foucauldian framework to argue that the very 
identity of Christianity was being established through the envisioning of the Christian 
community as the body or bodies of a “suffering self.” In particular, Perkins contrasts the 
comedic ending of Greco-Roman novels in marriage with the comedic ending of martyr 
accounts, the culmination of suffering in death.  Death as a happy ending (the name of 
her first chapter) turns Greco-Roman morality on its head.  In the moral universe of 
Greco-Roman values, there is no virtue in suffering; therefore, suffering epitomized by an 
ignominious death, a death which allows the sufferer to transcend the established social 
order and established hierarchies of this world for union with Christ, actually subverts the 
moral and political order of the elites who rule this earthly domain.35
                                                   
34 I would argue that while exmologēsis dominates the proto-orthodox form of Christianity which will 
become institutionalized in the fourth century, this is not necessarily the case with respect to all forms of 
early Christianities. The practices and beliefs of certain groups later deemed Gnostic align quite closely 
with Greco-Roman notions about the care of the soul in certain respects. Of course, many of the texts have 
been lost, but with the discovery of texts in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, particularly the large 
find near Nag Hammadi in 1945, we now have access to far more texts of early Christian groups than at 
any time since late antiquity.  If we closely examine them, what we find is not a Gnostic spirit but rather a 
variety of attitudes toward the care of the soul which intersect the dominant discourse of the glorification of 
martyrdom.  Chapter three argues this point in depth. 
  Though Perkins 
traces the way in which the notion of a suffering self is emerging in other Greco-Roman 
discourse (that of an Asclepius follower, for example), noting that Christian discourse 
 
35 Judith Perkins, The Suffering Self: Pain and Narrative Representation in the Early Christian Era (New 
York: Routledge, 1995), 15–40. 
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does not emerge out of a complete vacuum, she effectively argues that Christian 
discourse completely transforms notions of selves and suffering. Moreover, the very 
emergence of this subject, while not the sole reason for the success of Christianity, is 
helpful in at least two ways: a) in constituting an audience of suffering selves to whom 
Christianity can address itself (the sick, poor, suffering, widowed, and orphaned all of 
whom the discourses of Greco-Roman elites largely ignored) and b) the appropriation of 
the wealth of the rich for the serving of the poor. In this sense, she is articulating the 
operation of a communal technology of selves in the shaping of Christian identity.36
 In Perkins’ more recent book, Roman Imperial Identities in the Early Christian 
Era, she explores the way that the themes of alienation and estrangement from this world 
emerge in the construction of collective Christian identity, again by means of discursive 
analyses of a variety of ancient texts.  Perkins points out that the power of the Roman 
Empire revolved in part around an alliance of elites (the class known as honestiores).  
The law exempted such persons from cruel, physical punishments.  The emphasis on the 
value of martyrdom for Christians whether they were socially and economically of high 
or low status (including discourses emphasizing joy and rejoicing in the face of cruel, 
physical punishments and a belief in resurrection) “opened a crack in the unity of elite 
self-interest that informed the early empire”
 
37
                                                   
36 Jeremy R. Carrette, Religion and Culture, also discusses Foucault’s equating religion with a “political 
force.”  See Carrette, “Prologue to a Confession of the Flesh, ” 38.  Likewise, Foucault refers to the church 
as “a superb instrument of power for itself.” See page 107 of Thierry Voeltzel, “On religion (1978)” (Trans. 
Richard Townsend) in Jeremy R. Carrette, ed., Religion and Culture:  Michel Foucault (New York: 
Routledge, 1999), 106–109.   
—as this strategy stridently opposed the 
traditional distinction between the elites and the non-elites (honestiores and humiliores). 
37 Judith Perkins, Roman Imperial Identities in the Early Christian Era (Routledge Monographs in 
Classical Studies; New York: Routledge, 2008), 180. 
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Thus, the cult of martyrdom served larger social and political purposes as a means of 
disidentification with the status quo—being a member of the Roman Empire—and clear 
identification with a new institution which eventually served as an alternate space or site 
of power, the Christian church. In short, through the praise of martyrdom, Christians 
were discursively delineating their very self-definition over and against the Roman status 
quo.38
 Simultaneously, however, the meaning of Christian martyrdom for the individual 
was also being shaped discursively in particular ways.  Many early Christians believed 
that martyrdom assured one of salvation and was the ultimate means by which a self 
continued to exist and would be resurrected in the same fleshly form—the care of the self 
par excellence.  Such views are prevalent in the texts of the Apostolic Fathers.  The next 
chapter will discuss representative strategies with examples from 1 Clement, the Letters 
of Ignatius, the Letter of Polycarp to the Philippians, and the Martyrdom of Polycarp 
while chapter four utilizes the Passion of Perpetua and Felicity as an example. In 
Martyrdom and Memory, Elizabeth Castelli examines early Christian texts such as these 
and articulates the means by which writing by and about martyrs and elaborations on 
their lives and deaths constituted a “technology of the self.”  She specifically invokes 
Foucault’s notion of the technology of self-writing
  
39
                                                   
38 Perkins, Roman Imperial Identities, 172–180. 
 in analyzing the letters attributed to 
39 Michel Foucault, “L’écriture de soi.” Corps écrit no. 5, “L’autoportrait” (February 1983): 3–23.  
Reprinted in Foucault, Dits et écrits: 1954–1988, 4:415–30.  Translated as “Self Writing” by Paul Rabinow 
in Foucault, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, ed. Paul Rabinow, vol. 1 of Essential Works of Foucault, 1954–
1984, 207–22 (New York: The New Press, 1994). 
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Ignatius, the martyrdom account of Perpetua, and the work of Pionius, thus extending 
Foucault’s ideas to the martyrs themselves.40
 Perkins’ and Castelli’s work also supplement Daniel Boyarin’s development of 
the idea that discussions of martyrdom functioned as a discourse in Dying for God.  As he 
explains,  
    
I propose that we think of martyrdom as a “discourse,” as a practice of dying for 
God and of talking about it, a discourse that changes and develops over time and 
undergoes particularly interesting transformations among rabbinic Jews and other 
Jews, including Christians, between the second and the fourth centuries.  For the 
“Romans,” it didn’t matter much whether the lions were eating a robber or a 
bishop, and it probably didn’t make much of a difference to the lions, either, but 
the robber’s friends and the bishop’s friends told different stories about those 
leonine meals.  It is in these stories that martyrdom, as opposed to execution or 
dinner, can be found, not in “what happened.”41
Moreover, for Boyarin, accounts of martyrdom are “a particularly fertile site for 
the exploration of the permeability of the borders between so-called Judaism and so-
called Christianity in late antiquity.
 
42
                                                   
40Elizabeth A. Castelli, Martyrdom and Memory: Early Christian Culture Making (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2004), 69–103. 
 In other words, deconstructing this discourse is the 
basis for showing how various strands of Judaism and Christianity overlapped with each 
41 Daniel Boyarin, Dying for God: Martyrdom and the Making of Christianity and Judaism (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1999), 94–95. Paul Middleton’s comment is also useful: “Martyrdom is not a 
category that can be defined.  Martyrdom is essentially created when a narrative about a death is told in a 
particular way.  The central character is not the most important element in the creation of a martyrdom; it is 
the narrator.”  See Paul Middleton, Martyrdom: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: T&T Clark, 2011). 
Candida R. Moss also defines martyrdom as a discourse by utilizing the work of Talal Asad (himself no 
stranger to the work of Foucault) in providing a very useful definition of martyrdom as “a set of discursive 
practices that shaped early Christian identities, mediated ecclesiastical and dogmatic claims, and provided 
meaning to the experience described by early Christians as persecution, and in doing so produced a new 
economy of action.”  Moss goes on to say that what is at stake in the definition is “less about what makes or 
does not make a martyr in some ontological sense than about how martyrs are created and for what 
purposes.”  See Moss, Ancient Christian Martyrdom, 17. 
42 Boyarin, Dying for God, 21. 
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other rather than being separate, monolithic entities.43  Doing so is a key in 
deconstructing what he terms “supercessionist theology”44
W. H. C. Frend. Scholars have long considered Frend’s text on martyrdom a classic and 
cite it repeatedly.
 such as that in the work of  
45
 As evidence, Boyarin points to stories in the Talmud that show that it was 
possible for the authorities to mistake Jews for Christians even in the second and third 
centuries.  A prime example is the story of the arrest of Rabbi Eliezer for engaging in 
“sectarianism”: 
 However, in this work, Frend portrays martyrdom as originating in 
Judaism which Christians adopt as Christianity “replaces” Judaism.  Boyarin argues that 
such work has unwittingly obscured the nature of the relationship between Judaisms and 
Christianities in the early centuries of the Common Era.   
The ruler said to him: A sage such as you having truck with these matters! 
He said to him: I have trust in the judge. 
The ruler thought that he was speaking of him, but he meant his Father in Heaven.  
He said to him: Since you trust me, I also have said: Is it possible that these gray 
hairs would err in such matters?  Behold, you are dismissed!46
Boyarin goes on to discuss the fact that “sectarianism” may well have been a form of 
Christianity and that the boundaries between the two faiths may have been rather unclear 
to people living at that time.   
 
 What is also interesting, even more fascinating for the purposes of this 
dissertation, however, is that the rabbi chooses to avoid martyrdom through the use of 
                                                   
43 Boyarin, Dying for God, 8. 
44 Boyarin, Dying for God, 128. 
45 Frend, Martyrdom and Persecution, 1965. 
46 Boyarin, Dying for God, 27. 
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clever, ambiguous language (“trust in the judge”).  In fact, the Talmud juxtaposes this 
story against others that embrace martyrdom. Therefore, for Boyarin, given that both 
kinds of responses are recorded as acceptable, the Talmud demonstrates an openness to 
questions regarding what the response of a faithful person should be.  These positions 
function as “nodes on a continuum.”47
It is not finally the issues themselves, or even the positions taken on them, that 
divide the traditions, but the forms of textuality and authority that they generate 
and venerate.  Ambrose (and other patristic ‘authors’) control their texts in ways 
that the unauthored rabbinic text does not.  A useful analogy would be to 
Bakhtin’s distinction between Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, with Ambrose playing 
Tolstoy to the Talmud’s Dostoevsky.  This analogy should make clear, as well, 
that this typology does not imply a hierarchy.  It should also be emphasized that 
‘tolerance’ for diversity is not what was at issue here.  There is no reason to see 
the Rabbis as any more tolerant than the Fathers.  The issue is rather the elasticity 
or plasticity of the discourse of the different traditions in their ability and desire to 
allow heterogeneity on certain kinds of questions.
   By contrast, for those Boyarin terms “Christian,” 
the response is almost always a choice to face martyrdom bravely or even a desire for it.  
He states: 
48
Though we can applaud Boyarin’s desire not to label certain groups as more 
tolerant than others, it is worth noting that there is remarkable diversity of opinion 




                                                   
47 Boyarin, Dying for God, 66. 
 of those labeled Gnostic serve as a complement that fills out even more 
48 Boyarin, Dying for God, 66. 
49 This qualification is crucial as some texts traditionally labeled “Gnostic,” for example, do not necessarily 
disrupt a discourse glorifying martyrdom.  For example, the Letter of Philip to Peter and the Apocalypse of 
James are quite different in their representation of martyrdom than the Gospel of Judas.  There is no one 
attitude toward martyrdom but rather a spectrum of attitudes.  Karen King elucidates this nicely, suggesting 
that it may be helpful to see extra-canonical Christian texts as representing a range of viewpoints for 
readers to consider with respect to the meaning and significance of martyrdom. See Karen King, 
“Martyrdom and Its Discontents in the Tchacos Codex,” in The Codex Judas Papers: Proceedings of the 
International Congress on the Tchacos Codex held at Rice University, Houston, Texas, March 13–16, 2008 
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completely (if not fully) the continuum about which Boyarin speaks.  Boyarin has shown 
us that Judaism and Christianity were not monolithic entities but were each composed of 
fluid strands that continuously overlapped, and this research illustrates that variety even 
more specifically with regard to the early Christianities.50
 The recognition of a discursive formation of martyrdom so well-elaborated by 
Boyarin and others accords well with Foucault’s notion of the importance of the theme of 
self-renunciation mentioned above.  “Throughout Christianity there is a correlation 
between disclosure of the self, dramatic or verbalized, and the renunciation of self.”
  In fact, chapter three addresses 
this topic in much more depth.  
51  
Near the end of his essay on “Technologies of the Self,” Foucault states that for a 
Christian, “the acts by which he punishes himself are indistinguishable from the acts by 
which he reveals himself (emphasis added).”52
Disruptions to the Discourse of Martyrdom  
  Although Foucault mentions this in the 
context of exhibiting penitential behavior, it applies to the establishment of both 
individual and collective Christian identity as well.  
 If, then, the very constitution of Christian identity revolved around a specific 
technology of self, the discourse of martyrdom, which denoted also a means of not only 
                                                                                                                                                       
(ed. April D. DeConick; NHMS 71; ed. Johannes van Oort and Einar Thomassen; Leiden: Brill, 2009), 23–
42. See also Moss, Ancient Christian Martyrdom, 155–67. 
50 Boyarin is familiar with the work of Karen King, citing her article on “Gnosticism as Heresy” as a 
“productive influence” on his own work. He also mentions that there were “Gnostics” who did not see 
martyrdom as valuable, but he repeatedly refers to the “Christian” view as one which saw martyrdom as 
absolutely crucial.  See note 24 on pp. 136–37.  
51 Foucault, “Technologies of the Self,” 48. 
52 Foucault, “Technologies of the Self,” 42. 
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caring for one’s soul, but indeed, guaranteeing the eternal salvation of one’s soul and 
one’s bodily resurrection,53 one can well imagine that any disruptions to the discourses of 
glorifying and exalting the practices of martyrdom may have constituted a challenge, 
even a threat, to the very means by which the identity of Christianity was developing in 
various circles.  As Perkins clearly shows us, this discourse involved not only themes of 
individual salvation but eventually played a role in the establishment of an alternative 
power site, the Christian Church of the fourth century, as well.  Thus, such disruptions 
were probably not merely theological but may well have represented challenges to the 
developing power of the “orthodox” who came to dominate the institutional Church 
eventually centered in Rome.  One finds such a challenge in the discourses of certain 
individuals excoriated as “Gnostics” (a number of different early Christian groups being 
lumped together under this term).54
                                                   
53 The best exposition of this topic is that by Caroline Walker Bynum, The Resurrection of the Body in 
Western Christianity, 200 – 1336 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).  This relationship 
between martyrdom and the development of a doctrine of the resurrection of the flesh will be explored in 
more depth in chapters two and three. 
  These challenges must be closely examined and 
understood with this context in mind if we are to better understand the hostility and 
contentiousness which dominate the tone of the proto-orthodox texts with regard to other 
early Christian groups (and the similarly derogatory tone of these groups with respect to 
the proto-orthodox).  Indeed, close reading of the Apocalypse of Peter, the Testimony of 
Truth, two fragments preserved in the writings of Clement of Alexandria (one attributed 
to Basilides and one to Valentinus), and the recently-discovered Gospel of Judas  
provides striking insight.  We will examine these texts more closely in the third chapter. 
54 Again, the seminal work for understanding this conflation of several different groups under this one term 
is Michael Williams’ Rethinking “Gnosticism” cited above. 
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 In summary, rather than conceiving of differences as primarily doctrinal, perhaps 
it is possible to shed post-Cartesian assumptions and recognize that “orthodoxy” and 
“heresy” are not binary opposites centered in doctrinal differences defined in terms of 
essential characteristics.  Rather, they are discursive constructions arising out of 
competing visions regarding the best way to care for one’s soul (individually or 
collectively).  These perspectives simultaneously serve to reinforce certain technologies 
of the self which operate in a variety of ways in relation to the development of the proto-
orthodox Christian body as a distinct, identifiable group with accompanying concrete 
political and social consequences.  This is not to deny the existence of doctrinal 
differences but rather to try to understand the troubling dichotomy of “orthodoxy” and 
“heresy” in terms of the broad notion of the care of the self/soul which, according to 
Foucault, better represents the concerns of those inhabiting the ancient world.    
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CHAPTER TWO: MARTYRDOM REPRESENTED AS CARE OF THE 
SELF/SOUL IN “PROTO-ORTHODOX” TEXTS 




Martyrdom as Care of the Soul/Self  
 In chapter one, we have explored Foucault’s notion of the care of the soul and the 
way in which martyrdom functions as a discourse. According to Judith Perkins, this 
discourse serves to unify the “proto-orthodox” as they view themselves as part of a 
collective “suffering self.” In this chapter, we turn more specifically to the way in which 
certain proto-orthodox2
                                                   
1 Unless otherwise noted, all scriptural citations refer to the New Revised Standard Version (NRSV). While 
this sentence is the most striking in illuminating the theme described in this chapter, 1 John 4:17–18 is 
actually useful in its entirety: “Love has been perfected among us in this: that we may have boldness on the 
day of judgment, because as he is, so are we in this world. There is no fear in love, but perfect love casts 
out fear; for fear has to do with punishment, and whoever fears has not reached perfection in love” 
(emphasis added). Tertullian refers to this passage in section nine of De Fuga in Persecutione (On Flight in 
Persecution): “And yet who will flee from persecution but he who fears? Who will fear, but he who has not 
loved? Yes; and if you ask counsel of the Spirit, what does He approve more than that utterance of the 
Spirit? For, indeed, it incites all almost to go and offer themselves in martyrdom, not to flee from it; so that 
we also make mention of it. If you are exposed to public infamy, says he, it is for your good; for he who is 
not exposed to dishonour among men is sure to be so before the Lord. Do not be ashamed; righteousness 
brings you forth into the public gaze. Why should you be ashamed of gaining glory? The opportunity is 
given you when you are before the eyes of men.” Unless otherwise noted, citations of the Ante-Nicene 
Fathers throughout the dissertation come from Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, eds., The Ante-
Nicene Fathers: The Writings of the Fathers down to A.D. 325 (American Reprint of the Edinburgh 
Edition) 10 vols (ed. A. Cleveland Coxe; New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1903). 
 texts attributed to Clement of Rome, Ignatius of Antioch, and 
2 See chapter one for the problems inherent in using this term. 
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Polycarp of Smyrna repeatedly represent martyrdom3 as a kind of care of the self4
which permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a 
certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, 
and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of 
happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality.
 in 
terms of Stoic ideals and how this representation circulates in tandem with the 
signification of martyrdom as an imitation of Christ’s sacrifice.  Specifically, this 
representation of martyrdom as care of the self accords with Foucault’s definition of 
“technologies of the self” as those practices 
5
For the proto-orthodox, as the suffering of the body becomes emphasized in particular 
ways (as Perkins has demonstrated in The Suffering Self),
 
6 the body—as it endures torture, 
imprisonment, and death—becomes the means by which one can become a true disciple 
who re-enacts Christ’s own passion and who will become a fully-formed self, enjoying a 
blessed eternal existence, and eventually, the fleshly resurrection of one’s body.7
                                                   
3 As noted in chapter one, the very first definition for “martyr” in the twenty-volume Oxford English 
Dictionary is “a person who chooses to suffer death rather than renounce faith in Christ or obedience to his 
teachings, a Christian way of life, or adherence to a law or tenet of the Church; (also) a person who chooses 
to suffer death rather than renounce the beliefs or tenets of a particular Christian denomination, sect, etc.”  
 
4 Martyrdom could certainly be represented otherwise. There are multitude ways to conceptualize death, 
and scholars debate the very definitions of “martyr” and “martyrdom.” Lacey Baldwin Smith discusses “the 
debate over definition,” providing a good overview of other ways in which such deaths can be represented: 
as pathological, as the acts of the insane who foolishly put themselves in harm’s way, or as just punishment 
for traitorous acts or attitudes. See Lacey Baldwin Smith, Fools, Martyrs, Traitors: The Story of 
Martyrdom in the Western World (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997), 3–20. For further discussion of the 
difficulty in defining martyrdom and an overview of various theories about what motivates human beings 
to be willing to undergo martyrdom, see pages 8–26 of Eugene Weiner and Anita Weiner, The Martyr’s 
Conviction: A Sociological Analysis (Atlanta: Scholars, 1990). See pages 29–38 for more on the historical 
development of the concept.  
5 See Foucault, “Technologies of the Self, ” 18. 
6 Perkins, The Suffering Self, 1995. 
7 Caroline Walker Bynum delineates the development of the doctrine of the fleshly resurrection in the 
second century C. E. in the context of the persecution of Christians. See Bynum, The Resurrection of the 
Body, particularly chapter one, “The Patristic Background,” 19–58.  See also Joyce E. Salisbury, The Blood 
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Contemporary readers may take for granted that these notions of attaining immortality 
and resurrection are central concerns of the texts simply because such doctrines have 
dominated Christian theology through the centuries. For our purposes, though, the most 
important aspect is the manner in which proto-orthodox texts refer to the process of 
martyrdom in terms of how a self becomes fully actualized, the key element in Foucault’s 
delineation of technologies of the self. 
 This process of transformation, of actually becoming a certain kind of self, also 
goes hand-in-hand with Stoic ideals regarding freedom from passions and an emphasis on 
the “cure” of the passions, or the “therapy of emotions.”  Stoics believed that in order to 
be free, one should extirpate the passions from one’s soul. Passions were equated with 
illnesses. Just as medical cures involved healing and freedom from physical maladies, 
philosophical “cures” helped one to root out and become free of passions such as fear, 
anger, jealousy, and greed. “We call on the philosopher as we call on the doctor in cases 
of illness.”8
Foucault illuminates this in The Hermeneutics of the Subject in discussing the way 
in which the term therapeuein informs the care of the soul.
  The Stoics thought that such passions undermined self-control, and 
ultimately, it is self-control which allowed one to be truly free. 
9
                                                                                                                                                       
of Martyrs: Unintended Consequences of Ancient Violence (New York: Routledge, 2004), 31–53. This  will 
be discussed more fully in chapter three in conjunction with our exploration of the ways in which some 
early Christian texts resist the insistence on belief in such a doctrine. 
  It can have three meanings. 
One is to perform a medical operation in order to effect a treatment or cure. Another is 
8 Foucault, Hermeneutics of the Subject, 55. 
9 For further in-depth treatment of these issues, see Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire, 1994; Nussbaum, 
“The Stoics on the Extirpation of the Passions,” 129–77. See also A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, The 
Hellenistic Philosophers, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 410–23. 
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that it can describe a servant engaged in the activity of serving a master obediently. 
Lastly, it has the connotation of being devoted to oneself in the sense of keeping oneself 
free and pure of the emotions.10  One must “protect, defend, respect, worship, and honor 
oneself.”11 It is in this sense that Marcus Aurelius says that one must “surround [one’s 
inner self] with sincere service (Med. II.13).12 He also describes the “intelligence free 
from passions” as a “citadel.”  He says that when in this state, a person “has no stronger 
place into which to withdraw and henceforth be impregnable” and that one’s “inner 
guide” is also unassailable (Med., VIII.48).13 Seneca also discusses the value of curing 
the passions, saying “How much wiser to stifle one’s own passions than to recount for 
posterity those of others?” (Nat., Preface to Book III).14
[I]t is seeing the whole of this world with the eyes of the mind and having carried 
off the most beautiful triumph, triumph over the vices. Those who have made 
themselves masters of towns and entire nations are countless; but how few have 
been masters of themselves . . . What is great is a steadfast soul, serene in 
adversity, a soul that accepts every event as if it were desired . . . . What is great is 
having one’s soul at one’s lips, ready to depart; then one is free not by the laws of 
the city but by the law of nature.
 He then articulates the way in 
which greatness lies in the following:  
15
He goes on to say,  
 
                                                   
10 Foucault, Hermeneutics of the Subject, 8–9, 98–99 
11 For Seneca’s elaboration of this, see Foucault, Hermeneutics of the Subject, 272. 
12 The translations are those of Foucault unless otherwise noted. See Foucault, Hermeneutics of the Subject, 
105, n. 59. 
13 Foucault, Hermeneutics of the Subject, 101, n. 10. 
14 Foucault, Hermeneutics of the Subject, 269, n. 36. 
15 Foucault cites this passage on p. 265 of Hermeneutics of the Subject and cites it only as Natural 
Questions in n. 39 on p. 269. 
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I am not surprised that so few people enjoy this happiness: we are our own tyrants 
and persecutors; sometimes unhappy due to loving ourselves excessively, 
sometimes from disgust with our existence, in turns the mind is swollen by a 
deplorable pride or strained by greed; giving ourselves up to pleasure or burning 
up with anxiety (Nat., IV, Preface).16
 
  
Toward the end of the second century of the Common Era, Galen, the doctor to 
Commodus, the son of Marcus Aurelius, also discusses these themes in a text entitled On 
the Treatment of the Passions.17
 . . . the integrity of [the] rational human self is threatened by emotions and 
affections of the soul. Psychology, therefore, becomes a central and highly refined 
element of Stoic teaching as a doctrine of the affections . . . which are seen as 
diseases of the soul. Not only desire, fear, and pleasure, but also regret, sorrow, 
and compassion, are pathological states, from which the wise man must free 
himself in order to reach the goal of imperturbability (apatheia, later, in Epiktetos, 
ataraxia). In their description of the affections, Stoics borrowed many terms and 
concepts from the medical sciences. Their view of the affections as diseases of the 
soul is modeled on pathological insights into the diseases of the body. The 
philosopher becomes a physician of the soul.
 Helmut Koester has commented insightfully that for 
Stoics, 
18
                                                   
16 Foucault, Hermeneutics of the Subject, 392, n. 11. 
 
17 See Foucault’s discussion of the text on pp. 396–401 in Hermeneutics of the Subject. The focus on the 
care of the soul also continued to prevail in works Foucault does not discuss explicitly. Gregory the Great, 
for example, wrote a long treatise entitled “Pastoral Care” in the sixth century C.E. which dealt with the care 
of souls and was influential throughout the medieval and early modern period. See Thomas C. Oden, Care 
of the Souls in the Classic Tradition in Theology and Pastoral Care Series (ed. Don S. Browning; 
Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984). Boethius’ Consolation of Philosophy, also written in the sixth century C. E., 
delineates the role of virtue in attaining happiness as well. See Ancius Boethius, The Consolation of 
Philosophy (ed. Victor Watts; London: Penguin, 1999). The term itself is also popular in contemporary 
works such as that by Thomas Moore, The Care of the Soul: A Guide for Cultivating Depth and Sacredness 
in Everyday Life (New York: HarperCollins, 1992). 
18 Helmut Koester, History, Culture, and Religion of the Hellenistic Age. vol. 1 (2d ed.; New York: Walter 
de Gruyter, 1995). See also Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 82–89 for discussion of the Stoic notion of 
the care of the soul and its therapeutic connotations. 
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Recently, Tuomas Rasimus, Troels Engberg-Pederson, and Ismo Dunderberg 
have argued that Stoic ideals permeate the first two centuries of the Common Era,19 that 
is, in the time in which Christians were starting to write down accounts of martyrdom. As 
we closely examine these texts, we see the process of embracing martyrdom represented 
in terms of “patient endurance,”20 a term consonant with the ideas of self-control 
whatever the circumstances, even in anticipating a painful death which ultimately brings 
freedom.21 In fact, the authors of the texts actually represent death as desirable and the 
process of facing it successfully as the means of gaining eternal reward.22
                                                   
19 Tuomas Rasimus, Troels Engberg-Pedersen, and Ismo Dunderberg, eds., Stoicism in Early Christianity 
(Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2010). 
 
20 In most of the passages discussed below, the Greek term for “patient endurance” is hypomonê.  All 
citations come from Michael W. Holmes, ed. and trans., The Apostolic Fathers: Greek Text and English 
Translations (3d ed.; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2007). 
21 Brent D. Shaw has also noticed the prominence of this theme and refers to it as “an ideology of patience” 
on page 296 of “Body/Power/Identity: Passions of the Martyrs,” JECS 4.3 (1996): 269–312.   
22 A key debate concerns to what extent early Christians even actually sought martyrdom. Lack of hard, 
factual evidence regarding the extent of and degree of persecution makes studying Christian martyrdom in 
the first centuries of the Common Era problematic. See Moss, Ancient Christian Martyrdom, 8–16, 171–73. 
However, some scholars have argued that a certain desire seems to have existed at times. See G. E. M. De 
Ste. Croix, Christian Persecution, Martyrdom, and Orthodoxy (ed. Michael Whitby and Josephy Streeter; 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Paul Middleton, Radical Martyrdom and Cosmic Conflict in Early 
Christianity (London: T&T Clark, 2006), Philip L. Tite, “Voluntary Martyrdom and Gnosticism” (paper 
presented at the annual meeting of the SBL, Chicago, November 17, 2012).  During the Donatist 
controversy of the fourth century C. E., Augustine and others were at pains to curb any enthusiasm or 
desire for martyrdom, and an orthodox condemnation of any voluntary seeking of death entered Christian 
discourse with vociferous force, obscuring any early Christian tendencies in this direction. See Droge and 
Tabor, Noble Death, 167–83; Salisbury, The Blood of Martyrs, especially 189–204. The main thesis of 
Droge and Tabor’s work, however, is to point out that earlier generations did not necessarily conceive of a 
desire for death in negative terms. See also Jonathan Koscheski, “The Earliest Christian War: Second and 
Third Century Martyrdom and the Creation of Cosmic Warriors,” JRE 39.1 (March 2011), 100–124. Moss, 
too, cautions contemporary scholars against indulging in the modern tendency to judge a desire for death as 
pathological or abnormal: Moss, Ancient Christian Martyrdom, 49–52, 165–66.  She also urges us to 
reconsider the use of the term, “voluntary martyrdom,” pointing out that the term itself is little used prior to 
the writings of Clement of Alexandria in the third century of the Common Era.  The term is first used 
broadly in debates in seventeenth century England in reference to practices of self-denial.  Moreover, she 
argues that modern conceptions of martyrdom as voluntary have developed as part of the broader discourse 
about what is “natural” and in the context of a disdain for martyrdom on the part of scholars such as 
Edward Gibbon. See Candida R. Moss,“The Discourse of Voluntary Martyrdom: Ancient and Modern,” 
CH 81.3 (Sept 2012): 531–551. In her most recent work, though, while she does not use the term 
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 Close readings of the Apostolic Fathers23 and the Acts of the Christian Martyrs24 
reveal ample evidence of early Christians conceiving of martyrdom itself as well as the 
whole process leading up to the final event, as a kind of care of the self.25
                                                                                                                                                       
“voluntary,” even the very title supports the idea that Christian discourse has magnified the degree to which 
early Christians were actually persecuted: The Myth of Persecution: How Early Christians Invented a Story 
of Martyrdom (New York: HarperOne, 2013). P. Lorraine Buck also questions de Ste. Croix’s suppositions 
pointing to the fact that a relatively small percentage of Christians were probably martyred and that there 
was not “a free-for-all of crazed Christians thirsting after death.” See page 135 of P. Lorraine Buck, 
“Voluntary Martyrdom Revisited,” JTS 63.1 (April 2012): 125–35. 
  The idea that 
martyrdom assures one of salvation is prevalent. The suffering of the body could serve to 
23 Holmes notes that the association of the group of texts known as the “Apostolic Fathers” is a loose and 
somewhat arbitrary one (6). Traditionally, it refers to the earliest still-existing works other than those in the 
New Testament (3). Anastasius of Sinai used it in the seventh century, but its modern provenance dates to 
1672 in a work published by J. B. Cotelier and to 1765 in a collection published by A. Gallandi (5). 
Holmes’ most recent edition is the third version of a translation first published in 1891 by Lightfoot and 
Harmer (ix). Holmes carefully includes the Nag Hammadi Library and the Apocrypha in the bibliography 
of his introduction (23), pointing out the variety of early Christian texts that existed in addition to those of 
the New Testament. However, it is very difficult to rid ourselves of thinking of the texts in terms of their 
belonging to a category such as Gnostic if they are part of the Nag Hammadi collection or, on the other 
hand, as “proto-orthodox” if they are part of the New Testament, the “Apostolic Fathers,” or the “Ante-
Nicene Fathers.” In his excellent Beyond Gnosticism: Myth, Lifestyle, and Society in the School of 
Valentinus, Ismo Dunderberg notes his decision “to drop the term ‘Church Fathers,’ which . . . creates a 
misleading image of a unified, ‘orthodox’ front as opposed to ‘heretical’ Valentinians” (xii). Neither the 
term “Church Fathers” nor the term “Apostolic Fathers” appear in his work. Such a move is noteworthy. 
See Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 2008. 
24 All citations come from Herbert Musurillo, The Acts of the Christian Martyrs (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1972). 
25 Although this chapter presents primarily my own reading of these texts, the idea that facing and 
undergoing martyrdom is tied intimately with self-formation or the development of ethical living is present 
in other scholarly work even when the specific term, “care of the soul/self” is not necessarily used. See, for 
example, an excellent introductory text: Clayton N. Jefford, Reading the Apostolic Fathers: A Student’s 
Introduction (2d ed.; Grand Rapids, Baker Academic, 2012), xxv. See also Nicole Kelley, “Philosophy as 
Training for Death: Reading the Ancient Christian Martyr Acts as Spiritual Exercises,” CH 75:4 (2006): 
723–47. Candida R. Moss also notes the emphasis on self-control on pages 173–74 of The Other Christs: 
Imitating Jesus in Ancient Christian Ideologies of Martyrdom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010): 
“The martyrs speak the words of the dying Christ and physically embody his self control . . . .The image of 
Christ, glimpsed through the cloudy windows of the martyrs, is controlled, stoic, and apathetic. The 
emotional appeals of the agony of Gethsemane are nowhere to be found. Read in the context of persecuted 
communities that valued both suffering and self-control, the stoic Jesus was the most appealing.” In Ancient 
Christian Martyrdom, she also discusses the way in which martyrs were represented in terms of 
philosophical ideals, using Justin as a prime example. On page 81, she remarks: “[t]he narrative 
presentation of the deaths of Christians in a particular and distinctive manner was part of dressing 
Christianity in the trappings of Roman ideology and literary conventions. Styling the martyr as philosopher 
was a way to draw upon cultural values that prized the endurance, calm, and courage of the ethical, 
imperiled philosopher.”  
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ensure one’s eternal health and happiness and the body’s fleshly resurrection. Thus, 
suffering had a purpose—the care of the self in ultimate and eternal terms. This seems to 
be in line with a shift Judith Perkins discusses: from the Greco-Roman philosophical 
belief that the rational mind could control the body to a focus on the body itself as in pain 
and need of care.26
1 Clement 
  In turn, we shall examine 1 Clement, the Letters of Ignatius, and both 
the Letter of Polycarp to the Philippians and the Martyrdom of Polycarp for the ways in 
which notions about freedom and self-control appear in characterizations of selves as 
cured of enslaving passions. As we shall see, these notions merge with the representation 
of martyrdom as a sacrifice which imitates Christ’s own. 
 The book27
                                                   
26 Perkins, The Suffering Self, 173. 
 opens with those in Rome addressing the problem of “schism” in the 
church at Corinth (1 Clem. 1.1). Primarily at stake are matters of authority. The author 
27 1 Clement exists in two Greek manuscripts, the eleventh century Codex Hierosolymitanus (or Codex 
Constantinopolitanus) and the fifth-century Codex Alexandrinus (though the latter lacks 57.7–63.4), two 
fourth or fifth century Coptic texts (although one lacks 34.6–42.2 and the other consists only of 1.1–26.2), 
an eleventh century Latin manuscript (probably corrupted in the 800’s or 900’s C.E.  in order to support the 
ecclesiastical authority of the Roman bishop), a twelfth century Syriac copy from a Greek text, and in 
quotations in the Letter of Polycarp (9.2) and by Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Didymus the Blind, 
Jerome, Eusebius, and Jerome. However, the letter was less popular in the West than the East. By medieval 
times, Western theologians had forgotten about it, and even in the East, the letter eventually ceased to be 
used as it emphasized the importance of Rome. Traditionally, scholars attributed the authorship to Clement, 
bishop of Rome, who addresses it to the Corinthian Christians. However, it is crucial to note that the text 
does not actually contain the author’s name and that a single leader probably was not in charge of the 
churches in Rome as early as the end of the first century. Moreover, the text uses “we” and “us” quite 
liberally. Chapter forty-four in particular indicates leadership by a group rather than an individual. The 
style is a combination of a Greek diatribe (in which the author constructs an imaginary dialogue in a 
question-and-answer format and leads the reader to a certain conclusion) and a synagogue homily (in which 
the author starts with a scriptural text and then connects it to other scriptural passages which contain similar 
words and phrases). Most scholars date it between 65–110 C.E.  Probably a Christian leader or leaders in 
Rome wrote it during the reign of Domitian (81–96 C.E.) or possibly a bit earlier during the reign of Nero 
(54–68 C.E.)  Jefford provides a good introduction and overview in Reading the Apostolic Fathers, 103–21. 
See also Holmes, Apostolic Fathers, 33–43; Andrew Gregory, “1 Clement: An Introduction,” in Writings of 
the Apostolic Fathers (ed. Paul Foster; London: T&T Clark, 2007), 21–31. 
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emphasizes the importance of humility and submissiveness, and the way in which one 
demonstrates having them is by respect for hierarchy—that of the bishop and leaders in 
the line of the Roman apostolic succession. Interestingly, the writer frames the schism as 
the result of improper control of unruly emotions, particularly an excess of jealousy (1 
Clem. 3.2). Jealousy is characterized as leading to death (1 Clem. 9.1). Thus, Stoic 
notions regarding a need for therapy of the emotions28 seem to be in play.29
 In descriptions of the martyrdoms of Peter and Paul, the author depicts these two 
apostles as the particular targets of jealousy and as exemplifying the very antithesis of 
those who are subject to it. Consider the following passage: 
   
Let us consider the noble examples that belong to our own generation. Because of 
jealousy and envy the greatest and most righteous pillars were persecuted and 
fought to the death. Let us set before our eyes the good apostles. There was Peter, 
who because of unrighteous jealousy endured not one or two but many trials, and 
                                                   
28 Michael Holmes notes the prominence of Stoic influence in 1 Clement on page 37 of his introduction as 
does Andrew Gregory on page 30 of “1 Clement: An Introduction.” See also Jefford, Reading the Apostolic 
Fathers, especially 103–21. He explains that maintaining order in the Christian community is a strong 
emphasis of the text and that the author(s) explicate this theme using Stoic concepts of cosmology. 
Moreover, two images popular in Stoic texts appear.  One is the phoenix, and the other is the Roman army 
(invoked as a model for proper behavior). Jefford also explains that some argue for a strong Jewish 
influence on the text as well.  
29 Interestingly, in 4.1–13, the author gives a genealogy of biblical characters said to be consumed by 
“jealousy.”  The very first figure named is Cain. Thus, it is interesting to think of the possible allusions 
being made when later heresiologists brand certain “Gnostics” as Cainites and accuse them of thinking of 
Cain as a positive figure and as one of their ancestors. If, indeed, such heresiologists conceive of 
“Gnostics” as exuding the “jealousy” which leads to a lack of recognition of the authority of those claiming 
apostolic succession (perhaps due to their conducting meetings, services, rituals, or educational sessions 
without the bishop present), labeling them “Cainites” might well be a discursive strategy denoting their 
emotional state rather than a literal description of their origins. Such discursive strategies also seem to be at 
work in grouping a variety of early Christian groups together as “Gnostics” descended from Simon Magus. 
Such is the accusation of Irenaeus (Haer., Preface, Book II). It is amazing how often this is referred to as 
the description of a literal statement of origins in modern history of Christianity texts. If we look at texts 
such as the Apocryphal Acts of the Apostles, particularly the Acts of Peter, in which the contest between 
Simon Peter and Simon Magus clearly reveals debates about who has been given authority to speak and act 
for God (see Judith Perkins’ excellent analysis in chapter five of The Suffering Self), one wonders if 
Irenaeus is discursively signaling that all those who criticize the apostles are “descendants” of Simon 
Magus. April DeConick also discusses this possibility. See pp. 100–103 of The Thirteenth Apostle: What 
the Gospel of Judas Really Says (New York: Continuum, 2007).  
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thus having given his testimony went to his appointed place of glory. Because of 
jealousy and strife Paul showed the way to the prize for patient endurance. After 
he had been seven times in chains, had been driven into exile, had been stoned, 
and had preached in the east and the west, he won the genuine glory for his 
faith . . . . Finally, when he had given his testimony before the rulers, he thus 
departed from the world and went to the holy place, having become an 
outstanding example of patient endurance (1 Clem. 5.1–7). 
Here the writer does not directly discuss details of the martyrdoms of Peter and Paul 
themselves but rather simply refers to them as events with which the readers would be 
familiar, merely stating that they have “given witness/testimony” and then gone on to 
their rewards (5.7).30  Interestingly, what the author notes about their faithful witness is 
not their imitation of Christ or an association with atonement but rather the fact that they 
“patiently endured.”  Thus, the author describes them in terms of facing suffering and 
persecution with the proper attitudes or emotions.31
                                                   
30 The phrase used contains the same root as that in the noun, “martyr” thus we see an early usage of the 
linking of “witnessing” and “martyrdom.”  As explained in chapter one, the very definition of a “martyr” is 
a “witness.” 
 It is as though the suffering they face 
enables them to practice the therapy of the emotions and actually become the kinds of 
selves who demonstrate properly “cured” passions. The writer does not describe their 
witness in dramatic terms; there is no sense of spectacle involved. Rather, the manner in 
which they face suffering exemplifies the attitude of one who is taking care of the self 
properly while maintaining self-control and exercising restraint through “patient 
endurance.”  Simultaneously, the author reminds those who are not able to subdue their 
passions of the witness of Peter and Paul as persons who were in control, which, in turn, 
prompts the reader to remember their authority as apostles. Over and over, the readers of 
31 Candida R. Moss also discusses this point. See Moss, Other Christs, 102. While she discusses the wide 
range of positive qualities associated with martyrdom (105), she notes that “faithfulness” and “endurance” 
are the virtues which authors representing martyrdom as a model for virtue most commonly encourage their 
readers to imitate (108). 
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the text (or those listening to it being read) receive exhortations to proper behavior: 
kindness, gentleness, and peacefulness like that exhibited by the apostles (1 Clem.13, 14). 
In fact, the ultimate desired goal for the church is “peace” (19.2).32
 Christ is also lifted up as an example of a “pattern” to “imitate” (1 Clem. 16.7, 
33.8), and this involves modeling oneself on his example in terms of one’s emotions and 
attitudes (1 Clem. 17.1). The author emphasizes that the proper sacrifice is that of a 
“broken spirit” (1 Clem. 52.4) rather than a “burnt offering” (1 Clem. 18.16–17). 
Conceivably, this writer is advocating following Christ in terms of imitating him with 
respect to notions of the therapy of the emotions.
   
33
 At the same, time, however, there is language of sacrifice (as noted just above).  1 
Clement does represent Christ’s death as an atoning sacrifice which can mediate in the 
lives of those who practice repentance:  
  Likewise, the author describes God in 
terms consonant with the therapy of emotions as one who is “patient” and “free of 
anger”:  “Let us observe [God] with our mind, and let us look with the eyes of the soul on 
his patient will. Let us note how free from anger he is toward all his creation (19.3). 
Wash and be clean; remove the wickedness from your souls out of my sight. Put 
an end to your wickedness; learn to do good; seek out justice; deliver the one who 
is wronged; give judgment on behalf of the orphan, and grant justice to the widow. 
And come, let us reason together, he says: even if your sins are as crimson, I will 
make them white as snow, and if they are as scarlet, I will make them white as 
wool (1 Clem. 8.4). 
                                                   
32 Jefford notes the importance of this theme and its Jewish context in Reading the Apostolic Fathers, 111. 
The language of “patient endurance” here is similar to that of Seneca in Prov 4.12–13. 
33 For a thorough, nuanced discussion of the way that imitatio Christi functions in texts related to 
martyrdom, see Moss, Other Christs, 2010). Pages 105–109, 253–55 are especially relevant in discussing 
martyrdoms as models or “embodiments of Christian virtues” (105). For discussion of Ignatius, see Moss, 
Other Christs, 41–44, 224–25. 
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Moss comments: “These texts present us with a view of Christ’s death as spiritual 
detergent, as an expiatory sacrifice, that washed away sin.”34  She later comments on the 
way in which texts mingle and interweave concepts of martyrdom as sacrifice, 
martyrdom as a victory over Satan (a Christus Victor theory of atonement),35 and 
martyrdom as a model of virtue which Christians can imitate (this third being what 
Foucault discusses as “the care of the soul.”36
Through attachment to the death of Jesus, suffering and death become inherently 
‘good,’ even becoming a form of ‘salvation.’ The view that Christ’s death 
provides a model of salvation is a common one both in the acta and patristic 
literature. What is striking about this statement is that imitating the Jesus model 
entails only suffering and death, not a set of moral values. Strange and alien 
though this concept is to modern ears, at its core the model exemplified in Christ 
encouraged one thing: suffering.
  Such intermingling sets up suffering as a 
good.  As she goes on to say:  
37
                                                   
34 Moss, Other Christs, 80. 
 
35 Gustaf Aulén discusses this theme in detail in Christus Victor: An Historical Study of the Three Main 
Types of the Idea of Atonement (New York: Macmillan, 1966) (based on lectures Dr. Aulén gave in 1930). 
In the texts discussed in this dissertation, we will first see an example of this in the Martyrdom of Polycarp, 
but it is also conceivably present in the Apocalypse of Peter, the Gospel of Judas, and quite prominent in 
the Passion of Perpetua and Felicity. 
36 Moss, Other Christs, 102. 
37 Moss, Other Christs, 105. 
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Letters of Ignatius 
 Traditionally thought to be epistles that Ignatius38 wrote to various churches while 
being taken to Rome by soldiers to be executed, the tone of the Letters of Ignatius39
                                                   
38 The dating of both the life of Ignatius and the letters themselves remains contested. Eusebius refers to 
Ignatius being the bishop of Antioch during the time that Trajan was emperor (98–117 C.E.) (Eccl hist. 
3.21–22), and this date has been cited repeatedly in commentaries. For a good, modern translation of 
Eusebius’ work, see Paul L. Maier, trans. Eusebius: The Church History (Grand Rapids: Kregel, 2007). 
However, in 1979, Robert Joly seriously questioned this dating: Robert Joly, Le dossier d’Ignace 
d’Antioche (Brussels: Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 1979). Since then, others have followed suit. 
They date the life and letters attributed to Ignatius to a much later date during the reign of Marcus Aurelius 
(161–180 C.E.)  Most recently, Timothy D. Barnes has dated the letters to an intermediate period during the 
reign of Antoninus Pius (138–161 C.E.), arguing that Ignatius used phrasing found in Ptolemaeus, a disciple 
of Valentinus. Barnes cites Adolf Harnack’s dating of the letters to a time between the reigns of Trajan and 
Marcus Aurelius—to the time of the Emperor Hadrian (117–138 C.E.). See Timothy D. Barnes, “The Date 
of Ignatius,” Expository Times 120 (2009): 119–30; Timothy D. Barnes, Early Christian Hagiography and 
Roman History (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010). However, Candida R. Moss questions Barnes’ central 
argument in “The Date of Ignatius” regarding Ignatius’ knowledge of Ptolemaeus writings in her own 
excellent explanation of the textual complexities and dating difficulties in Ancient Christian Martyrdom, 
52–57, 178–80, arguing that the term Barnes places so much emphasis upon for his dating is also used 
elsewhere, 178, n. 2. See also Moss, Other Christs, 41–44, 224–25. For excellent commentary on the 
Letters of Ignatius as a whole, see William R. Schoedel, Ignatius of Antioch: A Commentary on the Letters 
of Ignatius of Antioch. Hermeneia: A Critical and Historical Commentary on the Bible (ed. Helmut 
Koester; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985). See also William R. Schoedel, “Are the Letters of Ignatius of 
Antioch Authentic?” RelSRev 6 (1980) 196–201. For a good introduction, see Michael Holmes, Apostolic 
Fathers, 166–81; Jefford, Reading the Apostolic Fathers, 44–62. Ross Shepard Kraemer, too, notes the 
difficulty in dating the Letters of Ignatius including certain feminist considerations in Her Share of the 
Blessings: Women’s Religions among Pagans, Jews, and Christians in the Greco-Roman World (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 188, n.92, 245–46. 
 
39 The textual history is quite complex as the letters exist in three recensions: Long, Middle, and Short. The 
Long Recension actually contains thirteen letters, but scholars only consider the seven mentioned by 
Eusebius authentic. In 1637, James Ussher wrote a letter to Samuel Ward discussing the fact that he had 
uncovered a Latin version of what is now called the Middle Recension in the library at Cambridge. It 
contains only the letters to the churches in Ephesus, Magnesia, Tralles, Philadelphia, and Smyrna, and the 
Letter to Polycarp, all actually listed by Eusebius (Eccl hist. 3.36). However, Usher did not initially publish 
an edition of this until 1644 as he realized that a Greek copy existed in the Codex Mediceo Laurentianus 57, 
7 in the Medicean Library in Florence dating to the eleventh century. He wanted to see this first but was 
unable to obtain it, so he published an edition of the Latin copy in 1644. An edition of the Greek copy in 
Florence was first published by Isaac Voss in 1646: Epistolae genuinae S. Ignatii martyris; quae nunc 
primum lucem vident ex bibliotheca Florentina (Amsterdam: Blaev, 1646). Portions of the Middle 
Recension also exist in Greek papyrus fragments and in Latin, Syriac, Armenian, Arabic, and Coptic. John 
Pearson established the authenticity of the Middle Recension, including the Letter to the Romans, to the 
satisfaction of scholars who had previously bitterly debated whether the Long or Middle Recension should 
be considered the most authentic in 1671 for various political reasons (largely having to do with 
Reformation debates over the degree of authority that bishops enjoyed in the early centuries of Christianity). 
However, the Codex Laurentianus does not contain the Letter to the Romans. This was published in an 
edition of the Letters of Ignatius by Thierry Ruinart in 1689 from the Codex Parisiensis–Colbertinus 1450 
which dates to the tenth century: Therry Ruinart, Acta primorum martyrum sincera et selecta (Paris: 
Muguet, 1689). Later, in 1845, William Cureton found and published a Syriac version of the letters, which 
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provides a striking contrast.40 The tone and rhetorical style that dominates the epistles is 
that of Asianism. This kind of writing is characterized by a certain floridity and 
colorfulness.41
In the Letter of the Ephesians, Ignatius states that it is his hoped-for success as a 
martyr that will allow him to become a disciple (Eph. 1.2).
 However, these classic texts provide clear examples of the meaning of 
martyrdom for the proto-orthodox and the way it is being shaped discursively as a kind of 
care of the self.  
42
                                                                                                                                                       
is referred to as the Short Recension, containing only abridged versions of the Letter to Polycarp, the Letter 
to the Ephesians, the Letter to the Romans and a single paragraph of the Letter to the Trallians. Cureton 
challenged the authenticity of the Middle Recension, arguing that the Short Recension was the oldest. See 
William Cureton, The Ancient Syriac Versions of the Epistles of Saint Ignatius to St. Polycarp, the 
Ephesians and the Romans  (London: Rivington, 1845). However, Theodor Zahn and Joseph Barber 
Lightfoot re-established the authenticity of the Middle Recension to the satisfaction of all in 1873 and 1889. 
See Theodor Zahn, Ignatius von Antiochien (Gotha: Friedrich Andreas Perthes, 1873); Joseph B. Lightfoot, 
The Apostolic Fathers 2.1 (London: Macmillan,1889), 70–430. The stemma in Helmut Koester, History 
and Literature of Early Christianity. vol. 2 (New York: DeGruyter, 2000), 57 shows the way in which the 
manuscript tradition has been transmitted. In this summary of a complex transmission process, I am 
indebted to Timothy D. Barnes, “The Date of Ignatius,”119–30; Moss, Ancient Christian Martyrdom, 52–
57, 178–80. 
 In other words, this is what 
40 Here Candida Moss’s note on the use of texts which come from different geographic and social contexts 
is worth remembering. She discusses the fact that social networks and various kinds of interaction existed 
across the Roman Empire. Thus, while it is important to pay attention to variation in attitudes and practices 
in particular geographic contexts, communication and a sharing of ideas across regional borders was also 
taking place: Moss, Ancient Christian Martyrdom, 20–21, 173. 
41 Holmes, Apostolic Fathers, 174. Some scholars characterize it more harshly. Schodel refers to Norden’s 
characterizing of this style as one that “violates the language” although Schoedel also mentions Perler’s 
discussion of Ignatius’ work as marked by “unusual diction and poetic color” in “the expression of pathos.” 
See Schoedel, Ignatius of Antioch, 7–8. Helmut Koester simply refers to Ignatius’ style as “bombastic,” 
saying that it “invite[s] the reader into a realm of religious experience rather than rational reflection. See 
Koester, History and Literature, 285–86. 
42 Some scholars argue that Ignatius’ desire for death is pathological. See Donald W. Riddle, The Martyrs: 
A Study in Social Control (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931); De Ste. Croix, Christian 
Persecution, 133; Perkins, Suffering Self, 33; Bowersock, Martyrdom and Rome, 6–7; Frend, Martyrdom 
and Persecution, 197. See also the discussion in Moss, Ancient Christian Martyrdom, 6–8, 49–52, 165–66, 
170–71, 178–79, 202–03 warning scholars against too easily conceiving of martyrdom in this way.  A 
recent dissertation by Jennifer Garcia Bashaw contrasting the Letters of Ignatius with the Gospel of 
Matthew also ascribes a negative value to Ignatius’ longing for suffering.  Garcia Bashaw argues that 
Ignatius’ texts “document his captivity to the cycle of sacred violence, the very myth that Matthew’s 
Gospel works to counter. A Girardian analysis of Matthew reveals that his Gospel establishes Jesus as the 
scapegoat to end all scapegoats, thus releasing humanity from the perpetual cycle of sacred violence. 
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will allow the complete formation of his identity as a truly Christian self. He clearly feels 
that he has not yet attained this status. Paradoxically casting his impending death as 
“success,” he states,  
For when you heard that I was on my way from Syria in chains for the sake of our 
shared name and hope, and was hoping through your prayers to succeed in 
fighting with wild beasts in Rome—in order that by so succeeding I might be able 
to be a disciple—you hurried to visit me (1.2).  
A little later on, he says,  
For even though I am in chains for the sake of the Name, I have not yet been 
perfected in Jesus Christ. For now I am only beginning to be a disciple, and I 
speak to you as my fellow students. For I need to be trained by you in faith, 
instruction, endurance, and patience (3.1).43
 The theme continues as Ignatius repeatedly implies that successfully facing and 
enduring martyrdom, rather than apostatizing, will lead to true discipleship. In other 
words, performing an operation on the body which requires grueling endurance allows 
one to become a perfected self. Ignatius makes use of an interesting analogy, referring to 
his chains as “spiritual pearls” (11.2). Here the value of suffering is clear. Just as there 
are irritants that produce something of worth and beauty, a pearl, so his chains will be the 
means of his spiritual perfection. This is true only, of course, if he is successful in 
persevering to the end (Eph. 14.2). Moreover, just as the author of 1 Clement refers to 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
Ignatius’ letters, however, when viewed through a Girardian lens, demonstrate that Ignatius unwittingly 
reenters that cycle of religious violence by envisioning his own martyrdom as a sacrifice and himself as a 
scapegoat. See pages 54–55 of Jennifer Garcia Bashaw, “Martyrdom and Sacred Violence: Dying for God 
in Matthew and Ignatius” (Ph.D. diss., Fuller Theological Seminary, Center for Advanced Theological 
Study, 2012.)  
43 It is interesting that Ignatius refers to his fellow Christians as “fellow students.” Such phrasing contrasts 
with the kinship language of “brother” and “sister” which is often used in proto-orthodox texts, but it 
suggests the kind of relationship which would have been in effect in a philosophical school where 
understanding how to practice virtues such as “endurance” and “patience”—virtues in accord with the care 
of the soul—would have been a major topic of study. This phrasing in terms of “endurance” and “patience” 
also echoes that of 1 Clement. 
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Christ as a “pattern (16.7, 33.8),” so Ignatius talks about suffering as an imitation of 
Christ’s forbearance toward his persecutors and of his patience and gentleness with them, 
portraying the Savior as one who exercised proper self-control with regard to his 
emotions when he was persecuted. 
 In the Letter to the Trallians and the Letter to the Magnesians, Ignatius briefly 
reiterates these themes. In the former, he talks about his desire to suffer and then speaks 
of his need for “gentleness” in order to be able to do so (Trall. 4.1). Likewise, in the latter, 
Ignatius states reaching God is possible for those who “patiently endure all the abuse of 
the ruler of this age and escape” (Magn. 1.2). Toward the end of the letter, Ignatius even 
maintains that a desire for death or at least a willingness to die is not just admirable but 
necessary when he says that Christ’s “life is not in us unless we voluntarily choose to die 
into his suffering” (Magn. 5.2). Over and over again, Ignatius frames suffering as a 
means of discipline that allows one to develop proper attitudes and emotions. It is an 
opportunity to engage in such therapy. This practicing of self-control in a manner 
consonant with those who engage in the therapy of emotions is the means of ultimate care 
for one’s eternal self. Those who “patiently endure” are the ones who “may be found to 
be disciples of Jesus Christ” (Magn. 9.1). 
 In his Letter to the Romans, Ignatius mentions these ideas yet again, speaking of 
his impending martyrdom as “an opportunity . . . to reach God” (Rom. 2.1). He implores 
his community to allow him to “be food for the wild beasts . . . . ground by the teeth of 
the wild beasts, so that I may prove to be pure bread” (Rom. 4.1). Simultaneously, 
however, issues of the formation of self-identity are at stake. Ignatius asks the Roman 
Christians to  
 37 
pray that I will have strength both outwardly and inwardly so that I may not just 
talk about it but want to do it, so that I may not merely be called a Christian but 
actually prove to be one. For if I prove to be one, I can also be called one, and 
then I will be faithful when I am no longer visible to the world (emphasis added) 
(Rom. 3.2). 
He says that it is only after he has been martyred that “I will truly be a disciple of Jesus 
Christ, when the world will no longer see my body” (Rom. 4.2). Finally, he says, “I am 
even now still a slave. But if I suffer, I will be a freedman of Jesus Christ and will rise up 
free in him” (Rom. 4.3). Perkins sees this passage similarly as meaning that Ignatius 
actually  
understood his real existence as beginning with his suffering and martyrdom. . . . 
the ‘self’ did not really come into being until it suffered; suffering was not simply 
something that happened to a person. Rather, it was the means of achieving real 
selfhood.44
Likewise, a little later, Ignatius says  
 
 
Bear with me—I know what is best for me. Now at last I am beginning to be a 
disciple. May nothing visible or invisible envy me, so that I may reach Jesus 
Christ. Fire and cross and battles with wild beasts, mutilation, mangling, 
wrenching of bones, the hacking of limbs, the crushing of my whole body, cruel 
tortures of the devil—let these come upon me, only let me reach Jesus Christ 
(Rom. 5.3)!45
Again, in chapter six, he begs and pleads to be allowed to suffer as he refers to death as 
“life” and life in this world as “death”: 
 
Bear with me, brothers and sisters: do not keep me from living; do not desire my 
death. Do not give to the world one who wants to belong to God or tempt him 
with material things. Let me receive the pure light, for when I arrive there I will 
be a human being. Allow me to be an imitator of the suffering of my God. If 
                                                   
44 Perkins, The Suffering Self, 190–191. See also Moss, Ancient Christian Martyrdom, 56, 179–80; Koester, 
History and Literature, 290. 
45 Carole Straw discusses the way in which Ignatius is alluding to a gladiator’s oath in this passage on 
pages 45–46 of “‘A Very Special Death’: Christian Martyrdom in Its Classical Context,” in Margaret 
Cormack, ed., Sacrificing the Self: Perspectives on Martyrdom and Religion (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001), 39–57.  
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anyone has him within, let that person understand what I long for and sympathize 
with me, knowing what constrains me (Rom. 6.2–3). 
In fact, Ignatius even says that he is “in love with death” (Rom. 7.2). 
 
 In the Letter to the Philadelphians, Ignatius also talks about not yet being perfect:  
 
My brothers and sisters, I am overflowing with love for you, and greatly rejoice as 
I watch out for your safety—yet not I, but Jesus Christ. Though I am in chains for 
his sake, I am all the more afraid, because I am still imperfect (Phld. 5.1). 
 In the Letter to the Trallians, Ignatius again alludes to the idea that a certain 
practice—that of suffering—is the way in which he can fully achieve a sense of self-
identity as a disciple of Christ. He actually contrasts the kind of self-care that suffering 
enables as opposed to that which mere comprehension “of heavenly things” allows. He 
claims that the latter does not make him a disciple; it is suffering that does (Trall. 5.2).  
 Finally, in the Letter to Polycarp, Ignatius repeats this theme once again. Ignatius 
mentions that he has learned that there is peace in his church at Antioch and says that he 
has “become more encouraged in a God-given freedom from anxiety—provided, of 
course, that through suffering I reach God, so that I may prove to be a disciple by means 
of your prayer” (Pol. 7.1) (emphasis added).46
 In Martyrdom and Memory, Elizabeth Castelli examines the Letters of Ignatius 




                                                   
46 Candida Moss nicely captures the way in which endurance and suffering serve as a process for self-
formation when she says, “Patient endurance and righteous suffering became part of a set of Christly moral 
virtues that early Christians were exhorted to emulate.  Suffering as Christological imitation was not just a 
passive interpretive move; it was an active practice to which Christians were constantly encouraged.” See 
Moss, Other Christs, 20. 
 linking the achieving of selfhood specifically to the technology of the self 
47 Castelli, Martyrdom and Memory, 85. 
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which Foucault terms “the technology of self-writing.”48 She discusses the way in which 
Ignatius emphasizes the on-going process of his spiritual transformation as a process of 
“attaining God or Christ”: “Ignatius’s preparation for martyrdom is a spiritual exercise in 
focusing his wants and gaining control over his desires. It is, in essence, a form of askesis 
avant le letter.”49 In short, the self that he is crafting through language is located “at the 
place where language and the body intersect.”50
Robin Darling Young also discusses the function of letter-writing in the formation 
of collective Christian identity:  
  
Those in training to become martyrs are shaped by the letters of people who have 
previously trained for and thought about this contest. . . . Certainly those 
Christians who joined this apostolic tradition of witness knew that their 
testimonies and deaths would be written about and that these accounts would be 
circulated. But the training went further than that. Because martyrs bore the name 
of Christ, they were themselves like letters meant to be read by the community 
and the world, letters from Christ that were recognizably like Christ (emphasis 
added).51
                                                   
48 Foucault, “L’écriture de soi,” 207–22. 
  
49 Castelli, Martyrdom and Memory, 82. 
50 Castelli, Martyrdom and Memory, 85. Castelli discusses the fact that Foucault did not discuss martyrdom 
in terms of the care of the self, focusing on Christian asceticism in the fourth and fifth centuries instead.  
However, Castelli argues that “techniques of self-formation” are “also very much on display” in “second- 
and third-century texts related to Christian martyrdom” (71).  It is actually hard to know the full extent of 
Foucault’s thought on these matters as he was planning to publish a fourth volume in his History of 
Sexuality series, Confessions of the Flesh, exploring the history of the early Christianities in greater detail.  
Unfortunately, he died before it could be published, asking that it never appear in print. See page 2, note 6 
of Jeremy R. Carrette, “Prologue to a Confession of the Flesh,” in Jeremy R. Carrette, Religion and 
Culture: Michel Foucault (New York: Routledge, 1999); Bernauer, Michel Foucault’s Force of Flight, 160.  
51 Robin Darling Young, In Procession Before the World: Martyrdom as Public Liturgy in Early 
Christianity (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2001), 9–10. 
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At the same time, the Letters of Ignatius emphasize martyrdom as an imitation of 
Christ’s sacrifice.52
My spirit is a humble sacrifice for the cross, which is a stumbling block to 
unbelievers but salvation and eternal life to us.  . . . For our God, Jesus the Christ, 
was . . . . born and baptized in order that by his suffering he might cleanse the 
water (Eph. 18.1–2).  
 Moss carefully points out that this is only one of the ways martyrdom 
is represented in the Apostolic Fathers and martyr acts themselves; yet, the idea that 
Christ died as a sacrifice is most definitely present. In the Letter to the Ephesians, for 
example, Ignatius addresses his audience by saying: “Being imitators of God, once you 
took on new life through the blood of God you completed perfectly the task so natural to 
you” (Eph. 1.1). A little later, Ignatius tells the Ephesian church: “I am a humble sacrifice 
for you and I dedicate myself to you” (Eph. 8.1). Near the end of the letter, he says,  
In the Letter to the Romans, he begs the readers: “Grant me nothing more than to be 
poured out as an offering to God while there is still an altar ready” (Rom. 2.2).  
Polycarp 
 The themes common in 1 Clement and the Letters of Ignatius also appear in the 
two texts of the Apostolic Fathers related to Polycarp, the Letter of Polycarp to the 
Philippians and the Martyrdom of Polycarp. Polycarp has traditionally been thought to 
                                                   
52 Several scholars explore this idea in depth: Frances M. Young, Sacrifice and the Death of Christ 
(Philadelphia: Westminster, 1975); Frances M. Young, The Use of Sacrificial Ideas in Greek Christian 
Writers from the New Testament to John Chrysostom, Patristic Monograph Series 5 (Cambridge, Mass: 
Philadelphia Patristic Foundation, 1979); Robert J. Daly, Christian Sacrifice: The Judaeo-Christian 
Background before Origen (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1978); Robert J. 
Daly, The Origins of the Christian Doctrine of Sacrifice (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1978); Castelli, 
Martyrdom and Memory, 51. See Moss, Other Christs, 77–87 for an excellent summary of the function of 
sacrifice in martyr acts specifically. For explication of the wide variety of ways in which sacrifice functions, 
see Daniel C. Ullucci, The Christian Rejection of Animal Sacrifice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012); Karen King, “Martyrdom among the Heretics” (paper presented at the annual meeting of the SBL, 
Chicago, November 19, 2012). This paper was part of a session on “Redescribing the Discourses of 
Sacrifice and Martyrdom in Early Christian Cultural Formation.” 
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have been the bishop of Smyrna in the mid-2nd century  C.E. and to have been martyred 
circa 155–160. Ignatius actually mentions Polycarp in his own letters: Letter to the 
Ephesians (21.1) and Letter to the Magnesians (15.1) and writes an entire letter to him as 
mentioned above. Polycarp also refers to Ignatius and his letters, mentioning that he is 
passing the letters of Ignatius that he has received on to the Philippians for their own 
encouragement (Pol. Phil. 13.1–2).  
Letter of Polycarp to the Philippians  
 The Letter of Polycarp to the Philippians53 clearly depicts martyrs in a favorable 
way as Polycarp immediately commends the Philippians for “help[ing] on their way those 
confined by chains suitable for saints” (Pol. Phil. 1.1) and exhorts the Philippians to 
follow God faithfully, reminding them that “the Lord said . . . ‘blessed are the poor and 
those who are persecuted for righteousness’ sake, for theirs is the kingdom of God” (Pol. 
Phil. 2.3). Later, the narrator depicts martyrs in a manner similar to that in 1 Clement, as 
those who “exercise[d] unlimited endurance” (Pol. Phil. 9.1–2). This and the frequent 
calls for “self-control” are quite reminiscent of 1 Clement.54
                                                   
53 There is only one existing text of this epistle which is complete, a Latin manuscript.  However, parts of 
the letter exist in nine Greek manuscripts, in Eusebius’ Ecclesiastical History, and in Syriac fragments.  See 
Jefford, Reading the Apostolic Fathers, 73–85; one of the main textual issues revolves around whether the 
extant manuscripts are actually a combination of two separate letters.  See pages 60–62 of Michael W, 
Holmes, “Polycarp of Smyrna, Letter to the Philippians,” Expository Times 118.2 (2006), 53–63. 
  Moreover, such 
“endurance” is attributed to Paul and the apostles as well as the martyrs Ignatius, 
Zosimus, and Rufus. In particular, Polycarp mentions that the Letters of Ignatius, which 
he is attaching to his own letter, will be of “great benefit . . . for they deal with faith and 
54 Michael W. Holmes notes that “Polycarp seems to be particularly familiar with 1 Peter and 1 Clement,” 
273. Jefford notes familiarity or access to the Gospel of Matthew and 1 Clement, Reading the Apostolic 
Fathers, 82. 
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patient endurance and every kind of spiritual growth that has to do with our Lord” (Pol. 
Phil. 14.2). Such phrasing resonates with the overtones of the kind of technologies of self 
associated with the care of the soul.55
 Michael Holmes has analyzed this emphasis on behavior and practicing virtue 
rather than doctrine per se: 
 
This understanding of the letter makes sense of the way Polycarp stresses so 
strongly the behavioural aspects of what is usually viewed as a purely 
“theological” concept, i.e. “righteousness”. For him, orthopraxy is the other side 
of the coin of orthodoxy; if the community is behaving properly, it is also likely 
believing properly. This position may explain the vigour with which he reinforces 
(what he thinks should be) the community’s sense of behavioural norms and 
standards throughout the letter.56
Stanley K. Stowers has written extensively on the role that letter-writing played in 
advocating ethical ideals in antiquity.  He notes that a letter like that of Polycarp’s 
provides a “model of what it means to be a good person in a certain role” and “attempts 




                                                   
55 Jefford also notes the ethical emphasis, Reading the Apostolic Fathers, 80. 
 
56 See Holmes, “Polycarp of Smyrna,” 57. For more regarding the function of the epistle as paraenesis, or 
moral exhortation, see also Harry O. Maier, “Purity and Danger in Polycarp’s Epistle to the Philippians: 
The Sin of Valens in Social Perspective,” JECS I (1993), 229–47.  Holmes analyzes the strengths and 
weaknesses of this argument: Holmes, “Polycarp of Smyrna,” 56–57. 
57 Stanley K. Stowers, Letter-Writing in Greco-Roman Antiquity (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986), 94. See 
also Holmes’ discussion in “Polycarp of Smyrna,” 54. 
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Martyrdom of Polycarp 
The Martyrdom of Polycarp58 is the only martyr account59
                                                   
58 The Martyrdom of Polycarp is considered to be the first of the acts of the martyrs although its 
provenance and dating have proven hard to establish. The many textual variants have provoked 
considerable scholarly debate. For discussion of these, see pages 3–42 of Boudewijn Dehandschutter and 
Johan Leemans, Polycarpiana: Studies on Martyrdom and Persecution in Early Christianity (Leuven: 
Leuven University Press, 2007). Although the text is well-attested in seven Greek manuscripts (including 
the Codex Hierosolymitanus of Jerusalem and the Codex Mosquensis) and one Latin one as well all of 
these sources date from the tenth to the thirteenth centuries. Moreover, the text claims that the account of 
Polycarp’s arrest and execution have been written down by an eyewitness to the latter. However, narration 
in the first person is not consistent throughout the account. In 15.1, for example, the plural pronoun “we” is 
used, indicating that the text may have been the work of more than one author. It is important not to 
confuse the date of the martyrdom itself with the date of the composition of the martyr account. Scholars 
have tended to assume that the original version was written close to the time of Polycarp’s actual death 
(sometime between 155–180 C.E.  as indicated by references to Statius Quadratus and Philip the Asiarch 
and by Eusebius’ placing it in this period), but there is actually no external evidence for dating the writing 
of the account to the same time as the event itself. In fact, there are certain literary qualities which have led 
some scholars to place it considerably later. Among the various manuscripts, we find two basic versions of 
the martyrdom, an account attributed to Pseudo-Pionius and that of Eusebius (Eccl hist. 4:15), the latter 
dated to 324–325 C.E.  Hans von Campenhausen has noted the possibility of four stages of redaction 
between Eusebius’s account and that of the account in Pseudo-Pionius. See Hans von Campenhausen, 
“Bearbeitungen und Interpolationen des Polykarpmartyrium,” in Aus der Frühzeit des Christentums: 
Studien zur Kirchengeschichte des ersten und zweiten Jahrhunderts (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1963), 253–
301. His analysis has stimulated both intense admiration and fierce criticism. For the latter, see pages 510–
11 of Timothy D. Barnes, “Pre-Decian Acta Martyrum,” JTS 19 (1968): 509–31.  
 per se included in the 
works of the Apostolic Fathers. Moreover, scholars have long considered it the oldest 
martyrdom account outside the New Testament although Moss compellingly argues for a 
59 Moss also urges us to consider the variety of contexts in which such a text may have functioned: 
“liturgical, catechetical, intra-ecclesial, pedagogical, apologetic, and heresiological” and to remember that 
even within any one of these contexts, a text can function in multiple ways.  The very fact that a martyrdom 
account could serve a heresiological function is an important one to note. Moss, Other Christs, 17, 210, n. 
61. Traditionally, scholars doing research on the differences between “orthodoxy” and “heresy” have relied 
primarily on treatises such as Ignatius’ Adversus Haereses (Against Heresies). Moss’s point accords well 
with Foucault’s use of multiple genres in researching any issue.  Including those genres ignored by 
previous scholars may shed tremendous light on a subject especially regarding the way in which it is 
represented and perceived in a particular social context.  Later, Moss is at pains to argue for what 
martyrdom texts can teach us about the way Christianity was being practiced and to deconstruct the 
labeling of such texts as “Kleinliteratur” written only for the masses, a designation used by Franz Overbeck 
and Adolf Deissmann. She also helpfully points us to Harry Y. Gamble, Books and Readers in the Early 
Church: A History of Early Christian Texts (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1995). Her work 
dispels the notion that martyr acts “represent the tawdry underbelly of Christian literature.” See Moss, 
Other Christs, 45, 225, n.1.  
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possible later date.60 Scholars repeatedly note its high quality as literature and defend its 
authenticity. The writer has discursively shaped it to parallel that of Jesus’ own death in 
order for it to be “in accord with the gospel” (Mart. Pol., 1.1). For example, the name of 
the captain of the police who arrests Polycarp is Herod (Mart. Pol., 6.2); Polycarp sits on 
a donkey (Mart. Pol., 8.1) to be taken before the official who will condemn him just as 
Christ entered Jerusalem on a donkey, and Polycarp also hears a “voice from heaven” 
(Mart. Pol., 9.1) just as Christ did at his baptism. He is also very kind toward his 
persecutors, inviting them to eat a meal and praying for them when they come to arrest 
him (Mart. Pol., 7.2–3).61
                                                   
60 Moss incisively summarizes the reasons for questioning the integrity, dating, and authenticity of the 
account, pointing instead to its elegance as a literary text. Certain elements are not historically plausible. As 
just one example, Polycarp’s trial occurs in an amphitheater rather than a judicial basilica. Such was not 
normal legal precedent. The text also explicitly condemns voluntary martyrdom, carefully contrasting 
Polycarp’s flight from persecution with that of Quintus, a man who presents himself to the Roman 
authorities but demonstrates cowardice when he actually faces the beasts. As noted above, criticism of 
seeking martyrdom became particularly pronounced in the conflict between the Catholics and the Donatists, 
and such a direct criticism of the practice leads some to date the text as late as the mid-third century C.E: 
Moss, Ancient Christian Martyrdom, 62, 181. Scholars also use the fact that the text shows evidence of 
well-developed ideas about a martyr’s function and status, ideas consonant with those at a time when the 
cult of the saints was more solidly in place, to support this later dating. For general discussion of these 
issues, see Jefford, Reading the Apostolic Fathers, 87–101; Moss, Ancient Christian Martyrdom, 57–76, 
180–85; Moss, Other Christs, 57, 231, n.60, 196–98. 
  Clearly, these elements are in keeping with a martyrdom 
account that the author is shaping to represent Polycarp as a Christ-like figure rather than 
a literal recounting of the story.  
61 For a table listing all of the similarities between the representation of Christ in the New Testament 
gospels and the representation of Polycarp in the martyrdom account, see Jefford, Reading the Apostolic 
Fathers, 97. For in-depth scholarly analysis of parallels between Christ’s passion and Polycarp’s 
martyrdom, see Boudewijn Dehandschutter, Martyrium Polycarpi: Ein literair-krittisch studie. Biblioteca 
Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium 52 (Leuven: Peeters, 2005), 241–54, and Moss, Other Christs, 
56–69, 231–238. However, see pages 59–63 of Judith Lieu, Image and Reality: The Jews in the World of 
the Christians in the Second Century (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996); Michael W. Holmes, “The 
Martyrdom of Polycarp and the New Testament Passion Narratives,” in Trajectories Through the New 
Testament and the Apostolic Fathers (ed. Andrew F. Gregory and Christopher Tuckett; Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 407–32 for discussion of the difficulty in making intertextual parallels.  
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 The theme of martyrdom as an imitation of Christ’s sacrifice definitely appears as 
well.  At the end of the account, Polycarp looks up toward heaven and prays, “May I be 
received  . . . in your presence today, as a rich and acceptable sacrifice” (14.2).  Moreover, 
the narrator then goes on to represent Polycarp’s body in terms that bring the Eucharist to 
mind—as fragrant, baking bread:  
For the fire, taking the shape of an arch, like the sail of a ship filled by the wind, 
completely surrounded the body of the martyr, and it was there in the middle, not 
like flesh burning but like bread baking or like gold and silver being refined in a 
furnace. For we also perceived a very fragrant aroma, as if it were the scent of 
incense or some other precious spice (15.1–2). 
In this passage, the idea of being refined like pure metal resonates with the idea of 
martyrdom as a process that develops one’s virtuous qualities, and indeed, as in other 
texts of the Apostolic Fathers, the narrator represents martyrdom as a means of 
developing and exhibiting “patient endurance” consonant with self-care (Mart. Pol., 2.2) 
throughout the text.62 In fact, the writer explicitly mentions the fact that Polycarp does 
“not collapse in fright” (Mart. Pol., 12.1) and that he does not need to be nailed to a post 
to prevent him from escaping the fire because he is so in control of his emotions (Mart. 
Pol., 13.3).63 Many scholars note parallels to the noble death of Socrates.64
                                                   
62 Michael Holmes also notes that Polycarp is portrayed in ways that embody Greco-Roman virtues as well 
as Christian ones. See p. 300 of his edition of The Apostolic Fathers.  
 Others note 
63 Jefford also discusses the way in which Polycarp’s martyrdom is represented as a “noble death” as well 
as an example par excellence of an imitation of Christ’s suffering which is “painted against the canvas of 
similar events in the life of Jesus of Nazareth.” See Reading the Apostolic Fathers, 97. The chart of the 
many parallels between Christ and Polycarp on p. 97 clearly demonstrates this. He also discusses the 
representation of these deaths as atoning sacrifices associated with the Eucharist on pages 95–96, and he 
articulates the ways in which the account clearly supports the developing doctrine of the resurrection of the 
flesh on page 99. 
64 See Johannes Geffcken, “Die christlichen Martyrien,” Hermes 45 (1910): 481–505; Christel Butterweck, 
“Martyriumssucht” in der Alten Kirche? Studien zur Darstellung und Deutung frühchristlicher Martyrien. 
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similarities to the literary representation of the binding of Isaac, as scene in which both 
Abraham and Isaac exhibit a virtuous sense of self-control and patience.65
Further Support for Martyrdom as Care of the Soul in Secondary Sources 
 
 The just-published Stoicism in Early Christianity66 provides fascinating insight 
into the ways in which those inhabiting the social and cultural world of the Roman 
Empire in the first two centuries of the Common Era lived in a world pervaded by Stoic 
philosophical ideas and ideals. In the introduction to the text, Thomas Rasimus argues for 
“borderlines”67 between the various pagan philosophies and early Christian and Jewish 
ones (these latter two also being characterized by diverse points of view). Though 
Rasimus does not specifically invoke Boyarin’s term or the hybridity theories of Homi 
Bhabha68 on which such a concept rests, he argues that characterizations of “eclecticism” 
are quite understandable as a Platonist might borrow from a Stoic, a Stoic from a 
Platonist, a Christian from a Stoic, etc.69
 In the one article in the volume related specifically to the ways in which the 
discourse of Stoicism influences representations of martyrdom, Nicola Denzey argues 
   
                                                                                                                                                       
Beiträge zur historischen Theologie 87 (Tübingen: J. C. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1995), 8–22; Gregory E. 
Sterling, “Mors philosophi: The Death of Jesus in Luke,” HTR 94:4 (2001), 383–402. See also discussion 
in Moss, Ancient Christian Martyrdom, 182, n. 47. 
65 Moss, Ancient Christian Martyrdom, 65, 182. 
66 Rasimus, Engberg-Pedersen, and Dunderberg, Stoicism in Early Christianity, 2010. 
67 Daniel Boyarin, Border Lines: The Partitioning of Judaeo-Christianity. Divinations: Rereading Late 
Ancient Religion (ed. Daniel Boyarin, Virginia Burrus, Charlotte Fonrobert, Robert Gregg; Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004). 
68 Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 2004). 
69 Tuomas Rasimus, “Introduction,” in Stoicism in Early Christianity (ed. Tuomas Rasimus, Troels 
Engberg-Pedersen, and Ismo Dunderberg; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2010), 8–10. 
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that early Christian writers represent martyrdom in accord with Stoic ideals of virtue 
regarding freedom from the emotions;70 that is, in terms consonant with the care of the 
soul.71
I argue that Christians pursued a complex relationship with Stoic philosophy, 
rejecting it overtly while nevertheless embracing elements of it in a complicated 
pattern of rebuttals, refutations, and ultimate assimilation of Stoic ideals, even 
while deliberately repudiating them.
 She is careful to qualify the relationship between Stoicism and Christianity in an 
illuminating way:  
72
 With regard to martyrdom specifically, she maintains that it is not merely a 
desperate, counter-cultural or anti-social move, an attempt to subvert the existing society 
or rebel politically.
   
73  In the end, it actually draws on Stoic ideals regarding “noble 
death,” representing martyrdom as a courageous feat that accords with Roman notions of 
social respectability.74
In Roman Stoicism, freedom was attainable—almost ironically—through self-
discipline and self-mastery. Control of the passions ensured the necessary 
  As she notes,  
                                                   
70 Nicola Denzey, “Facing the Beast: Justin, Christian Martyrdom, and Freedom of the Will,” in Stoicism in 
Early Christianity (ed. Tuomas Rasimus, Troels Engberg-Pedersen, and Ismo Dunderberg; Grand Rapids: 
Baker Academic, 2010). 
71 For other articles citing the influence of Stoicism on Christian martyrdom, see David Aune, “Mastery of 
the Passions: Philo, 4 Maccabees, and Early Christianity.”  Pages 125–58 in Hellenization Revisited: 
Shaping a Christian Response within the Greco-Roman World (ed. W. E. Hellerman; Lanham, Md.: 
University Press of America, 1994); Straw, “A Very Special Death,” 39–57. 
72 Denzey, “Facing the Beast,” 177. Moss, too, notes this “complex relationship” and comments: “When 
interpreting their own experiences and crafting their own concept of martyrdom, early Christians adapted, 
transformed, shaped, and subverted existing cultural tropes. Things changed; things stayed the same.” See 
Ancient Christian Martyrdom, 47. 
73 Denzey, “Facing the Beast,” 177, 184. As counter-evidence for Denzey’s own position, she cites many of 
those who conceive of the desire for martyrdom as pathological: Riddle, Martyrs, 1931, De Ste. Croix, 
Christian Persecution, 2006; Frend, Martyrdom and Persecution, 1965, Bowersock, Martyrdom and Rome, 
1995; Robin Lane Fox, Pagans and Christians (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1987). 
74 Denzey, “Facing the Beast,” 177. See also Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 93–101 for discussion of 
philosophy as “training for death.” 
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emotional detachment of the sapiens. . . . Controlling death defines virtus in the 
Roman context; the word virtus itself embraces notions of bravery while facing 
down death with steely emotional control. . . . the death of the Christian martyr 
mirrors or refracts the death of the Stoic philosopher, reduplicating its image 
rather than merely turning away.75
In other words, the practice of welcoming death is one common to both Stoics and proto-
orthodox Christians, and Christians were “participat[ing] in a language whose rules 
Roman Christians did not seek to alter.”
   
76
Denzey notes the way in which this language influenced Justin, the philosopher 
who converted to Christianity and ultimately became a martyr:  
  In other words, Christians may well have been 
subverting and resisting the Roman Empire and demonstrating their allegiance to a 
different community, but they did so using the language spoken by the rulers of the 
Empire. 
It was, above all, the Christians’ preternatural calm and sense of control, of utter 
freedom or lack of participation in a regime they found to be demonic, that Justin 
found the most moving. These living philosophers—not the schoolhouse 
wiseacring of the Platonists, Stoics, Cynics, or Epicureans—inspired Justin to 
face life as a Christian (2 Apol. 12.1). This control of the passions was ‘right 
behavior’ at its most sublime.  
She goes on to note that this total lack of fear in the face of death compelled Justin to 
desire such for himself77
These [were] Stoic virtues, and Christian martyrs aimed to create a potent and 
lasting display of virtuous behavior that their audience would read as such . . . . 
the Christian performance of martyrdom is merely a Christian enactment of 
 and that 
                                                   
75 Denzey, “Facing the Beast,” 183. 
76 Denzey, “Facing the Beast,” 185.  
77 Candida R. Moss also explores the way in which Justin is conceiving of martyrdom in philosophical 
terms.  See chapter three, “Rome: Contesting Philosophy” of Ancient Christian Martyrdom, 77–99, 185–
190. 
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Roman cultural values. That he is moved to “convert” by witnessing Christian 
control of the passions is ironic.78
Denzey points out that the work of Foucault has been generally useful in 
conceiving of martyrdom “as actively participating in a broader discourse of power, 
characterized by resistance to a dominant, hegemonic order.
 
79  She agrees that “resistance 
was indeed power,”80
What is most remarkable to me about Foucault’s work is that it develops Christian 
notions of resistance to Roman power within (emphasis added) the framework of 
Stoic articulations of self. He sees this development not as oppositional, but rather 
as a direct and logical progression; early Christians engaged the same ethical 
problematic that Romans and Greeks before them faced . . . . the ancient sources 
themselves do not need to be massaged to reveal such a provocative mise-en-
place of Christian emotional theory.
 but then says,  
81
In this sense, Denzey seems to be saying that Christian martyrdom is consonant with 
Greco-Roman notion of the care of the soul. She concludes,  
   
Going peacefully to one’s fate was to ultimately accommodate to philosophies of 
self-control, which themselves had Stoic foundations. Thus, to show control in the 
amphitheater was to own and embody deeply ingrained Roman models of 
emotional continence.82
Moss also notes the philosophical framing of martyr narratives:  
 
Narratives about the death of Jesus were used to frame descriptions of the deaths 
of early Christians. The martyrs speak the words of the dying Christ and 
physically embody his self-control. The imitation of Christ in the martyr acts is 
about more than simple repetition. In their presentation of martyrs as Christly 
imitators, the martyr acts construct their own portraits of Christ and 
                                                   
78 Denzey, “Facing the Beast,” 190–91. 
79 Denzey, “Facing the Beast,” 184. 
80 Denzey, “Facing the Beast,” 185. 
81 Denzey, “Facing the Beast,” 185. 
82 Denzey, “Facing the Beast,” 193–94. 
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martyrological ideals. The image of Christ, glimpsed through the cloudy window 
of the martyrs, is controlled, stoic, and apathetic. The emotional appeals of the 
agony of Gethsemane are nowhere to be found. Read in the context of persecuted 
communities that valued both suffering and self-control, the stoic Jesus was the 
most appealing.83
Development of a Collective Identity through the Discourse of Martyrdom 
 
The cultivations of individual selves through the process of facing and enduring 
martyrdom accompanied the formation of a corporate self among the proto-orthodox. In 
fact, Judith Perkins utilizes a discursive, Foucauldian framework to argue that the very 
identity of Christianity (although I would argue that it is the identity only of one 
particular form, that of “proto-orthodoxy”)84 was being established through the 
envisioning of the Christian community as a “suffering self.” She argues that in the moral 
universe of Greco-Roman values, there was no virtue in suffering; therefore, suffering 
epitomized by an ignominious death, a death that allowed the sufferer to transcend the 
established social order and hierarchies of this world for union with Christ, actually 
subverted the moral and political order of the elites who rule this earthly domain.85  In 
her more recent book, Roman Imperial Identities in the Early Christian Era, she also 
argues that through the praise of martyrdom, Christians were discursively delineating 
their very self-definition over and against the Roman status quo, opening “a crack in the 
unity of elite self interest that informed the early empire.”86
                                                   
83 Moss, Other Christs, 173–74.  
 
84 Perkins herself readily agrees. In discussing “Imperial Time Frames” (paper presented at the annual 
meeting of the SBL, Chicago, November 19, 2011), she directly mentioned that she was talking about one 
kind of Christianity in her paper but that there were also many other kinds.  
85 Perkins, The Suffering Self, 15–40. 
86 Perkins, Roman Imperial Identities, 180. 
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Denzey argues for understanding the discourse of martyrdom differently. She 
asserts that martyrdom reflects a conservative social perspective.87  Seemingly, this 
argument is at odds with the one Perkins makes in The Suffering Self. Perkins argues that 
Christian martyrdom is a radical social move that aligns the members of the Christian 
community with each other and, in fact, creates an institution at odds with the values of 
Roman society as a whole. In actuality, both Denzey and Perkins illuminate important 
parts of the way martyrdom is being represented. Perkins may well be right about the 
ways in which the representation of martyrdom help to create a new institution; however, 
the Roman elites are challenged by means of a kind of discourse they can understand—a 
discourse that highlights the virtue of Christians in terms that resonate with Stoic 
sensibilities regarding freedom from the emotions, a virtue attained through proper care 
of the soul. If Rasimus, Engberg-Pedersen, and Dunderberg are correct about the degree 
to which Stoic philosophical ideas permeated the Roman world at the time the early 
Christian martyr acts were being written, it would have been hard for Christians to think 
of presenting themselves in any other way. Such notions were part of the philosophical 
“deep structure” in which they lived.88
                                                   
87 Denzey, “Facing the Beast,” 193–94. 
  In this sense, Denzey’s insights ring true. The 
88 George Tinker and Loring Abeyta regularly present the ideas of Noam Chomsky to their classes at the 
Iliff School of Theology. Chomsky argues that there is a universal grammar wired into the brains of all 
infants which allows them to quickly acquire language. What particular language is acquired depends on 
the social context the infant inhabits. One acquires the language one hears, but the underlying basis of all 
cognitive linguistic development is the universal grammar that is intrinsically part of the human brain. 
Another name for this universal grammar is “deep structure.”  The grammar of the specific language an 
infant learns is a “surface structure.” Chomsky’s seminal work in laying out his theory is Syntactic 
Structures, first published in 1957 (2d ed.; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1972). Tinker and Abeyta transfer 
this concept to the world of culture, arguing that while it is possible to think differently in terms of “surface 
structure,” it is impossible to change one’s cultural view in terms of “deep structure.”  Such an argument 
resonates with what seems to be happening with regard to martyrdom. Early Christians are representing 
martyrdom in ways consonant with the philosophical tenets that pervaded the Roman cultural view. 
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arguments are “conservative” and reflect the viewpoint of those that inhabit the social 
context of the Roman Empire in the first two centuries of the Common Era. This is 
simply a way of saying that the arguments utilize strategies understandable to those living 
in this culture. It is noteworthy that those of lower socio-economic status are engaged in 
making them and that these arguments appear in martyr acts whose narrative form was 
popular with all classes rather than merely in philosophical or theological treatises 
accessible only to the elites. However, they are in service of an alternative group, one 
with a different hierarchy, that of the proto-orthodox church. I fully concur with Perkins’ 
arguments about proto-orthodox Christians constructing an alternative site of power 
although the degree to which such a community was democratic or granted equality to its 
members is not clear-cut. Certainly, the discourse speaks of equality, but the very texts 
which the members of the community value the most, speak unceasingly of obedience to 
and respect for the bishop, deacons, and presbyters. The Letters of Ignatius are a prime 
example. Repeatedly, Ignatius tells each of the churches to whom he writes that they 
must do nothing without the bishop: 
For Jesus Christ, our inseparable life, is the mind of the Father, just as the bishops 
appointed throughout the world are in the mind of Christ. Thus, it is proper for 
you to run together in harmony with the mind of the bishop, as you are in fact 
doing. For your council of presbyters, which is worthy of its name and worthy of 
God, is attuned to the bishop as strings to a lyre. Therefore in your unanimity and 
harmonious love Jesus Christ is sung. You must join this chorus, every one of you, 
so that by being harmonious in unanimity and taking your pitch from God you 
may sing in unison with one voice through Jesus Christ to the Father, in order that 
he may both hear you and, on the basis of what you do well, acknowledge that 
                                                                                                                                                       
However, as Judith Perkins has argued particularly cogently, they are investing the meaning of martyrdom 




you are members of his Son. It is, therefore, advantageous for you to be in perfect 
unity, in order that you may always have a share in God (Eph. 3.2–4.2).  
1 Clement reiterates this theme, simultaneously defining and reinforcing a hierarchy:  
Let us fear the Lord Jesus Christ, whose blood was given for us. Let us respect 
our leaders; let us honor the older men; let us instruct the young with instruction 
that leads to the fear of God. Let us guide our women toward that which is good: 
let them display a disposition to purity worthy of admiration; let them exhibit a 
sincere desire to be gentle; let them demonstrate by their silence the moderation 
of their tongue; let them show their love, without partiality and in holiness, 
equally toward all those who fear God (21.6–7). 
Shelly Matthews insightfully points out the way in which the discourse of 
martyrdom can work both to subvert the existing sites of power and authority and yet also 
generate new ones in a manner that illuminates the insights of both Perkins and Denzey: 
As a discourse that attempts to wrest meaning out of violence through inverting 
categories of strength and weakness, victory and loss, and life and death, 
martyrdom narratives can subvert hegemonic powers, providing a language of, 
and hence a means for, resistance to those facing similar violent 
circumstances . . . . Paradoxically, the anti-judgment, anti-authority alignment of 
Christian martyrdom discourse can work in the service of generating new sites of 
authority.”89
Here she cites Beth Berkowitz specifically with regard to the way in which Ignatius links 
the themes of martyrdom with those of obedience and submission to the bishop:   
  
We have [in Ignatius] martyrdom on top of martyrdom on top of martyrdom: 
Ignatius martyrs himself for those church members who in turn “martyr” 
themselves for the bishop, all of whom imitate the originary martyrdom of Christ 
for God. Yet Ignatius also demands obedience as a bishop: He is both the subject 
of suffering and the object for whom one suffers.90
                                                   
89 Shelly Matthews, Perfect Martyr: The Stoning of Stephen and the Construction of Christian Identity 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 4–5. 
 
90 See Beth Berkowitz, Execution and Invention: Death Penalty Discourse in Early Rabbinic and Christian 
Cultures (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 200. See also discussion by Matthews, Perfect 
Martyr, 139, n. 6. 
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Resurrection of the Flesh 
Interestingly, themes regarding the nature of Christ’s life, death, and resurrection, 
actual love not just for Christ, but for “his suffering and resurrection,” and those of 
respect for apostolic authority also interweave with those in which immortality is 
promised to the Christian and in which participating in the Eucharist is linked with 
certain notions of Christ’s suffering, death, and resurrection as well. The text also links 
medical imagery and the notion of an “undisturbed mind” with these ideas in an 
intriguing manner as well. Such language resonates with the idea of a properly-cared for 
soul and the notion of “immovability” and emotional stability discussed in chapter four. 
Ignatius says, for example: 
If Jesus Christ, in response to your prayer, should reckon me worthy, and if it is 
his will, in a second letter . . . I will explain to you the subject about which I have 
begun to speak, namely, the divine plan with respect to the new man Jesus Christ, 
involving faith in him and love for him, his suffering and resurrection . . . . All of 
you, individually and collectively, gather together in grace, my name, in one faith 
and one Jesus Christ . . . in order that you may obey the bishop and the council of 
presbyters with an undisturbed mind, breaking one bread, which is the medicine 
of immortality, the antidote we take in order not to die but to live forever in Jesus 
Christ (Eph. 20:2) (emphasis added). 
This passage is also interesting because participating in the Eucharist, a symbol of 
Christ’s sacrifice, goes hand-in-hand with obedience to the church authorities. Ignatius 
makes this clearer in his Letter to the Smyrneans when he accuses heretics of 
“abstain[ing] from Eucharist . . . because they refuse to acknowledge that the Eucharist is 
the flesh of our savior Jesus Christ, which suffered for our sins and which the Father by 
his goodness raised up” (6.2). He then goes on to tell the readers “to avoid such people” 
(7.2) as he emphatically thunders,  
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You must all follow the bishop as Jesus Christ followed the Father, and follow the 
council of presbyters as you would the apostles; respect the deacons as the 
commandment of God. Let no one do anything that has to do with the church 
without the bishop. Only that Eucharist which is under the authority of the bishop 
(or whomever he himself designates) is to be considered valid. Wherever the 
bishop appears, there let the congregation be; just as wherever Jesus Christ is, 
there is the catholic church. It is not permissible either to baptize or to hold a love 
feast without the bishop. But whatever he approves is also pleasing to God, in 
order that everything you do may be trustworthy and valid. Finally, it is 
reasonable for us to come to our senses while we still have time to repent and turn 
to God. It is good to acknowledge God and the bishop. The one who honors the 
bishop has been honored by God; the one who does anything without the bishop’s 
knowledge serves the devil (8.1–9.1). 
Indeed, in such passages, it is hard to delineate the point where one theme ends and 
another begins.  Ignatius’ comparison of his chains to “spiritual pearls” is also intriguing 
because he sees those very chains as the means of resurrection, and he then intermingles 
notions of agreement with or submission to apostolic authority as well: 
Let nothing appeal to you apart from him, in whom I carry around these chains 
(my spiritual pearls!), by which I hope, through your prayers, to rise again.  May I 
always share in them, in order that I may be found in the company of the 
Christians of Ephesus, who have always been in agreement with the apostles by 
the power of Jesus Christ (Eph. 11.2).   
Though Ignatius does not use the term “flesh” in speaking of the resurrection, he 
carefully notes that Jesus Christ “really was raised from the dead when his Father raised 
him up” (Trall. 9.2; emphasis added).  
In 1 Clement, the author speaks of resurrection, invoking the image of the phoenix 
and a passage from Job, and the notion of a fleshly resurrection is clear: “[Y]ou will raise 
this flesh of mine, which has endured all these things” (26.3).  Likewise, Polycarp’s 
words are represented as follows:  
I bless you because you have considered me worthy of this day and hour, so that I 
might receive a place among the number of the martyrs in the cup of your Christ, 
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to the resurrection to eternal life, both of soul and of body, in the incorruptibility 
of the Holy Spirit (14.2) (emphasis added). 
Theologians such as Tertullian make the insistence on this idea of a fleshly resurrection 
extremely plain:  
If God raises not men entire, He raises not the dead. For what dead man is entire, 
although he dies entire? Who is without hurt, that is without life? What body is 
uninjured, when it is dead, when it is cold, when it is ghastly, when it is stiff, 
when it is a corpse? When is a man more infirm, than when he is entirely infirm? 
When more palsied, than when quite motionless? Thus, for a dead man to be 
raised again, amounts to nothing short of his being restored to his entire 
condition,—lest he, forsooth, be still dead in that part in which he has not risen 
again. God is quite able to remake what He once made. This power and this 
unstinted grace of His He has already sufficiently guaranteed in Christ; and has 
displayed Himself to us (in Him) not only as the restorer of the flesh, but as the 
repairer of its breaches . . . . Thus our flesh shall remain after the resurrection—so 
far indeed susceptible of suffering, as it is the flesh, and the same flesh, too; but at 
the same time impassible, inasmuch as it has been liberated by the Lord for the 
very end and purpose of being no longer capable of enduring suffering (De res. 
57). 
It is important to note the interweaving of these themes as all of them will play a part in 
discussing the ways in which other texts disrupt the meaning of martyrdom as a kind of 
care of the soul linked with notions of martyrdom as sacrifice, notions of apostolic 
authority, and the doctrine of a fleshly resurrection. Caroline Walker Bynum shows the 
means by which this doctrine actually arises in the context of persecution, and we will 
discuss it more fully in chapter three as we put both those who promoted it and those who 
disagreed with it in conversation.91
In summary, the main argument of this chapter is that early Christian writers 
represent martyrdom in terms consonant with the care of the soul, particularly in its Stoic 
conception. In signifying the meaning of martyrdom in this way, suffering becomes a 
 
                                                   
91 Bynum, The Resurrection of the Body, 21–58. 
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good and martyrdom something to be desired. In some cases, the texts also link 
martyrdom with the imitation of Christ’s sacrifice as a blood atonement for sin, a 
sacrifice pleasing to God.  In addition, it is linked with the development of proto-
orthodox belief in a bodily resurrection of the very flesh of one’s existing, earthly body. 
Moreover, the discourse of martyrdom upholds the legitimacy of the proto-orthodox 
insistence on the authority of the bishops in the line of the apostolic succession from 
Peter and Paul. Finally, all of these together make the discourse of martyrdom one of the 
significant ways by which the Roman Empire’s claim to authority is challenged as an 
alternate sense of corporate selfhood develops and an alternative site of power starts to 
coalesce in the Christian church. Chapter three delineates the ways in which so-called 
Gnostic texts disrupt this discourse in two ways: by articulating alternate views about 
how to care for the soul using practices that reflect more traditional Greco-Roman 
notions regarding the therapy of emotions while simultaneously critiquing the 
glorification of martyrdom, disrupting the increasingly dominant discourse.  
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CHAPTER THREE: COMPETING VISIONS OF THE CARE OF THE SOUL IN 
THE APOCALYPSE OF PETER, THE TESTIMONY OF TRUTH, FRAGMENTS 
OF BASILIDES AND VALENTINUS, AND THE GOSPEL OF JUDAS 
 
May nothing wind you up, 
Nothing affright you; 
Everything comes and goes 
God, still, just there; 
Through patience 
All will be achieved. 
If you have God, 
You lack nothing; 




 If, then, the very constitution of proto-orthodox Christian identity was revolving 
around a specific technology of self—the discourse of martyrdom—one can well imagine 
that any disruptions to this discourse may have constituted a challenge, even a threat, to 
the means by which that identity was starting to coalesce.  One finds such a challenge in 
the discourses of certain individuals excoriated as “Gnostics” (a number of different early 
Christian groups being lumped together under this term).2
                                                   
1 Rosalind Bradley, ed., A World of Prayer: Spiritual Leaders, Activists, and Humanitarians Share Their 
Favorite Prayers (trans. James Alison; Maryknoll, New York: Orbis, 2012), 5. 
 In contrast to the way that the 
meaning and significance of martyrdom are represented in texts of the proto-orthodox, 
such as 1 Clement, the Letters of Ignatius, and the Martyrdom of Polycarp, other early 
2 Williams, Rethinking “Gnosticism”, 1996. Williams provides a compelling argument regarding the 
lumping of a variety of groups under a single umbrella term. 
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Christian writers and theologians offer a broad range of differing interpretations.3  Like 
the proto-orthodox, several thinkers describe the care of the soul in terms consonant with 
Stoic philosophy particularly regarding the therapy of emotions and healing, which 
results in freedom from enslavement to desires or passions.4  For the writers of these texts, 
Christ is the teacher and healer who can effect a “cure” from passions such as fear and 
anger through his teaching, through his revelation, and through his wise interpretations of 
the visions his followers have.  It is through being acquainted with Christ, knowing him, 
and interacting with him that freedom comes.5
                                                   
3 This by no means implies that the discourse in proto-orthodox texts is itself monolithic.  See Moss, Other 
Christs, 87. 
  However, these thinkers see entrapment 
in desire of any kind as weakness; therefore, while articulating this Christian therapy of 
emotions, these writers simultaneously adopt a discursive strategy of criticizing those 
4 For an excellent discussion of this idea, which differs somewhat from but supplements those provided by 
Foucault in the Hermeneutics of the Subject and Technologies of the Self, see Nussbaum, Therapy of Desire, 
1994.  Chapters nine and ten consider Stoic conceptions of the self-government of the soul and the 
extirpation of the passions.  In contrast to Foucault, Nussbaum emphasizes the focus on reason in Greek 
texts.  Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 1995 is also extremely useful in understanding the notion of the 
care of the soul as discussed in chapter one. 
5 Bentley Layton’s analysis of the Greek gnōsis is helpful here.  Layton explains that in Greek, 
“knowledge” is represented by several different words.  Some knowledge is propositional while other 
knowledge is relational, involving personal acquaintance with something or someone.  There are different 
words for these kinds of knowledge, and Layton feels that gnosis connotes relational knowledge and 
translates it accordingly as “acquaintance with.” This helps us to understand the connotations of gnōsis as 
having to do with one’s relationship to knowledge provided by Christ and even to Christ himself rather than 
the acquiring of supposedly mysterious and esoteric cult knowledge.  As Layton summarizes: “One kind 
[of knowledge] is propositional knowing—the knowledge that something is the case (“I know that Athens 
is in Greece”).  Greek has several words for this kind of knowing—for example, eidenai (French savoir). 
The other kind of knowing is personal acquaintance with an object, often a person (“I know Athens well”; 
“I have known Susan for many years”).  In Greek the word for this is gignoskein (French connaître), and in 
English one can call this kind of knowledge “acquaintance.”  The corresponding Greek noun is gnōsis.  If, 
for example, two people have been introduced to one another, each one can claim to have gnōsis or 
acquaintance of the other.  If one is introduced to god, one has gnōsis of god.  The ancient Gnostics 
described salvation as a kind of gnōsis or acquaintance, and the ultimate object of that acquaintance was 
nothing less than god.”  Layton carefully qualifies this distinction, saying “Ordinary language is not a rigid 
system of course, and thus in natural usage the distinction between the two kinds of knowledge is 
sometimes blurred.” See Bentley Layton, The Gnostic Scriptures: Ancient Wisdom for the New Age (New 
York: Doubleday, 1987), 9. 
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who glorify or even desire martyrdom as “filled with passion,” representing them as 
lacking in self-control.6
 It is in this context that disputes regarding doctrine erupt.  Those responsible for 
the texts discussed in this chapter do not necessarily agree with the particular significance 
ascribed to the death of Christ by some of the proto-orthodox—as an atonement needed 
to appease a God who requires sacrifice.
  Thus, this criticism disrupts a proto-orthodox discourse 
increasingly dominated by such praise. 
7
                                                   
6 Interestingly, these writers are not altogether different in their critique than non-Christian Romans. For 
example, the Stoic emperor Marcus Aurelius remarks in Meditations 11.3, “What a soul that is which is 
ready, if at any moment it must be separated from the body, and ready either to be extinguished or 
dispersed or continue to exist; but so that this readiness comes from a man’s own judgment, not from mere 
obstinacy, as with the Christians, but considerately and with dignity and in a way to persuade another, 
without tragic show.” See Marcus Aurelius, Meditations of Marcus Aurelius (ed. Charles W. Eliot; trans. 
George Lang; New York: P. F. Collier and Son, 1937), 285.  
  While they agree that there is a life (or lives) 
beyond this one, they do not necessarily agree with the developing theology of the 
resurrection of the flesh. They do believe in immortality but not necessarily that of the 
very same material body one inhabited prior to death. 
7 Moss discusses the way in which sacrifice is represented in various martyr acts. In some (as well as in 
other genres, such as the Letters of Ignatius), language and imagery associated with sacrifice is present, but 
in others, such language is rare or altogether lacking, and martyrs are represented as conquering Satan (in 
accord with a Christus Victor theory of atonement) or as moral exemplars. See Moss, Other Christs, 75–
111, 240–255.  Thus, it is crucial to understand that early Christians in a wide variety of groups and social 
and geographical contexts are responding and reacting to a wide spectrum of representations. As Moss 
says, “while the basic principle that martyrs are models was a feature of the majority of the acta, there was 
considerable disagreement about the core values that the martyrs embody. Ancient Christians employed a 
variety of linguistic and conceptual images to describe the significance of martyrdom. We have considered 
the function of the death of the martyr as a sacrifice, as a victory over Satan, and as a moral exemplar . . . . 
these elements often appear in nuanced and integrated forms in the same texts. These concepts were 
frequently interwoven in a manner so that while one particular soteriological model may dominate our 
interpretation of that individual account, other models nevertheless resonate in the background of the 
narrative. The Letter of the Churches of Lyons and Vienne presents the deaths of its protagonists as both 
victories over Satan and moral exemplar, and the Martyrdom of Polycarp combines elements of all three 
models. One of the more consistent features of all three perspectives, however, is that whatever the function 
of the martyr’s death, it functions in the same way as the death of Jesus. Thus, whether or not a martyr is 
explicitly named as a model of virtue for others, the function of his or her own death mirrors that of Christ. 
Even here, though, we should be hesitant to generalize and reach broad conclusions. If we attempt to 
harmonize the passiones into a single interpretation of the martyr’s death, then we do a disservice to the 
richness and complexity of the texts themselves. See Moss, Other Christs, 110–11 (emphasis added).  
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Heresiological Framing 
 Unfortunately, these disputes have long been refracted through the lens of 
heresiologists who accused their opponents of disloyalty or a lack of courage in not 
embracing martyrdom. Criticism begins with Justin, who observes that “they [Gnostics] 
are neither persecuted nor put to death” (I Apol. 26).8
[s]ome of these men have proceeded to such a degree of temerity, that they even 
pour contempt upon the martyrs, and vituperate those who are slain on account of 
the confession of the Lord, and who suffer all things predicted by the Lord, and 
who in this respect strive to follow the footsteps of the Lord’s passion, having 
become martyrs of the suffering One; these we do also enrol with the martyrs 
themselves. For, when inquisition shall be made for their blood, and they shall 
attain to glory, then all shall be confounded by Christ, who have cast a slur upon 
their martyrdom (Haer. 3.18.5).    
  Irenaeus, too, accuses the 
Gnostics:  
Later, Irenaeus returns to this theme:  
Wherefore the Church does in every place, because of that love which she 
cherishes towards God, send forward, throughout all time, a multitude of martyrs 
to the Father; while all others not only have nothing of this kind to point to among 
themselves, but even maintain that such witness-bearing is not at all necessary, for 
that their system of doctrines is the true witness [for Christ], with the exception, 
perhaps, that one or two among them, during the whole time which has elapsed 
since the Lord appeared on earth, have occasionally, along with our martyrs, 
borne the reproach of the name (as if he too [the heretic] had obtained mercy), and 
have been led forth with them [to death], being, as it were, a sort of retinue 
granted unto them. For the Church alone sustains with purity the reproach of those 
who suffer persecution for righteousness' sake, and endure all sorts of 
punishments, and are put to death because of the love which they bear to God, and 
their confession of His Son; often weakened indeed, yet immediately increasing 
her members, and becoming whole again (Haer. 4.33.9).  
                                                   
8 As noted above, all citations come from Roberts and Donaldson, Ante-Nicene Fathers, 1905 unless 
otherwise noted. 
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Moss points out that Irenaeus actually uses an analogy in which he equates those 
he deems heretics with the wild beasts of the arena. In other words, he uses the discourse 
of martyrdom itself as a discursive strategy of “othering”:  
Utilizing the language of the arena, Irenaeus casts himself as the martyr and the 
heretics as wild beasts and dumb animals (Haer. 4.31.4). The violence of the 
heresiological contest is striking: Irenaeus hopes to inflict the heretics with 
wounds and trample them underfoot (Haer. 4.31.4). Such imagery emulates the 
discourse of martyrdom in Gaul: battle with heresy functions like conflict with the 
animals, which in turn encapsulates the cosmic battle with Satan. In an ironic act 
of narrative violence, Irenaeus drags the Gnostics to the arena in order to force 
them to play the persecutor (157). 
 
In the first chapter of the Scorpiace, Tertullian, too, refers to some who scorn martyrdom:    
This among Christians is a season of persecution.  When, therefore, faith is 
greatly agitated and the church burning, as represented by the bush, then the 
Gnostics break out; then the Valentinians creep forth; then all the opponents of 
martyrdom bubble up, being themselves also hot to strike, penetrate, kill. For, 
because they know that many are artless and also inexperienced, and weak 
moreover, that a very great number in truth are Christians who veer about with the 
wind and conform to its moods, they perceive that they are never to be 
approached more than when fear has opened the entrances to the soul, especially 
when some display of ferocity has already arrayed with a crown the faith of 
martyrs. . . .we are in the midst of an intense heat, the very dog-star of 
persecution . . . . Of some Christians the fire, of others the sword, of others the 
beasts, have made trial; others are hungering in prison for the martyrdoms of 
which they have had a taste in the meantime by being subjected to clubs and 
claws besides. We ourselves, having been appointed for pursuit, are like hares 
being hemmed in from a distance; and heretics go about according to their wont. 
At the end of the chapter, he says,  
But woe to them who turn sweet into bitter, and light into darkness. For, in like 
manner, they also who oppose martyrdoms, representing salvation to be 
destruction, transmute sweet into bitter, as well as light into darkness; and thus, by 
preferring this very wretched life to that most blessed one, they put bitter for 
sweet, as well as darkness for light.  
 
In fact, the entire Scorpiace is an antidote to what Tertullian considers the poison of 
heretics who are akin to small but very dangerous scorpions. Finally, in the fourth chapter 
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of Book IV of the Stromata, sometimes referred to as “miscellanies” or even a “carpet 
bag” due to its loosely-organized and eclectic nature, Clement of Alexandria says, 
Now some of the heretics who have misunderstood the Lord, have at once an 
impious and cowardly love of life, saying that the true martyrdom is the 
knowledge of the only true God (which we also admit), and that the man is a self-
murderer and a suicide who makes confession by death; and adducing other 
similar sophisms of cowardice.9
The style and tone of such writers varies somewhat, but in the end, some would argue 
that all these critiques are “hostile sources”
 
10
Ismo Dunderberg notes that Gnostic texts have not often been examined for what 
they have to say about “moral exhortation, views about emotions, and critical analysis of 
power and society” simply because such topics have not been considered main themes of 
“the core of Gnostic thought.”
 whose framing of the issues as doctrinal 
disputes has long perpetuated the discourse of “orthodoxy” and “heresy.”   
11  As he succinctly points out, “None of these features has 
been regarded as constituting the distinct essence, or the ‘spirit,’ of Gnosticism.”12  In 
effect, the focus of scholarship has been influenced by presuppositions about what the 
main themes of Gnostic writing are.13
                                                   
9 There are other examples as well, particularly in Origen’s Exhortation to Martyrdom. See John O’Meara, 
trans., Prayer: Exhortation to Martyrdom (Westminster, Maryland: Newman, 1954). Eusebius of Caesarea 
cites Agrippa Castor’s critique as well (Hist. Eccl. 4.7.7). However, the passages above serve to capture 
vividly the flavor of the accusations against the “Gnostics.” 
  Philip Tite reinforces this point in his 
comprehensive discussion of the ways in which scholars usually explicate texts deemed 
10 Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 8. 
11 Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 1. 
12 Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 1. 
13 For a fuller discussion of this point, see also Williams, Rethinking “Gnosticism”, 1996; King, What is 
Gnosticism?, 2003), and Lance Jenott, The “Gospel of Judas”: Coptic Text, Translation and Historical 
Interpretation of the “Betrayer’s Gospel” (Studien und Texte zu Antike und Christentum; ed. Christoph 
Markschies et al.; 64 Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011).  
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Gnostic in terms of their esoteric myths, arguing that these writings are worth re-
examining with respect to their ethical teachings.14 Likewise, Lance Jenott also discusses 
the impossibility of presupposing a Gnostic point of view and the distorted perspective 
that evolves from doing so.15
Alternative Perspectives 
 
Therefore, in this chapter, we take a fresh look at some of these texts with respect 
both to what they have to say about the care of the soul as the therapy of emotions and 
their critique of martyrdom. In particular, the texts of the Apocalypse of Peter,16 the 
Testimony of Truth,17
                                                   
14 Philip L. Tite, “Valentinian Ethics and Paraenetic Discourse: Determining the Social Function of Moral 
Exhortation in Valentinian Christianity” (Ph.D. diss., McGill University, 2005). In particular, see 1–2, 6–7, 
102 and 192–195. 
 two fragments preserved in the writings of Clement of 
15 Jenott, Gospel of Judas, 2, 10. 
16 There are actually two texts by this name, the contents of which are completely different.  The one 
discussed in this chapter is the Coptic Apocalypse of Peter in codex VII of the Nag Hammadi library.  It is 
in Coptic but was probably originally in Greek. Andreas Werner dates it to the late second or early third 
century.  See page 702 of Andreas Werner, “The Coptic gnostic Apocalypse of Peter,” in Writings Relating 
to the Apostles, Apocalypses, and Related Subjects, vol. 2 of New Testament Apocrypha (ed. Wilhelm 
Schneemelcher; trans. and ed. R. McL. Wilson; Cambridge: James Clarke, 1991), 700–05.  All citations 
here are from James Brashler, trans., Apocalypse of Peter (NHC VII,3), in Nag Hammadi Codex VII (ed. 
Birger A. Pearson; NHMS 30; Leiden: Brill, 1996), 201–47. Also valuable is the translation in the easily-
obtained, one-volume edition of the texts found near Nag Hammadi along with the Gospel of Mary and 
those in the Codex Tchacos: Marvin Meyer, ed., The Nag Hammadi Scriptures: The International Edition 
(New York: HarperOne, 2007), 491–97. Here the work is referred to as the Revelation of Peter. (The other 
work of the same name, surviving in Ethiopic, was probably also originally written in Greek.  An English 
translation is available in New Testament Apocrypha, vol.  2, 620–38.  This name was also given to some 
other apocalypses written considerably later, which now exist in Arabic and Ethiopic.  See Michel 
Desjardins, Introduction to the Apocalypse of Peter (NHC VII,3), in the Coptic Gnostic Library: Nag 
Hammadi Codex VII (ed. Birger A. Pearson;  NHMS 30; Leiden: Brill, 1996), 201–16.  
17 Birger A. Pearson discusses the difficulty in dating the text.  He argues that the “most plausible 
hypothesis” is the late second or early third century of the Common Era. See Birger A. Pearson, 
introduction to the Testimony of Truth (NHC, IX, 3) in the Coptic Gnostic Library: Nag Hammadi Codices 
IX and X (ed. Birger A. Pearson;  NHMS 15; Leiden: Brill, 1981), 118–20. 
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Alexandria—one attributed to Basilides18 and the other to Valentinus,19 and the Gospel of 
Judas,20—offer insight into these interpretations.21
                                                   
18 See the translation of Fragment G and accompanying commentary by Layton, Gnostic Scriptures, 440–
43.  
 In these five texts, a discourse which 
articulates the positive value of the therapy of emotions intersects with a discourse 
challenging the meaning of martyrdom as described in chapter two (as, in and of itself, 
ultimate care of the soul associated with imitation of Christ’s atoning sacrifice, the 
doctrine of the fleshly resurrection, and notions of apostolic succession).  Close 
examination of these texts reveal not the existence of two opposed religions—
19 See the translation of Fragment F and accompanying commentary by Layton, Gnostic Scriptures, 240–41. 
20 Rodolphe Kasser, Gregor Wurst, Marvin Meyer, and François Gaudard, The Gospel of Judas Together 
with the Letter of Peter to Philip, James, and a Book of Allogenes from Codex Tchacos: Critical Edition 
(Washington, D.C.: National Geographic, 2007). Irenaeus of Lyon may have known about this text, which 
would place its dating prior to ca. 180 of the Common Era. See discussion below. 
 
21 The Apocalypse of Peter and the Testimony of Truth were both a part of the cache of texts discovered in 
a jar near Nag Hammadi, Egypt in the 1940’s. This collection of texts contains thirteen codices written on 
papyrus.  These thirteen codices contain a total of forty-six different works.  (There are fifty-two works, but 
six of them are duplicates.) This discovery constitutes a tremendous find as forty-one of these texts were 
not extant at the time they were found.  The texts date to the mid-fourth century and are written in Coptic, 
though the original texts were in Greek.  The codices may have come from a Pachomian monastery which 
once existed near the area where they were uncovered. The texts themselves are probably mostly from the 
second and third centuries of the Common Era although dating many of them is quite difficult as is often 
the case with ancient texts. It is important to keep in mind that certain details of the discovery are contested, 
and the circumstances surrounding the placement of the jar out into the desert are pure speculation.  For 
more on the discovery, see John Doresse, The Secret Books of the Egyptian Gnostics: An Introduction to 
the Gnostic Coptic Manuscripts Discovered at Chenoboskion (trans. Philip Mairet; London: Hollis & 
Carter, 1960); James M. Robinson, “From the Cliff to Cairo: The Story of the Discoverers and Middlemen 
of the Nag Hammadi Codices,” in Colloque International sur les textes de Nag Hammadi (Québec, 22–25 
août 1978) (ed. Bernard Barc, 21–58; Bibliothèque copte de Nag Hammadi, Section “Études” 1; Québec: 
Les Presses de l’Université Laval; Louvain: Peeters, 1981); James M. Robinson, “Nag Hammadi: the First 
Fifty Years,” in The Nag Hammadi Library after Fifty Years: Proceedings of the 1995 Society of Biblical 
Literature Commemoration (ed. John D. Turner and Anne McGuire; NHMS 44; Leiden, Brill, 1997), 3–33; 
Dart, The Jesus of Heresy and History, 1988; Marvin Meyer, The Gnostic Discoveries: The Impact of the 
Nag Hammadi Library (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 2005); Marvin Meyer, “Preface,” Nag 
Hammadi Scriptures, xi–xii; Marvin Meyer and Elaine H. Pagels, “Introduction,” Nag Hammadi Scriptures, 
1–13.  (Meyer and Pagels also succinctly summarize the problems with even using the term “Gnosticism,” 
citing Williams’ Rethinking “Gnosticism” and King’s What is Gnosticism?, 9). For more on the problems 
with the accounts of the discovery, see Nicola Denzey, “‘The Beauty that Came to Me in the Books’ (NHC 
VI.6.54): Scribal Cultures in the Nag Hammadi Codices” (paper presented at the annual meeting of the 
SBL, San Francisco, November 20, 2011).  
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“Christianity” and “Gnosticism”—but rather a shifting, fluid web of interactions among 
that branch of Christianity that will come to be thought of as the orthodox and a variety 
of other Christian groups, such as those that scholars increasingly refer to as Sethians, 
Basilideans, and Valentinians.  The boundaries among groups such as these were not 
necessarily clearly defined or fixed, and such groups may have been marked by internal 
diversity as well.22  These inner-Christian borderlines are in many ways analogous to 
those between the strands of the various Judaisms and Christianities Daniel Boyarin has 
articulated so well.23  In fact, Boyarin discusses the ways in which attitudes toward 
martyrdom reflect a spectrum of religious identities in his Dying for God.24
                                                   
22 Lance Jenott describes this well: “The Gospel of Judas therefore raises questions about the internal 
diversity of the Sethians’ cult movement. Scholars classify writings like the Apocryphon of John, the 
Gospel of Judas, and the Holy Book as ‘Sethian’ because they share many unique mythological characters 
and themes. Yet if we choose to use such labels as Sethian (or Valentinian, or any other) to typologically 
sort texts according to the unique features they share, we must also remember that our typologies do not 
represent monolithic ‘systems’ with no internal diversity. When one looks closely at the specific details of 
each text, it is clear that they also tell drastically different narratives and advocate different theological 
perspectives. This raises a larger question that historians of early Christianity are only beginning to explore, 
namely, what sorts of controversies there were within the various ‘schools’ of thought that we typologically 
construct by blurring differences among their members. Although much attention has been paid to Sethian 
disputes with other forms of Christianity, I find it quite likely that many of the differences found within the 
Sethian corpus itself can be explained on the basis that they carried on more disputes with each other than 
they did with non-Sethians” (Gospel of Judas, 132). 
  He describes 
Christians as those who embrace martyrdom, and he maintains that Jews hold a variety of 
positions regarding its value, but closer examination of Christian texts previously deemed 
Gnostic actually serves to extend Boyarin’s thesis regarding the variety of attitudes 
toward martyrdom.  His ideas on the ways in which attitudes toward martyrdom serve as 
markers of identity can be applied to the inner-Christian debates regarding its value as 
well.   
23 Boyarin, Border Lines, 2004. 
 
24 Boyarin, Dying for God, 1999. 
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Apocalypse of Peter 
 The single extant text of the Apocalypse of Peter in Nag Hammadi Codex VII, 3 
(70,13–84,14)25 provides clear support for understanding the way in which an early 
Christian text can articulate a vision of the care of the soul as healing from the destructive 
effects of one’s emotions.  This text revolves around Peter’s need for a therapy of 
emotions and the portrayal of Jesus as being able to provide such a cure.  At the same 
time, it serves as critique of those whom the author sees as blindly attributing the source 
of liberation from one’s passions to a glorification of suffering centered in theologies of a 
substitutionary atonement and a fleshly resurrection. 26
 The main thrust of the text is that Peter lacks courage.  In short, he is consumed 
by his passions and in need of the kind of healing that a therapy of the emotions can 
provide.  The text progresses with Jesus repeatedly telling Peter not to be afraid.  Indeed, 
as the editor of the Brill edition points out, exhortations to Peter to be strong, perfect, or 
unafraid frame the entire text, appearing at both the introduction and the end as well as 
throughout the text (71,16; 71,22; 80,32–33; 82,18; 84,7–12).  Specifically, Peter 
expresses his fear three times, and Jesus reassures him in each case, instances that are 
 
                                                   
25 As noted above, the translation used here is that by Brashler, Apocalypse of Peter, 1996.  For other 
editions, see Meyer, Nag Hammadi Scriptures, 491. See also Desjardins, Introduction, Apocalypse of Peter 
(NHC VII,3), 201–16; chapter two, “Die Polemik der Petrusapokalypse (NHC, VII, 3) gegen das 
Kirchliche Christentum,” in Klaus Koschorke, Die Polemik der Gnostiker gegen das Kirchliche 
Christentum (Leiden: Brill, 1978), 11–90.  
26The dating of this text is unclear.  It has often been assumed to have been written in the third century 
because it clearly reflects the existence of discord among Christian groups rather than the supposed unity 
which characterized the earliest Christianity.  However, such reasoning is circular.  The notion of an 
original unity within which heresy arose has been deconstructed: Walter Bauer, Orthodoxy and Heresy in 
Earliest Christianity (ed. Robert A. Kraft and Gerhard Kroedel; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971). Thus, a 
paradigm shift has ensued.  Interestingly, the editors of the Brill edition note that this work could be as 
early as 150 C.E.   See Desjardins, Introduction, Apocalypse of Peter (NHC VII, 3), 214.  
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discussed below.  First, Peter fears that both he and Jesus will be killed when a mob runs 
toward them with stones.  Later, he expresses fear regarding who will win the battle for 
control of the “little ones.”  Finally, Peter expresses fear in his vision of the crucifixion, 
begging Jesus to flee.  In each case, Jesus carefully explains why Peter does not need to 
be afraid and exhorts him to be “perfect” (71,16) or “strong” (71,22).  
The term “perfect” also appears in Seneca, Philo, the Book of Thomas the 
Contender, and the Secret Revelation of John.27
 Repeatedly in Apocalypse of Peter, Peter fails to demonstrate such apatheia.  
Near the beginning, he says, “I saw the priests and the people running toward us with 
stones, as if they were about to kill us. And I was afraid that we were going to die” (72,5–
9).  Some scholars feel this scene takes place on the night of Jesus’ arrest.  Others argue it 
occurs in a heavenly temple.
  The Stoic notion of perfection entailed 
the extirpation of the passions, or apatheia.  It is used in the Gospel of Judas as well. 
Judas is the one who more closely approaches the status of “the perfect human” (35,4) 
than do any of the other disciples (although scholars sharply debate whether, in the end, 
he is portrayed positively or negatively).   
28
                                                   
27 See Ismo Dunderberg, “Judas’ Anger and the Perfect Human,” in The Codex Judas Papers: Proceedings 
of the International Congress on the Tchacos Codex held at Rice University, Houston, Texas, March 13–16, 
2008 (ed. April D. DeConick; NHMS 71; ed. Johannes van Oort and Einar Thomassen; Leiden: Brill, 2009), 
201–21. 
  In any case, it is Peter’s sense of fear that is highlighted, 
the same fear recorded in all four gospels of the New Testament, which results in Peter’s 
28 Michael Desjardins’ comment is pertinent here: “Brashler (125–35) and Dubois (“Le preambule,” 387–
90) argue that the author sets his work in a heavenly temple, with the revelation given by the risen Savior. 
Koschorke (13), Perkins (Gnostic Dialogue, 116), and Brown and Griggs (133) posit an earthly, pre-
crucifixion setting and do more justice to the passage. In fact, however, the Savior's spiritual nature moves 
the revelation to a non-earthly sphere regardless of the option one chooses.” See Desjardins, Introduction, 
Apocalypse of Peter (NHC VII, 3), 203, n.15. 
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three-fold betrayal of Jesus. The Apocalypse of Peter does not explicitly mention this 
betrayal, but it comes to mind when the text says that Jesus “will correct you three times 
in this night” (72,2–4).  Through these corrections, which actually function as special 
insights, Jesus provides the words of revelation Peter needs to help him overcome his 
fears. 
There are also interesting parallels with the transfiguration that Peter, James, and 
John witness in the Gospel of Mark (chapter 9), the Gospel of Matthew (chapter 17), and 
the Gospel of Luke (chapter 9).  In the Apocalypse of Peter, Peter sees Jesus bathed in 
light:  “For I saw a new light greater than the light of day.  Then it came down upon the 
Savior” (72,22–26).  This allusion is interesting because it can serve to remind the reader 
of Peter’s lack of full understanding and his fear. In that transfiguration scene, Peter 
wants to honor Jesus, Moses, and Elijah equally (Mark 9:5; Matt 17:4).  A voice from 
heaven has to tell him to listen only to Jesus (Mark 9:7; Matt 17:5).  Moreover, Peter and 
the others (James and John) are afraid (Mark 9:6; Matt 17:6).  Jesus has to tell them 
explicitly not to fear (Matt 17:7).  When they come down from the mountain, a man with 
a son in need of healing immediately confronts them, but in spite of the experience they 
have just had, they are unable to cure him (Mark 9:18; Matt 17:16).  The father has to 
bring him to Jesus (Mark 9:17; Matt 17:17).  Jesus tells them that they are still lacking in 
belief (Matt 17:20) and that a cure is possible only with prayer and fasting (Mark 9:29; 
Matt 17:21).  The limited understanding Peter and the others exhibit in these passages 
seems similar to Peter’s lack of awareness in the Apocalypse. 
 Interestingly, as the narrative progresses, Jesus understands and responds to Peter 
even though Peter has never voiced his fear out loud. Peter does tell Jesus what he has 
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seen, and Jesus responds with a lengthy discourse (72,29–79,31) in which he tells Peter 
that those whom he fears are “blind and deaf” (73,13–14) and that they are “dry canals” 
(79,31). In other words, they are not drinking of and filled with Jesus, the living water 
(John 4:10), the “spring of water gushing up to eternal life” (John 4:14), or the bubbling 
spring (Gospel of Thomas, Logion 13).  It is in this context that a long conversation 
ensues in which a clear critique of those who embrace martyrdom appears (as discussed 
below). In fact, it is those “who name themselves bishops”—that is, those who falsely 
claim authority—that Jesus is describing as “dry canals.”29
 Jesus also alludes in this passage to his “forgiveness of their transgressions into 
which they fell through their adversaries, whose ransom I got from the slavery in which 
they were, to give them freedom” (78,9–16).  Here are allusions to a Christus Victor 
theory of atonement. Those who are blind and ignorant do not properly understand this.  
The implication may well be that they instead insist on a substitutionary atonement 
theory in which Jesus’ blood serves to appease a wrathful God.   
 
 However, once again, Peter is afraid.  He is worried that the wrong leaders will 
prevail.  He says,  
I am afraid because of what you have told me—that indeed little ones are in our 
view counterfeit.  Indeed, there are multitudes that will mislead other multitudes 
of living ones, and they will be destroyed among them.  And when they speak 
your name, they will be believed (79,32–80,6).    
 
 Again, the text shows Jesus reassuring Peter, saying, “[Y]ou, oh Peter, will stand 
in their midst.  Do not be afraid because of your cowardice” (80,31–33).  In fact, Jesus 
has already affirmed Peter’s leadership over these “blind and deaf” ones.  He has told 
                                                   
29 This closely parallels the critique of the apostles in the Gospel of Judas which will be further discussed 
below.   
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Peter, “But you yourself, Peter, become perfect in accordance with your name, along with 
me, the very one who chose you.  For from you I have made a beginning for the remnant 
whom I have summoned to knowledge” (71,15–71,21).   
However, even toward the end of the text, after Jesus has revealed many things to 
him, Peter is still afraid!  His visions continue, and he starts to see the crucifixion of Jesus.  
The divine part of Jesus, which cannot die, actually comes and stands beside him, and he 
and Jesus watch the crucifixion together.  He pleads with Jesus saying, “Lord, no one is 
looking at you. Let us flee this place” (81,26–28).  
Again, Jesus responds with words of reassurance, telling Peter that those who 
think they are killing him are blind and ignorant (81,30–32), and he once again exhorts 
Peter: “Be strong!” (82,18).  Again, he names Peter as “the one to whom these mysteries 
have been given” (82,18–19).  He tells Peter that the “living Savior, the primal part in 
him whom they seized” (82,28–29) cannot be destroyed.  In fact, “he has been released” 
(82,30).   
A scene such as this reflects a two-natures Christology rather than Docetism per 
se.  Docetism is the belief that Jesus only appeared to be human; thus, he could not 
actually suffer and die.  A two natures, or pneumatic, Christology affirms that the pre-
existent Son of God either transformed into or inhabited a human body.  In this latter case, 
it is still possible that the human body could suffer and die efficaciously for humankind.30
                                                   
30 See J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines (rev. ed.; San Francisco: Harper, 1978), 141–158.  Lance 
Jenott’s discussion of this issue with regard to the Gospel of Judas is pertinent here as well; see especially 
pp. 23–30.  Jenott builds on the classic work of Elaine Pagels: “Gnostic and Orthodox Views of Christ’s 
Passion: Paradigms for the Christian’s Response to Persecution?,” in The Rediscovery of Gnosticism: 
Proceedings of the International Conference on Gnosticism at Yale, New Haven, Connecticut, March 28–




Ultimately, Christ triumphs. Jesus is making all of this clear to Peter, and, therefore, Peter 
does not need to feel any fear. 
 At the very end, Jesus says, “You, therefore, be courageous and do not fear 
anything.  For I will be with you so that none of your enemies will prevail over you.  
Peace be to you!  Be strong!” (84,6–11).  The text ends by saying that Peter “came to his 
senses” (84,12–13).  Perhaps this implies that Peter comes to his senses on a couple of 
levels—he comes back to regular consciousness after being in a visionary state, and, 
seemingly, he is now equipped with the knowledge he needs to serve and lead 
courageously.  The text does not state this explicitly, but the story ends as the task of 
healing Peter of his fear has apparently been accomplished.   
In summary, the fact that Peter feels or expresses fear three times seems to be in 
keeping with the fact that he betrayed Jesus three times in the canonical gospels.  Here, 
though, it is Peter’s emotions that are emphasized along with a representation of Jesus as 
the one who can heal Peter of those emotions.  The pro-Petrine emphasis seems to be 
stronger in this text than in the Gospel of John where Peter (and the reader) are reminded 
of the fact that Peter betrayed Jesus three times by Jesus’ asking Peter three times if he 
will “feed his sheep” (John 21:15–17).  In both texts, Jesus affirms that Peter will 
ultimately have the courage to be loyal to Jesus, but in the Gospel of John, this courage is 
linked to martyrdom, whereas in the Apocalypse of Peter, it is not.  In the Gospel of John, 
Jesus says to Peter, 
Very truly, I tell you, when you were younger, you used to fasten your own belt 
and to go wherever you wished.  But when you grow old, you will stretch out 
your hands, and someone else will fasten a belt around you and take you where 
you do not wish to go. . . . Follow me (John 21:18–19). 
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In the context of the Apocalypse of Peter, Peter is not asked explicitly to follow 
Jesus to a martyr’s death but to be strong and unafraid.  Indeed, Jesus continues believing 
in Peter as one who will ultimately be healed of his fear and become a suitable leader. 
Although these two perspectives are not necessarily at odds, the emphasis is different 
regarding what Peter needs in order to be a strong leader.  The source of his apostolic 
authority in the Apocalypse of Peter stems from his ability to perceive things in such a 
way that he is cured of the passion of fear.  As Desjardins notes:  
In the Apoc. Pet., Peter needs the strength not only to realize that those putting 
Jesus to death can do him no harm but especially to await the Savior’s Parousia 
(78,4–6; perhaps also 71,22–23) which ends the rule of the present generation of 
Christians, thereby allowing Peter to resume his rightful leadership over the 
‘remnant’ (71,18–19).31
Indeed, Jesus’ teaching provides this “strength.” 
  
Moreover, the source of Peter’s authority does not derive from his understanding 
Jesus as an atoning blood sacrifice who was then resurrected into a fleshly body. The 
knowledge that Peter needs in order to develop the courage that will enable him to lead 
others comes before Jesus actually dies as Jesus interprets Peter’s visions and clothes 
them with significance, revealing why Peter need not fear.  As Pheme Perkins notes, 
“Apocalypse of Peter has turned Peter, the witness of the sufferings of Jesus, into the 
witness of the true meaning of those sufferings; they did not touch the heavenly 
redeemer” (emphasis added).32
                                                   
31 See Desjardins, Introduction, Apocalypse of Peter (NHC VII, 3), 203–04.  
  
32 Pheme Perkins, The Gnostic Dialogue: The Early Church and the Crisis of Gnosticism (New York: 
Paulist Press, 1980), 121. 
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   However, this means of effecting Peter’s transformation from fear into boldness 
does not involve Peter’s buying into a discourse in which sacrifice and suffering are 
exalted in and of themselves.  In fact, those who glorify martyrdom, those immersed in 
the discourse of what Perkins has termed the “suffering self,” are subject to sharp critique.  
While the discourse of the suffering self, elaborated in chapter one, also seeks to 
eradicate fear and incite its subjects to boldness in the face of death, in the Apocalypse of 
Peter, Jesus explains that this is an improper understanding and a false means of 
overcoming fear.  He clearly disrupts the discourse of this type of glorification, saying 
that such people  
are without perception.  And the guileless, good, pure one is pushed to the 
executioner, even into the kingdom of those who praise a restored Christ.  And 
they praise the men of the propagation of falsehood, who will succeed you.  And 
they will hold fast to the name of a dead man, while thinking that they will 
become pure. But they will become greatly defiled. And they will fall into an 
explicit error and into the hand of an evil, cunning man with a multifarious 
doctrine. And they will be ruled heretically. For some of them will blaspheme the 
truth and proclaim evil teaching. And they will say evil things to each other 
(74,3–27). 
The allusion to a “restored Christ” and a “multifarious doctrine” may be that of the 
resurrection of the flesh.  To “hold fast to the name of a dead man” may also imply 
disputes over whether the human part of Jesus was resurrected in the flesh.  The writer 
may feel not that Christ only appeared to be human but that he did indeed have a human 
nature that died.  However, he also had an immortal nature that triumphed over Satan, 
demons, and death.  Such would be consistent with a two-natures Christology.  This 
triumph, though, would not necessarily have resulted in the restoration of the fleshly 
body.   
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Jesus goes on to say that the “deaf and blind ones” (76,21–22) “will create an 
imitation remnant in the name of a dead man” (78,15–17).  The referent may well be the 
proto-orthodox church.  He then states,  
These are the ones who oppress their brothers, saying to them, “Through this our 
God has pity, since salvation (allegedly) comes to us through this.” They do not 
know the punishment of those who are delighted by what has been done to the 
little ones whom they sought out and imprisoned. And there will be others of 
those who are outside our number who name themselves “bishop” and also 
“deacons,” as if they have received their authority from God.  They submit to the 
judgment of the leaders.  Those people are dry canals (79,11–20). 
Michel Desjardins notes that  
the context suggests that the term “allegedly” in line fifteen begins a parenthetical 
and ironic comment expressing the author’s rejection of the oppressors’ 
motivation that they are promoting the salvation of the Gnostics by forcing 
orthodox doctrine upon them.33
 
   
Unfortunately, such a statement perpetuates the notion of a unified, orthodox group 
versus a unified Gnostic group.  It also perpetuates the idea that differences originate in 
doctrine rather than practice.  However, it does clearly show us that the editor recognizes 
the tensions between different groups in the early Christianities. 
Pheme Perkins has also commented insightfully on the contrast between the way 
in which the orthodox (or proto-orthodox) see martyrdom as a source of victory and the 
way in which other early Christian groups (which she terms Gnostics) locate it elsewhere: 
The Christian may also be said to triumph over the powers through the victory 
that Christ works in him or her.  Orthodox Christians saw this victory represented 
in the martyrs (Origen, Comm Matt XII 25; Exhort ad Martvr. XL 1).  We have 
seen that Gnostics locate the Christian’s share in the victory in the preaching of 
Gnosis as the Savior had done (e.g., SJC CG III 119, 1–9, PetPhil VIII 137, 20–
25).  ApocPet also associates the victory with the Docetic account of the 
crucifixion.  The powers are crucifying what they think is the Savior, while the 
living Jesus is standing aside and laughing at them (CG VII 81, 15–24).  Patristic 
                                                   
33 See Desjardins, Introduction, Apocalypse of Peter (NHC VII, 3), 237, n. 37. 
 76 
authors could never go this far and deny that Christ died, but they do agree that 
those who crucified him were deceived in thinking that they had gained power 
over him.  Origen even speaks of Christ laughing with scorn at the ignorance of 
those who accepted the Son handed over to them (Comm Matt xiii, 9).  Thus, 
Gnostic preaching shares broad lines of thought with other Christian preaching.  
These similarities show how a Gnostic soteriology might find a sympathetic 
audience in larger Christian circles.34
Finding a “sympathetic audience” would be particularly likely if the account of the 
crucifixion is not that of a Docetic one but that of a two-natures Christology in which 
Jesus did indeed triumph over the power of death, such that the proponents of the view at 
issue were not actually denying that Christ died, at least in his human nature.   
 
 Even Jesus’ laughing (81,11; 81,16–17; 82,6) may serve to disrupt a discourse in 
which martyrdom is being idealized as an imitation of Christ’s own death with that death 
being given a very specific interpretive twist—that of a substitutionary blood sacrifice.  
Jesus’ laughter may function as a kind of signal to the reader pointing out Jesus’ 
recognition of a lack of understanding on the part of a group.  Indeed, in this case, the 
writer of the Apocalypse of Peter explains, “he laughs at their lack of perception” (83,1–
2).  It is interesting that Jesus is not cursing those who persecute them but merely able to 
dismiss it by laughing at their lack of perception.  This response shows Jesus himself to 
be in control of his emotions.  He is neither afraid nor angry.35
                                                   
34 Perkins, Gnostic Dialogue, 179–80. 
 
35 Often, scholars have simply assumed laughter to be mockery, but one must be very careful about 
attributing a certain significance to laughing, crying, or other expressions of emotion given the fact that 
these can have quite different meanings in varying social and narrative contexts.  Jesus’ laughter is not 
consistently interpreted as mockery.  For example, in the introduction to The Gospel of Judas Together with 
the Letter of Peter to Philip, James, and a Book of Allogenes from Codex Tchacos: Critical Edition 
(Washington, D.C.: National Geographic, 2007), Rodolphe Kasser describes Jesus’ laughter as “an 
affectionate smile, tinged with pity and gentle irony” (24). 
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 By reading the text in terms of what it says about the care of the soul, it is 
possible to see the relationship between what have often been characterized as two 
separate themes: Peter’s strengthening and the inner-Christian debates.  For example, 
Michel Desjardins notes in his introduction to the text that there seem to be two issues: 
“Koschorke, noticing that the Apoc. Pet. deals with two issues, and considering the inner-
Christian polemic to be more important than the discussion about Jesus’ passion, has 
postulated a tripartite structure.”36
The inner-Christian polemic which dominates the central discourse is all but 
excluded from the rest of the work, where the focus is on Jesus’ coming death, 
Peter’s need to be strong, and the necessity of distinguishing the physical Jesus 
who dies on the cross from the spiritual one who remains unaffected by the 
passion.
  He goes on to give his own analysis: 
37
Thus, he sees these issues as separate and not necessarily bearing a relationship to each 
other.   
   
 In effect, however, these issues are intimately related if one reads the text in terms 
of competing visions of the care of the soul.  The Apocalypse of Peter articulates a vision 
elaborating a particular kind of care of the soul while simultaneously challenging the 
competing vision regarding martyrdom as the ultimate care of the soul.  Tradition has 
long held that Peter ultimately gave his own life as a martyr.  In the Apocalypse of Peter, 
however, an alternate explanation for Peter’s boldness is given.  Peter does not achieve 
the status of a holy martyr but that of one healed of his fear by Christ’s intervention in a 
whole other way, his explanations of Peter’s visions.  
                                                   
36 See Desjardins, Introduction, Apocalypse of Peter (NHC VII, 3), 202.  
 
37 See Desjardins, Introduction, Apocalypse of Peter (NHC VII, 3), 203. 
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 Of course, there is yet another twist.  We cannot discount the possibility that the 
readers of the text would actually have thought that Peter had suffered and died for the 
faith whether or not such is mentioned specifically in this text.  Although we have no 
hard proof that this is the case, it is a part of long-standing tradition.38
In this respect, the Apocalypse of Peter can be compared with the Letter of Peter 
to Philip, the Apocalypse of James,
  Moreover, there is 
a crucifixion scene in this text.  The body of Jesus does indeed suffer.  What differs from 
proto-orthodox texts is the meaning and significance the text ascribes to Christ’s 
suffering and that of his followers.  Such suffering should not necessarily be desired or 
sought, but if it comes as a result of proclaiming the gospel, Jesus’ teaching clearly 
allows Peter to see that it is not to be feared either.   
39
                                                   
38 1 Clement, for example, mentions it as discussed in chapter two. 
 and the Gospel of Mary (discussed further in 
chapter four).  In each of these texts, fear of persecution is real, and the reality of such is 
not denied.  In short, in the Apocalypse of Peter suffering is not to be sought because it is 
not represented as the imitation of an atoning blood sacrifice that aids in the forgiveness 
of sin, and neither does it result in a fleshly resurrection.  However, it certainly can come 
as the result of proclaiming the gospel boldly, as doing so often brings one into conflict 
with the evil powers that dominate this world.  Thus, the texts themselves simply do not 
represent those depicted in them as having a lack of courage or refusing to embrace 
39 Karen King discusses the fact that the Letter of Peter to Philip and the Apocalypse of James were found 
in the same codex containing the Gospel of Judas.  In each of these texts, the possibility of persecution and 
death is real.  She suggests that it may be helpful to see them as representing a range of viewpoints for 




martyrdom.  In fact, the opposite may be true as they empower the reader in 
understanding Jesus’ teaching and thus can serve to encourage the reader to proclaim the 
gospel boldly and face suffering bravely as she/he realizes that Christ has triumphed over 
these powers.   
Testimony of Truth  
Another text found near Nag Hammadi, the Testimony of Truth, is also relevant to 
our discussion for describing the manner in which the text discusses the care of the soul 
while simultaneously disrupting a discourse which glorifies martyrdom.  One copy of this 
text has surfaced and appears in Nag Hammadi Codex IX,3,40
The text bears no name, but based on its content, modern scholars have assigned it 
the title the Testimony of Truth.  The first major section of the text resembles a homily in 
form.  Here, the text concerns the Son of Man revealing the “word of truth” (31,8) and 
 but unfortunately, only in a 
heavily fragmentary condition.  Only about forty-five percent of the text is decipherable.  
However, in what remains, this text also presents the care of the soul in a manner 
consonant with the therapy of emotions.  Simultaneously, it voices concerns about the 
practice of martyrdom.  
                                                   
40 All citations come from Birger A. Pearson, ed., Testimony of Truth (NHC IX, 3), in the Coptic Gnostic 
Library: Nag Hammadi Codices IX and X (trans. Birger A. Pearson and Søren Giversen; NHS 25; Leiden: 
Brill, 1981), 122–203. The introduction to the text on pages 101–120 is also by Pearson. Another useful 
translation is that of Birger A. Pearson with accompanying introduction in Meyer, Nag Hammadi 
Scriptures, 613–628. See also Klaus Koschorke, “Die Polemik von Testimonium Veritatis (NHC IX, 3) 
gegen die ‘Häresien’ der Katholiken und Gnostiker,” in Die Polemik der Gnostiker gegen das Kirchliche 
Christentum (Leiden: Brill, 1978), 92–174; Birger A Pearson, “Anti-Heretical Warnings in Codex IX from 
Nag Hammadi,” in Gnosticism, Judaism, and Egyptian Christianity. Studies in Antiquity and Christianity 
(New York: Clark International, 2004), 183–93; Birger A Pearson, “Gnostic Interpretation of the Old 
Testament in The Testimony of Truth from Nag Hammadi (CG IX, 3),” HTR 71 (1980): 311–19; Birger A. 
Pearson, “Jewish Haggadic Traditions in The Testimony of Truth from Nag Hammadi,” in Gnosticism, 
Judaism, and Egyptian Christianity. Studies in Antiquity and Christianity (New York: Clark International, 
2004), 39–51. 
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the importance of our receiving it.  The section concludes, “This therefore is the true 
testimony. When man knows himself and God who is over the truth, he will be saved and 
he will be crowned with the crown unfading” (44,30–45,6).41
In the context of the ways in which Foucault has highlighted the significance of 
“knowing” within the broader context of “caring for the soul,” such a term is especially 
interesting.  So is the fact that this kind of knowing is associated with receiving a crown, 
the athlete’s crown typically being associated with martyrdom.   However, as we will see, 
in this text, such knowing goes along with being able to struggle against the passions 
successfully while the glorification of martyrdom is actually critiqued.
 
42
                                                   
41 For discussion regarding choosing the title, see Pearson, Testimony of Truth (NHC IX, 3), 101. It comes 
from the phrasing near the end of the text. 
  Several 
references in the text to overcoming passion resonate with the terminology of the therapy 
of emotions.  Thus, the text actually seems to focus on an ability to rid one’s soul of 
harmful desires.  Esoteric knowledge is not a goal in and of itself but rather a means of 
42 Bas von Os has argued that this text may not necessarily be referring to martyrdom per se but rather to 
ascetic practices. See “The Testimony of Truth Reconsidered” (paper presented at the annual meeting of the 
SBL, Chicago, November 17, 2012).  He has argued similarly with respect to the Gospel of Judas as will be 
discussed below. It is very difficult to parse a text such as this because baptism and martyrdom were both 
associated with a purifying death.  Jesus himself is represented as associating his death with a kind of 
baptism (Luke 12:50). Tertullian, for example, writes: “Uncleanness is washed away in baptism, of course, 
but the stains of it are made immaculately white through martyrdom” (Scorp. 12.10). In the Martyrdom of 
Perpetua and Felicity, too, the editor represents Saturus’s martyrdom as a “drench[ing] with blood” after 
which the crowd yells, “Well washed!”  The editor describes it as their “witness to his second baptism” 
(21.7). See also the discussion on page 97 of F. Forrester Church, “Sex and Salvation in Tertullian,” HTR 
68 (1975): 83–101; repr. in Women in Early Christianity (ed. David M. Scholer; vol. 14 of Studies in Early 
Christianity: A Collection of Scholarly Essays, ed. Everett Ferguson, David M. Scholer, and Paul C. 
Finney; New York: Garland, 1993), 199–217.  See also Moss, Other Christs, 14. Likewise, see Gordon 
Jeanes, “Baptism Portrayed as Martyrdom in the Early Church,” SL 23 (1993): 158–76; repr. in Forms of 
Devotion: Conversion, Worship, Spirituality, Asceticism (ed. Everett Ferguson; vol. 5 of Recent Studies in 
Early Christianity: A Collection of Scholarly Essays, ed. Everett Ferguson; New York: Garland, 1999), 62–
80. This article provides a detailed overview of associations between baptism and martyrdom. However, 
the thrust of Jeanes’ argument is that language associated with martyrdom enters into baptismal rites after 
actual martyrdoms are no longer occurring (174). However, it seems likely that martyrdom is the referent 
in the Testimony of Truth. Pearson clearly states this with respect to 31,22–34,26 in his introduction to the 
Testimony of Truth in Meyer, Nag Hammadi Scriptures, 614. 
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engaging in the therapy of emotions.43
And this is what the Son of Man reveals to us: It is fitting for you (pl.) to receive 
the word of truth.  If one will receive it perfectly,—. But as for one who is [in] 
ignorance, it is difficult for him to diminish his works of [darkness] which he has 
done.  Those who have [known] Imperishability, [however,] have been able to 
struggle against [passions] (31,5–31,15). 
  Closer examination of the passage in which the 
phrase “word of truth” appears helps us to see this: 
The text also discusses the idea that the subjugation of desire is important for 
salvation.  The author praises the one who has “subdued desire” (41,12) and is in the state 
of “having examined himself” (41,14).  Likewise, it talks about the need for “endurance” 
(44,9) and “patience” (44,13–19), terms frequently associated with those who are 
sufficiently healed of their emotions to be able to practice self-control: “He rejects for 
himself loquacity and disputations, and he endures the whole place; and he bears up 
under them, and he endures all of the evil things.  And he is patient with every one” 
(44,4–14). 
Moreover, this kind of knowing contrasts with the ignorance of those who desire 
martyrdom.  In fact, the glorification of martyrdom is severely critiqued: 
The foolish, thinking [in] their heart [that] if they confess, “We are Christians,” in 
word only (but) not with power, while giving themselves over to ignorance, to a 
human death, not knowing where they are going nor who Christ is, thinking that 
they will live, when they are (really) in error, hasten towards the principalities and 
the authorities.  They fall into their clutches because of the ignorance that is in 
them.  For (if) only words which bear testimony were effecting salvation, the 
whole world would endure this thing [and] would be saved.  [But] in this way, 
they [drew] error unto themselves  (31,22–32,14). 
                                                   
43 Pearson attributes an Alexandrian origin to the text and feels that it can be dated to the late second or 
early third century, possibly as early as 189 C.E.  See discussion in Introduction, Testimony of Truth (NHC 
IX, 3), 117–18. If the Apocalypse of Peter can be dated as early as 150 C.E.  and the Gospel of Judas can be 
dated prior to 180 C.E., these three texts may belong to a similar time period.  However, dating remains 
quite speculative with regard to early Christian writings.   
 82 
The author goes on to argue that it would be “vainglorious” for the Father to desire a 
human sacrifice (31,22–32, 21).  Such an attitude would implicate the Father himself in 
passionate emotions.  This implies a clear critique of Christ’s death as a substitutionary 
blood atonement necessary for the appeasement of God (though not necessarily a critique 
of an atonement as a ransom paid to Satan, the Christus Victor perspective).   
Rather, just following the passage above, the author not only represents Christ as 
bringing freedom to those in Hades but also freedom to those on earth in that Christ 
“granted healing” (33,7–8) to “the lame, the blind, the paralytic, the dumb, (and) the 
demon-possessed” (33,5–7).  This connotes healing from both physical and emotional 
infirmities. 
This is followed by another passage in which the glorification of martyrdom is 
disrupted.  The author calls those who seek martyrdom “empty martyrs” (33,25) who 
“bear witness only to themselves” (33,26–27).  They are described as “sick” and unable 
“to raise themselves” (33,28–34,1).  Then follows a particularly interesting section. The 
author says that when those he or she has been describing above “are filled with passion, 
this is the thought that they have within them: ‘If we deliver ourselves over to death for 
the sake of the Name, we will be saved’” (34,1–6).  But, the author disagrees, saying, 
“These matters are not settled in this way” (34,6–7).  The Coptic reads as follows: 
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The English translation in the Nag Hammadi Library reads,  
themselves. But when they are 
“perfected” with a (martyr’s) death, this 
is the thought that they have 
within them: “If we 
deliver ourselves over to death 
for the sake of the Name we will be saved.” These  
matters are not settled in this way. But . . . . 
 
The context of the passage clearly refers to those who desire martyrdom, but the 
author is literally accusing them of being filled with “passion,” that is, a state which is the 
opposite of being healed of emotions; in this sense, when one seeks death, one is 
simultaneously “passionate,” or “ignorant.”  For this author, salvation lies in being healed 
of passion, not filled with it.   
Interestingly, in this edition of the Nag Hammadi Library, Birger Pearson has 
translated the Coptic phrase “filled with passion” into English as “perfected with a 
martyr’s death.”  The term πάθος, or passion, is translated as “death.” The term martyr is 
not actually in the Coptic.  This is signified by placing the word martyr in parentheses.  
Pearson has inserted a footnote explaining that this phrase has been translated as “‘filled 
with passion’ (‘Wenn sie aber ihr [Leben voller] Leidenschaft vollenden’) by Koschorke 
in a German translation of the text.”44
                                                   
44 See Pearson, Testimony of Truth (NHC IX, 3), 132–33. 
  However, here he states that “it probably means 
the suffering of martyrdom.”  The Coptic word for passion can, of course, refer to death 
as when we talk about “the passion of Christ.”  However, Pearson himself notes that the 
best translation of the Greek πάθος  is just “passion” at three other places in the 
Testimony of Truth (30,5; 42,28; 58,7).  
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I would argue that the precise translation of this term is crucial as the author of the 
Testimony of Truth cleverly associates those who seek passion (or death) with those who 
are “filled with passion” and in need of the kind of healing that Christ can bring.  In fact, 
Pearson recognizes this as the better translation and has recently changed it to read “filled 
with passion” in The Nag Hammadi Scriptures: The International Edition where the 
passage reads: “But when they are full of passion, this is their motivating idea: ‘If we 
give ourselves up to death for the sake of the name, we will be saved. ‘That is not the 
way things are. Rather . . . .”45
 If we examine these other three places where πάθος is used, the term clearly 
connotes the kinds of desire or emotion that needs to be dealt with in a therapy of 
emotions.  πάθος is the “desire which constrains the souls of those who are begotten 
here” (30,5–7).  It is associated with ignorance (31,11; 31,28) and a lack of knowledge of 
the truth. People afflicted thus are said to be filled with the “old leaven” of the Pharisees 
(29,13), which is equated with “errant desire” (29,16).  In the second passage where 
πάθος is used, the phrase “he struggled against their passions” (42,28) occurs within a 
long passage endeavoring to discern why some are lame, rich, poor, and so on (42,8–21).  
Unfortunately, these three adjectives are the only ones that can be deciphered, as the text 
is fragmentary, but clearly the author seems to be asking why sickness, both physical and 
emotional, exists. Struggling against the passions seems to be a way of discussing the 
struggle to heal people enslaved to their passions.  
 
                                                   
45 Meyer, Nag Hammadi Scriptures, 618. 
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In the final passage containing πάθος (58,7), the context is not at all clear.  πάθος 
seems to refer to the attitude of a group that the author does not necessarily approve of; 
but other than this, it is hard to understand what the passage is about as the text is very 
fragmented. 
 The author also critiques the notion that those who seek martyrdom will be 
resurrected in the flesh.  The author discusses the misperceptions of those who expect a 
“carnal resurrection” (36,31):  
[Do not] expect, therefore, [the] carnal resurrection, which [is] destruction, [and 
they are not] [stripped] of [it (the flesh) who] err in [expecting] a [resurrection] 
that is empty.  [They do] not [know] the power [of God,] nor do they [understand 
the interpretation] of the Scriptures [on account of their] double-mindedness  
(36,30–37,10). 
In fact, Pearson cleverly notes in his introduction that in this context, the author equates 
such persons with the Sadducees whom Jesus criticizes (Matt 22:29).46
Finally, in lines 38,6–8, the author seems to be reiterating that when people try to 
sacrifice themselves “they die [in a] human [way].”  However, it is hard to be sure given 
that the text is rather corrupt at this point.   
 In this passage, 
the author of the Testimony of Truth seems to be talking about the fact that knowledge of 
Christ has already allowed for a different kind of resurrection, which involves some 
people having come to know themselves.  The translators’ footnote says that lines 35,22–
36,3 refer to “the process of gnostic awakening,” but such phrasing may simply be the 
author’s conception of the way Christ helps his followers to care for their souls.  These 
people are described as being in “the place [in] [which] they will rest from their 
senselessness, [arriving] at knowledge” (35,28–36,3).   
                                                   
46 See Pearson, Testimony of Truth (NHC IX, 3), 104. 
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The end of the first major portion of the text invokes “the crown unfading” (45,5–
6).  The athlete’s crown was, of course, a primary symbol for the martyr who faced death 
bravely and successfully.  This allusion nicely contrasts the “achievement” of martyrdom 
with a different kind of triumph—engaging successfully in the therapy of emotions and 
becoming healed and whole.47
There is also a reference to a salamander that is quite interesting: “[like a] 
salamander.  [It] goes into the fiery oven which burns exceedingly; it slithers into the 
[furnace]” (71,26–29).  In antiquity, the salamander was thought unharmed by fire.  
Although much of the context of this passage has been lost due to the fragmentary form 
of the manuscript, Pearson notes that “the author of Testim. Truth may have utilized the 
salamander for allegorical purposes . . . in praise of the Gnostic who can live untouched 




 In summary, this text repeatedly discusses the need for the Christian to overcome 
“passion.”  In this sense, it is not esoteric knowledge that the Christian needs but rather 
the ability to live in a manner free of entanglement in harmful desires.  Those who seek 
martyrdom are not living in this way as they associate salvation with a carnal resurrection 
of a material body that is enslaved to the passions.   
 
                                                   
47 See Dylan M. Burns, “Sethian Crowns, Sethian Martyrs? Jewish Apocalyptic and Christian Martyrology 
in a Gnostic Literary Tradition” (paper presented at the annual meeting of the SBL, Chicago, 17 November 
2012) for insights regarding the way crown imagery functions in early Christian texts although the 
Testimony of Truth is not discussed specifically since it is not Sethian. 
48 Pearson, Testimony of Truth, 114. 
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Fragment of Basilides 
 Yet another interesting representation of the proper way for a Christian to live 
comes from Basilides, a second-century Alexandrian teacher widely credited with being 
one of the first to write commentaries on the Gospels.  Bentley Layton astutely describes 
Basilides as “a skilled, independent, and outrageously original philosopher within 
Christianity” (emphasis added).49 Unfortunately, the vast majority of his writings have 
been lost, making it difficult for modern readers to access his thought although a few 
fragments remain in the quotations of Clement of Alexandria and Origen.50
 Basilides also portrays Christian care of the soul in terms consonant with Stoic 
philosophy.  For example, according to Clement of Alexandria, Basilides says, “that one 
part of the so-called ‘will’ of god is to love all. . . . A second, is to desire nothing; and a 
third, is to hate nothing.”
   
51  This admonition accords well with the Stoic virtue of 
freedom from passion.52
                                                   
49 Layton, Gnostic Scriptures, 413. 
  Moreover, it provides a marked contrast to the kind of desire or 
craving for martyrdom present in proto-orthodox texts.  For Basilides, it is liberation 
from desire of any kind that marks the spiritually mature soul, for it is only when one 
50 Eight of the fragments have been translated into English with brief commentary by Bentley Layton in 
Gnostic Scriptures 417–44.  For another translation and commentary, see Winrich A. Löhr, Basilides und 
seine Schule: Eine Studie zur Theologie-und Kirchengeschichte des zweiten Jahrhunderts (WUNT 83; ed. 
Martin Hengel und Otfried Hofius, Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1996), 42–254; Werner 
Foerster, Gnosis: A Selection of Gnostic Texts, vol. 1, Patristic Evidence (ed. and trans. R. McL. Wilson; 
London: Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1972), 74–83.  
51 Fragment D, Layton, Gnostic Scriptures, 435.  
52 Bentley Layton notes that this loving all is “in accordance with the strong Stoic element in Basilides’ 
ethical theory” and that it “must mean to live in complete harmony with the rational order of the universe, 
accepting all of one’s fate without regret or protest; accordingly, there is no place for desire or revulsion, 
since all is dictated by providence” (Gnostic Scriptures, 435). 
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realizes and accepts the order in all things preordained by Providence that one can be 
liberated.53
 Significantly, however, Basilides does see martyrdom as providing possible 
benefit in terms of spiritual development.  His ideas are found in Fragment G,
   
54 which is, 
interestingly, by far the longest fragment preserved for us by Clement, mirroring, perhaps, 
the degree to which debates surrounding the interpretation of martyrdom dominated inter-
Christian conversations in the second century.  In this fragment, he holds that the soul 
“receives benefit, profiting by many unpleasant experiences” when it “experiences 
suffering” (4.82.1).55 This statement is strikingly similar to the kind of benefit described 
by the Apostolic Fathers when they discuss “patient endurance,” which is elaborated in 
chapter two.56
 Basilides also describes a martyr’s death as an honorable one, a “good end” 
(4.81.2), saying that such a death is preferable to death for murder or adultery or other 
crimes as one is likely to believe that in this case one’s death has purpose and meaning 
and thus one may not necessarily feel oneself to be suffering:  
    
Through the kindness of that which leads each one of them about, they are 
actually accused of an extraneous set of charges so they might not have to suffer 
as confessed criminals convicted of crimes, nor be reviled as adulterers or 
murderers, but rather might suffer because they are disposed by nature to be 
                                                   
53 Bentley Layton also notes this Stoic influence on 418.  Interestingly, Layton’s assertion accords with the 
recent interest in linking Stoic thought with the New Testament and developments in the first three 
centuries of Christianity by Troels-Engberg Pedersen and other scholars as discussed in chapter two. 
54 Layton, Gnostic Scriptures, 442. 
55 Layton, Gnostic Scriptures, 442. 
56 On page 306, vol. 1, Le Boulluec comments that chastisement and punishment were commonly viewed 
as beneficial purifications, remarking that both Clement and Basilides accepted this idea: Alain Le 
Boulluec, La notion d'hérésie dans la littérature grecque, 2 tomes (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1985). 
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Christian.  And this encourages them to think that they are not suffering 
(4.81.2).57
 However, Basilides provides clear disruptions to the discourse of martyrdom as a 
sacrifice willed by and pleasing to a God who must be appeased through a substitutionary 
blood sacrifice along with the accompanying theology of the resurrection of the flesh.  He 
clearly states that “suffering is not caused by the plotting of some power” (4.81.3).
   
58  In 
fact, Basilides actually represents the agonizing death of a martyr as possible punishment 
for previous sin: “I believe that all who experience the so-called ‘tribulations’ must have 
committed sins other than what they realize” (4.81.2).59  While there are many 
theological alternatives to this point of view, it is the way in which Basilides reconciles 
his belief in the goodness of Providence with the fact of brutal physical suffering endured 
by Christians in times of persecution.  He asserts, “For I will say anything rather than call 
Providence evil” (4.82.2).60  In other words, if God is good, it cannot be necessary for 
Christ or Christians to suffer to appease God, but their doing so may indeed be the means 
of their spiritual development or “benefit.”  Basilides carefully notes that since seeming 
suffering may be of benefit, it is even possible that an innocent person may suffer.  He 
thinks that such cases are rare, but he does not rule out the possibility (4.81.3).61
                                                   
57 Layton, Fragment G, Gnostic Scriptures, 442. 
  
58 Layton, Fragment G, Gnostic Scriptures, 442. 
59 Layton, Fragment G, Gnostic Scriptures, 442. 
60 Layton, Fragment G, Gnostic Scriptures, 442.  One only wonders what a thorough comparison of 
writings by figures such as Basilides who are criticized as “deterministic” with those of Calvin, praised as 
one of the greatest orthodox theologians of all time, who similarly espouses deterministic beliefs in 
“predestination” and “election,” would yield. 
61 Layton, Fragment G, Gnostic Scriptures, 442. 
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Although it is hard to be sure given the scanty evidence remaining to us, it seems that 
Basilides may be referring to Jesus himself as one such person when he writes,  
Nevertheless, let us suppose that you (sing.) leave aside all these matters and set 
out to embarrass me by referring to certain (famous) figures, saying perhaps, 
“And consequently so-and-so must have sinned, since he suffered!”  If you permit, 
I shall say that he did not sin, but was like the newborn baby that suffers.  But if 
you press the argument, I shall say that any human being that you can name is 
human; god is righteous.  For no one is “pure of uncleanness,” as someone once 
said (4.81.1).62
Such an idea is hardly representative of the supposed Docetism attributed to some 
Gnostics.
   
63
 Moreover, Basilides does not promote a doctrine of the resurrection of the flesh.  
He appears to believe in the transmigration of souls. For example, in Fragment F, Origen 
refers to Basilides’ belief in this concept and quotes him as saying, “Indeed, the apostle 
has said, ‘I was once alive apart from the law,’ at some time or other.  That is (Paul 
means), before I came into this body, I lived in the kind of body that is not subject to the 
law; the body of a domestic animal or a bird.”
 
64
                                                   
62 Layton, Fragment G, Gnostic Scriptures, 442. 
  Likewise, Irenaeus accuses Basilides of 
63 There is also the matter of Irenaeus’ accusation regarding Basilides’ supposed assertion that Simon of 
Cyrene actually died rather than Jesus himself.  This example is often used to support Basilides’ supposed 
Docetism.  However, we have only Irenaeus’ word regarding this.  Given Irenaeus’ propensity for 
distortion of the ideas of his opponents, it is hard to be sure what Basilides actually said or meant.  Irenaeus 
represents Basilides as saying that Jesus was laughing while Simon was crucified.  It is important to note 
that such laughing is not necessarily mere mockery.  In many early Christian texts, Jesus’ laughing serves 
as a signal to the reader that Jesus is aware of spiritual ignorance on the part of those with whom he is 
interacting.  They misunderstand him.  Jesus does not curse or condemn them, but his laughter serves to 
show that he is not subject to passions of anger or fear with regard to them.  It is interesting that Christ 
laughs in the Apocalypse of Peter and the Gospel of Judas as well.   
64 Layton, Fragment F, Gnostic Scriptures, 439. 
 91 
believing that “salvation belongs only to the soul; the body is by nature corruptible” 
(Haer. 1.24.5).65
 Such views might constitute merely a theological difference but for the fact that 
the discourse of suffering and martyrdom is becoming increasingly key to the way in 
which the proto-orthodox are at that time consolidating the Christian story in a triumphal 
way, linking martyrs and the resurrection of the flesh with the order of apostolic 
succession.  Peter Brown’s The Making of Late Antiquity
 
66
 As noted above, this fragment is preserved only in Clement of Alexandria’s 
writings.  Clement includes it in Book IV of his Stromata (which can be translated as 
Miscellanies or even literally as Carpet Bags).  Clement explains that Book IV is devoted 
entirely to a discussion of martyrdom, and indeed he lays out the relevant issues in a 
careful manner, discussing the nuances of the kinds of significance attributed to 
martyrdom by various groups and figures.  He includes this particular fragment in order 
to refute Basilides’ teaching.  Alain Le Boulluec insightfully points out Clement’s 
methodology, noting that Clement uses an ancient rhetorical technique of question and 
response that involves imagining what an opponent would say if present, presenting this 
 provides an excellent 
description of the ways in which the cult of the saints increasingly provided support for 
notions of apostolic authority.  Likewise, Judith Perkins’s notion of the “suffering self” 
(as discussed in chapters one and two) does so as well.  It appears that Basilides opposed 
such conceptions and thus, not surprisingly, proto-orthodox writers such as Irenaeus 
angrily denounced him. 
                                                   
65 Layton, Fragment F, Gnostic Scriptures, 423.  
66 Peter Brown, The Making of Late Antiquity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978). 
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in the form of a question, and then refuting this question in a response, as one would in an 
oral debate.  Unfortunately, helpful as such a technique might be as an exercise, it can 
result in attributing an argument to an adversary that the opponent never actually made.  
This could well be the case regarding Basilides’ teaching on martyrdom.67
 Irenaeus of Lyons also discusses Basilides’ teaching about martyrdom.  Irenaeus 
does not quote the fragment verbatim as Clement does, but he does comment on it.  
However, Irenaeus’ description of Basilides’ thought differs dramatically from what is 
preserved in Fragment G. Irenaeus writes that the Basilideans say, “Recognize them all, 
But let none recognize you!” and then he goes on to comment, “For this reason, such 
people are prepared to deny; or, rather, they are not even susceptible to suffering on 
behalf of the name” (Haer. 1.24.6).
  
68
 Christoph Markschies and Bentley Layton have both noted the discrepancies 
between the actual text of Basilides and the accusations of Irenaeus.  Layton is careful to 
point out that Basilides was accused by later theologians of “disparaging” or “opposing” 
 However, in Fragment G, Basilides does not 
denounce the martyrs or even fail to recognize that their suffering has meaning and 
purpose; he simply attributes a different kind of meaning and purpose to such suffering.  
In short, then, even though only miniscule portions of Basilides’ writings remain to us for 
examination, what seems clear is Basilides’ disruption of a discourse that glorifies 
martyrdom and presents its meaning and significance in simple, black-and-white terms 
linked strongly with proto-orthodox notions of apostolic authority. 
                                                   
67 See page 306 in part II, chapter 4 which translates as “The ‘Liberalism’ of Clement of Alexandria and Its 
Limits,” and section V: “The art of rhetorical dialectic in the struggle against heresy in Alain Le Boulluec,” 
in Le Boulluec, La notion d'hérésie dans la littérature grecque, 1985.  
68 Layton, Gnostic Scriptures, 425. 
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martyrdom although nothing in this fragment actually bears that out.69 Markschies goes 
so far as to maintain that Irenaeus has probably not read Basilides directly, mentioning 
that Irenaeus’ accusation—that Basilides encourages the avoidance of martyrdom and 
denial of the faith—simply does not correspond to the pastoral manner in which Basilides 
addresses the issue of persecution.70
 Basilides is interesting, too, because supposed Gnostics are often accused of 
dualism, but Basilides’ insistence on the ultimate goodness of Providence extends all the 
way to the circumstances of individuals’ material, earthly existence.  In this sense, it is 
markedly less dualistic than the views of those among the proto-orthodox who represent 
this life as one filled with darkness and suffering and the afterlife alone as happy and 
peaceful. 
   
Fourth Fragment of Valentinus 
The fourth fragment of Valentinus also fails to exhibit what might be considered 
“Gnostic” elements, presenting rather a perspective regarding the care of the soul that 
intersects the dominant discourse of the glorification of martyrdom. Clement of 
Alexandria has preserved the fourth fragment of Valentinus in Book IV of his Stromata.  
Clement quotes Valentinus as saying, 
From the beginning, you (plur.) have been immortal, and you are children of 
eternal life. And you wanted death to be allocated to yourselves so that you might 
spend it and use it up, and that death might die in you and through you.  For when 
                                                   
69 Layton, Gnostic Scriptures, 441. 
70 Christoph Markschies, Gnosis: An Introduction (trans. John Bowden; London: T&T Clark, 2003), 79, 81. 
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you nullify the world and are not yourselves annihilated, you are lord over 
creation and all corruption (Strom. 4.89.1–3).71
 This passage provides an excellent example of the way Valentinus discusses the 
care of the soul in terms of a therapy of the emotions while simultaneously critiquing the 
way in which the care of the soul is represented in the increasingly dominant discourse of 
martyrdom.  Scholars usually argue that Valentinus is doing one or the other, but in 
actuality, the passage contains a marvelous ambiguity lending itself to both 
interpretations—as an affirmation of the therapy of emotions and a critique of the 
glorification of martyrdom.   
   
 Clement himself includes this passage in Book IV of the Stromata.  In the 
introduction, Clement specifically remarks that he will be dealing with the topic of 
martyrdom, and indeed, he addresses a great many issues in a complex way, presenting 
the points of many different Christian thinkers.  He does not espouse a simple “pro” or 
“con” approach but tries to consider the issues thoughtfully from many different angles.  
It is within this context that he critiques Valentinus (and Basilides).  Thus, he clearly 
represents the passage as having something to do with the issue of martyrdom. 
 Most modern scholars have assumed Clement’s interpretation of this passage—as 
a Valentinian critique of martyrdom.72
                                                   
71 This is the translation of Bentley Layton in Layton, Gnostic Scriptures, 241. For another translation and 
commentary, see Foerster, Gnosis: A Selection of Gnostic Texts, 239–43; Christoph Markschies, Valentinus 
Gnosticus? Untersuchungen zur valentinianischen Gnosis mit einem Kommentar zu den Fragmenten 
Valentins (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1992), 118–52. 
  Hans Holzhausen focuses on the fiscal imagery 
 
72 Jens Holzhausen, “Gnosis und Martyrium: Zu Valentins viertem Fragment,” ZNW 85 (1994): 116–131.  
See also Jens Holzhausen, “Valentinus and Valentinians,” in vol. 2 of Dictionary of Gnosis and Western 
Esotericism (ed. J. Hanegraaff et al..; Leiden: Brill, 2005), 1144–1157. 
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contained in the text.  The phrase, use it up, could indicate the idea that the “immortal 
ones” wish to pay for eternal life with their own martyrdom.  
 However, Ismo Dunderberg explicates this passage in a completely different way.  
He argues that it may well demonstrate Valentinus’ characterization of the way Christians 
should take on a proper attitude of detachment from the world, an explanation similar to 
teaching regarding the therapy of the emotions in Stoic philosophy.73
                                                   
73 Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 45. 
  Dunderberg makes 
several convincing arguments.  First of all, he points out that the present tense is used in 
the first line, “You are immortal from the beginning, and you are children of eternal life.”  
Such phrasing would indicate that the readers or listeners already understand themselves 
to have eternal life; they do not need to become martyrs in order to gain it.  Second, 
Dunderberg notices that previous interpretations of this fragment have translated the 
passage as though the second sentence begins with the word but.  However, in 
Dunderberg’s reading, the second sentence simply affirms the character and wishes of the 
hearers.  In other words, “you are immortal” and you wished to have “death bestowed 
upon you.”  If this is the case, “death” may well be referring to the death of passions, 
desires, and emotions, not the physical death of martyrs.  This kind of death is a way of 
“nullify[ing] the world.”  “Death” becomes paired with “self-control.” When one has 
self-control, one is able to rule over oneself and all of creation.  Such a reading evokes 
Socrates’ sense of the care of the soul as necessary for being a good ruler of others (as 
discussed in chapter one).    
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 Later, in the context of discussing the Valentinian myth of wisdom, Dunderberg 
suggests that the Valentinians described this therapy, the curing of excessive emotion, as 
a kind of gift that Christ could give to those who followed him.74
 I would argue that this passage might represent a kind of “both/and” argument on 
the part of Valentinus.  Such a passage works both to provide a positive vision of what is 
possible for those who come to realize that they can indeed overcome their passions and 
attain self-control through following Christ, and it simultaneously provides a critique of 
those who try to “nullify the world” by literally seeking death.  The passage is cleverly 
written such that both readings are possible.  The ambiguity allows for an interpretation 
that would provide support both for those who see martyrdom as a way of fusing care of 
soul and body (believing it insures eternal salvation) and by those who feel a glorification 
of martyrdom to be a distortion of the care of the soul, seeing Christ as the one who helps 
the believer to find self-control and attain freedom from one’s emotions here and now.   
  This focus on issues of 
spiritual transformation accords with the kind of care of the self that Foucault discusses 
as prevalent.   
Dunderberg’s reading is astute, but one wonders if Clement would have included 
this passage in Book IV—all of which is devoted to a discussion of martyrdom—had the 
fragment been totally irrelevant to that issue.  On the other hand, while Clement’s tone 
toward figures such as Valentinus and Basilides is understandably considerably less 
hostile than that of an Irenaeus or a Tertullian, it is interesting that Clement utilizes his 
                                                   
74 Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 117. 
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adroitness with respect to discursive strategies to categorize this passage as a refusal to 
embrace martyrdom rather than in terms of Stoic detachment from the world.  
 Le Boulluec argues that Clement attributes ideas to Basilides that he does not 
actually express.  It may well be that Clement indulges in a similar tactic with respect to 
Valentinus.  However, it seems more plausible that the strategy here is one of omission.  
Clement is thoroughly versed in the idea that Christian perfection involves the therapy of 
emotions. This theme occurs repeatedly in the Stromata. For example, in chapter one, 
book 1 of the Paedagogus (or “instructor”), Clement describes Christ as follows: 
The Instructor being practical, not theoretical, His aim is thus to improve the soul, 
not to teach, and to train it up to a virtuous, not to an intellectual life. . . . Hence 
accordingly ensues the healing of our passions . . . the Paedagogue strengthening 
our souls, and by His benign commands, as by gentle medicines, guiding the sick 
to the perfect knowledge of the truth.  
In fact, at times Clement seems to echo Valentinus.  Consider the following passages 
where Clement discusses martyrdom as “confession to God” and death to passion, which 
may or may not entail a martyr’s physical death: 
If the confession to God is martyrdom, each soul which has lived purely in the 
knowledge of God, which has obeyed the commandments, is a witness both by 
life and word, in whatever way it may be released from the body,—shedding faith 
as blood along its whole life till its departure. For instance, the Lord says in the 
Gospel, “Whosoever shall leave father, or mother, or brethren,” and so forth, “for 
the sake of the Gospel and my name,” he is blessed; not indicating simple 
martyrdom, but the gnostic martyrdom, as of the man who has conducted himself 
according to the rule of the Gospel, in love to the Lord (for the knowledge of the 
Name and the understanding of the Gospel point out the gnosis, but not the bare 
appellation), so as to leave his worldly kindred, and wealth, and every possession, 
in order to lead a life free from passion (Strom. IV.4). 
At the beginning of Book V, Chapter XI, Clement even describes the sacrifice that is 
truly acceptable to God in terms of freedom from passion:  
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Now the sacrifice which is acceptable to God is unswerving abstraction from the 
body and its passions. This is the really true piety. And is not, on this account, 
philosophy rightly called by Socrates the practice of Death? For he who neither 
employs his eyes in the exercise of thought, nor draws aught from his other senses, 
but with pure mind itself applies to objects, practises the true philosophy. . . . For 
the gnostic soul must be consecrated to the light, stript of the integuments of 
matter, devoid of the frivolousness of the body and of all the passions, which are 
acquired through vain and lying opinions, and divested of the lusts of the flesh. 
But the most of men, clothed with what is perishable, like cockles, and rolled all 
round in a ball in their excesses, like hedgehogs, entertain the same ideas of the 
blessed and incorruptible God as of themselves. 
It is well known that Clement himself left Alexandria at one point when 
persecution broke out.  Given his love of philosophy and his possible affinity for fellow 
Alexandrians such as Basilides and Valentinus, he may simply have felt a need to set 
himself apart from thinkers such as these and establish his own “orthodoxy.”  
Characterizing the passage he attributes to Valentinus as a critique of martyrdom would 
have been a clever discursive means of doing so.    
Candida Moss also picks up on the ways in which Clement discursively shapes 
martyrdom in accord with his own purposes:  
The distinctions between Clement’s position and those of his interlocutors are 
hardly the radical breaks in thought that his rhetoric leads us to believe. In 
pushing the heretics to the margins, Clement acquires power. In creating and 
claiming the middle position, he also assumes the rhetorical high ground that the 
Aristotelian mean affords him. His own perspective, grounded as it is in a 
philosophy of love, emerges as a middle course and thus as the default position on 
martyrdom. Much has been made of the ways in which Clement is influenced by 
the positions of his opponents and takes a reasonable middle position . . . . Much 
more should be made, however, of the ways in which he creates this middle 
position and sets himself firmly on it. Scholars have tended to treat Clement’s 
categories of true martyrdom, enthusiasm, and anti-martyrdom as an adequate 
description of the various positions on martyrdom in his day, yet perhaps he is 
more constructive that descriptive.75
                                                   
75 Moss, Ancient Christian Martyrdom, 149; see also 145–58. Later, she continues, “The intellectual and 
ideological functions of reluctance and enthusiasm are rarely documented and are instead constantly elided 
by ancient record. If these practices can be historically associated with schismatic or heretical groups, then 
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In short, we  must remember that we are reading Valentinus as Clement represents him 
and keep in mind that Clement may be using particular discursive strategies in his reading 
of an intriguing passage which seems to offer interesting insights regarding the care of 
the soul but which can be interpreted in more than one way. Valentinus may well be 
offering a critique of seeking martyrdom as well, but this position in no way implies a 
lack of Christian devotion. It simply reflects a perspective different from “proto-
orthodox” thinkers such as those discussed in chapter two. 
 
Gospel of Judas 
Finally, we turn to the Gospel of Judas.  First of all, it is worth noting that the 
parallels between the Apocalypse of Peter and the Gospel of Judas are particularly 
striking.  Both are revelation dialogues that take place with disciples of Jesus prior to his 
crucifixion.  These are the very two men whom the canonical gospels portray as having 
betrayed Jesus.  In each of the texts respectively, Peter and Judas are represented as 
                                                                                                                                                       
they are rhetorically stabilized by Clement and attributed to the nonorthodox. Clement’s self-positioning as 
the moderate, temperate bastion of orthodoxy is rhetorically powerful, reproducing an Aristotelian cultural 
investment in moderation as a means of self-elevation. Martyrdom that occurs outside of this construction 
is either the nonrational product of excessive passion, like the voluntary martyrs, or the result of womanly 
cowardice, as in the case of Gnostics. The association of volunteerism and reluctance with the ugly 
feminizing vices of excessive passion and cowardice sets up a contrast with the manliness of Clement’s 
prudent orthodox martyr. The rhetorical effect of this construction is twofold: on one hand, heretical groups 
are associated with these passionate, nonrational forms of self-governance; on the other, there is no 
orthodox intellectual basis for these practices” (Moss, Ancient Christian Martyrdom, 162). Finally, she 
concludes, “Clement’s construction of the true martyr as the true gnostic Christian has had far-reaching 
effects. Traditionally, overviews of ancient Christian martyrdom have tended to plot three points on a 
sliding scale: the hot enthusiasm of the New Prophecy, the frigid apostasy of the Gnostics, and, in between, 
the measured position of the orthodox, who got it just right. Yet, when used in a survey of the ancient 
Christian ideological terrain, this model produces results that are flatly two-dimensional. Under the 
slightest pressure, Clement’s model breaks down. Adherents of the New Prophecy were perhaps no more 
enthusiastic about martyrdom than any other group, and some Gnostic authors wrote approvingly about 
martyrdom. There was no homogenous, moderate, orthodox position on the performance and significance 
of martyrdom” (Moss, Ancient Christian Martyrdom, 162). 
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struggling with destructive passions—Peter with fear and Judas with anger.  The 
Apocalypse of Peter shows Jesus patiently revealing the way of liberation and 
transformation to Peter in spite of his repeated failures to comprehend Jesus’ teaching 
while the author of the Gospel of Judas portrays Judas as the one who comes closer than 
any other disciple to being “the perfect human.”76 Some scholars feel that, ultimately, 
Judas fails miserably in this role, but others feel just as strongly that he models it (as 
discussed below).  Still others feel that he is portrayed ambiguously.  Likewise, Peter’s 
portrayal—in the Apocalypse of Peter and elsewhere—is also riddled with 
ambivalence.77  Thus, similarities regarding a need for healing and Jesus’ insight 
regarding a cure, the care of the soul in terms of the therapy of emotions, emerge.  Other 
remarkable affinities arise as well: a critique of apostolic succession, a critique of 
practices of sacrifice (including martyrdom conceived of as a particular kind of sacrifice), 
and two-natures Christology (with the divine nature engaging in laughter).  In addition, 
neither text interprets Jesus’ death as a substitutionary blood atonement or advocates a 
belief in a fleshly resurrection.78
                                                   
76 Gospel of Judas 35,4.  As stated above, citations come from Kasser, et al., The Gospel of Judas, 2007 
unless otherwise noted.  
 
77 For similarities between the portrayals of Judas and Peter, see also Jean-Daniel Dubois, “L’Évangile de 
Judas et la Tradition Basilidienne,” in The Gospel of Judas in Context: Proceedings of the First 
International Conference on the Gospel of Judas, Paris, Sorbonne, October 27th–28th, 2006 (ed. Madeleine 
Scopello; NHMS 26; ed. Stephen Emmel and Johannes van Oort; Leiden: Brill, 2008), 145–154. 
78 One other parallel concerns the date of the works.  Interestingly, the dating of neither work is clear, and 
both have often been characterized as “late” simply because of their anti-orthodox remarks, but a gospel 
featuring Judas is mentioned by Irenaeus in Adversus Haereses (Against Heresies), circa 180 C.E.   As noted 
above, Michael Desjardins states that the Apocalypse of Peter could possibly be dated as early as 150 C.E.  
Therefore, the Apocalypse of Peter and the Gospel of Judas may come from a similar time period. 
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In this section, we examine first the representation of Judas and its relation to the 
care of the soul in terms of the therapy of emotions.  In order to do so, we will examine 
most closely the interpretations of Judas as an ambiguous moral figure.  We then turn to 
the critique of apostolic succession and of the practices of sacrifice and martyrdom.  
Finally, we explore the way in which this text may have served as reflection for early 
Christians facing persecution.   
Background 
 Irenaeus sarcastically refers to a text called the Gospel of Judas as a “fictitious 
history:” 
Others again declare that Cain derived his being from the Power above, and 
acknowledge that Esau, Korah, the Sodomites, and all such persons, are related to 
themselves.  On this account, they add, they have been assailed by the Creator, yet 
no one of them has suffered injury.  For Sophia was in the habit of carrying off 
that which belonged to her from them to herself.  They declare that Judas the 
traitor was thoroughly acquainted with these things, and that he alone, knowing 
the truth as no others did, accomplished the mystery of the betrayal; by him all 
things, both earthy and heavenly, were thus thrown into confusion.  They produce 
a fictitious history of this kind, which they style the Gospel of Judas (Haer. 
1.31.1).  
However, until the late 1970s, not a single copy was known to exist; therefore, it 
was impossible to discern the merit of Irenaeus’ critique.79
                                                   
79 Pseudo-Tertullian, Epiphanius, and Theodoret also refer to either this text or ideas contained in it.  See 
pages 190–195 of John D. Turner, “The Place of the Gospel of Judas in Sethian Tradition,” in The Gospel 
of Judas in Context: Proceedings of the First International Conference on the Gospel of Judas, Paris, 
Sorbonne, October 27th–28th, 2006 (ed. Madeleine Scopello; NHMS 26; ed. Stephen Emmel and Johannes 
van Oort; Leiden: Brill, 2008), 187–237. 
 Most scholars think the text 
released to the world by National Geographic in 2006 is the one to which Irenaeus is 
referring. The actual copy that was found around 1970 dates to the fourth century  C.E., 
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but it is most probably a copy of a work composed by the time at which Irenaeus is 
writing, the latter half of the second century. 80
Johannes van Oort argues that Irenaeus had actually read and had first-hand 
knowledge of the Gospel of Judas.
   
81  Likewise, Lance Jenott, the author of yet another 
newly published critical edition of the text that incorporates fragments to which the 
National Geographic team did not have access, also argues for a second-century 
composition.82
Scholars unanimously agree that the text is not a literal recounting of actual 
conversations between Jesus and Judas, and that it tells us nothing about their historical 
relationship in the first century of the Common Era.  However, the text provides 
 
                                                   
80 By means of comparison, our oldest copy of the Bible, the Codex Sinaiticus, dates to the fourth century, 
but the New Testament gospels contained therein were composed in the first century. It is interesting to 
note that while the Gospel of Judas is certainly of a later date than most of the books of the New Testament, 
recent scholarship has pointed to a later date than previously thought for Luke-Acts. This, too, may be a 
second-century composition rather than a first-century one.  It is difficult to establish exact dates for the 
composition of many early Christian writings.  Acts is particularly interesting for it contains the sole 
account of what was later widely perceived as a martyrdom (though this term is not actually used in Acts 
itself)—the stoning of Stephen.  Shelly Matthews’ recent book provides a fascinating overview and 
discusses the ways in which the representation of Stephen’s death functions to strengthen the proto-
orthodox discourse of martyrdom: Matthews, Perfect Martyr, 2010.  
81 See Johannes van Oort, “Irenaeus on the Gospel of Judas: An Analysis of the Evidence in Context,” in 
The Codex Judas Papers: Proceedings of the International Congress on the Tchacos Codex held at Rice 
University, Houston, Texas, March 13–16, 2008 (ed. April D. DeConick; NHMS 71; ed. Johannes van Oort 
and Einar Thomassen; Leiden: Brill, 2009), 43–56. 
 
82 See Jenott, Gospel of Judas, 5–6.  There are some dissenting opinions.  See page 3 of Alastair Logan, 
“The Tchacos Codex: Another Document of the Gnostics?,” in The Codex Judas Papers: Proceedings of 
the International Congress on the Tchacos Codex held at Rice University, Houston, Texas, March 13–16, 
2008 (ed. April D. DeConick; NHMS 71; ed. Johannes van Oort and Einar Thomassen; Leiden: Brill, 2009), 
3–21. See also pages 90–94 of Gesine Schenke Robinson, “The Gospel of Judas: Its Protagonist, Its 
Composition, and Its Community,” in The Codex Judas Papers: Proceedings of the International Congress 
on the Tchacos Codex held at Rice University, Houston, Texas, March 13–16, 2008 (ed. April D. 
DeConick; NHMS 71; ed. Johannes van Oort and Einar Thomassen; Leiden: Brill, 2009), 75–94. 
Additionally, see pages 131–33 of John D. Turner, “The Sethian Myth in the Gospel of Judas: Soteriology 
or Demonology? in The Codex Judas Papers: Proceedings of the International Congress on the Tchacos 
Codex held at Rice University, Houston, Texas, March 13–16, 2008 (ed. April D. DeConick; NHMS 71; ed. 
Johannes van Oort and Einar Thomassen; Leiden: Brill, 2009), 95–133. 
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invaluable insight into inner-Christian debates of the second or third century particularly 
concerning attitudes regarding the care of the self.83
Judas’ Moral Character 
 
Scholars have fiercely debated the issue of Judas’ moral character, and it is 
significant for discussing the way in which the text serves to illuminate the care of the 
soul.  Thus, we follow the debate around relevant textual passages in some detail below. 
Ultimately, it is the compelling argument of Ismo Dunderberg—that Judas is an 
ambiguous figure—which is most compelling.  As such, he serves as a moral exemplar 
for the care of the soul, but not a perfect one. 
 National Geographic acquired the right to publish what has become known as the 
Codex Tchacos and put together a team of scholars to prepare a critical edition in Coptic, 
English and French; however, each person involved was forced to sign a non-disclosure 
agreement, and the text could not be widely and freely discussed.84
                                                   
83 The discovery of the text and its modern history is in and of itself a fascinating story which has been 
shrouded in a great deal of mystery.  Rodolphe Kasser, one of the scholars chiefly responsible for the text’s 
restoration, describes what is summarized below in detail. It appears that Egyptian farmers found the codex 
containing this text in a tomb on the Nile River north of the town of Al Minya.  The manuscript came into 
the hands of local antiquities dealers and was divided up into several parts, as the owners thought doing so 
would be a more profitable way to dispose of it.  The portion containing the Gospel of Judas was shown to 
scholars in the early 1980s, but although its value was recognized, none of the institutions with which they 
were associated were willing to part with the three million dollar asking price. Unfortunately, the 
manuscript simply sat in a vault in New York for several years, deteriorating in a humid climate.  It was 
finally sold and resold, but this, too, resulted in further deterioration. In fact, one of the new owners decided 
to freeze the manuscript, thinking that this would be the best way to preserve it. However, when the 
papyrus was removed from the freezer, it started to crumble.  Finally, the text was purchased by Frieda 
Tchacos, and several years of painstaking restoration ensued in which crumbled fragments had to be pieced 
together with tweezers under high definition microscopes. An estimated ten to twenty percent of the text 
could not be recovered.  See Rodolphe Kasser, “Introduction: Lost and Found: The History of Codex 
Tchacos,” in The Gospel of Judas Together with the Letter of Peter to Philip, James, and a Book of 
Allogenes from Codex Tchacos: Critical Edition (ed. Rodolphe Kasser et al.; Washington, D.C.: National 
Geographic, 2007), 1–25. 
  This work was not 
84 See DeConick, The Thirteenth Apostle, 181 for a concise summary of the ways in which the profit-
making motives of corporations impede the cause of scholarship.  See also John D. Turner’s article in 
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published in any form until 2006.  Then, it appeared only on-line:  
www.nationalgeographic.com/lostgospel/document.html.  
In this version, the editors represented Judas as a hero, one actually doing Jesus a 
favor by releasing his immortal spirit from entrapment in a human body.  Bart Ehrman 
promoted this view widely in a popular book released immediately for publication as 
well:  
In late Christian anti-Semitic rhetoric he (Judas) becomes the prototypical Jew: a 
greedy, money-grubbing, God-denying Christ-killer. The Christian tradition has 
consistently and increasingly portrayed Judas in a bad light. The Gospel of Judas 
provides an alternative vision . . . . The Gospel of Judas stands alone in insisting 
that Judas was not only close to Jesus but also was the only one among the 
disciples who understood who Jesus was and did what he wanted.85
The critical edition (containing photographic plates of the actual manuscript) was then 
published in a hardback copy in 2007.
 
86
According to one interpretation, Judas Iscariot is the hero of the gospel. He alone 
of all the disciples understands who Jesus really is and where he has come from. 
He is favoured by Jesus with a special revelation about the divine realm and about 
the origins and structure of the cosmos. Finally, he is entrusted with the painful 
but necessary task of handing Jesus over to the authorities, in order that the 
Saviour may be liberated from the prison of his earthly body. This is the 
interpretation of the Gospel of Judas that was promulgated together with the 
publication of the text on April 6, 2006, and which no doubt contributed to the 
  Shortly thereafter, Karen King and Elaine 
Pagels published an additional translation and interpretation called Reading Judas which 
largely followed that of the National Geographic team. Einar Thomassen provides a nice 
summary of the positive portrayal of Judas:  
                                                                                                                                                       
which he sharply critiques the lack of access to the text on the part of National Geographic as well as the 
interpretation of the team: “The Sethian Myth in the Gospel of Judas: Soteriology or Demonology?,” 187–
88. 
85 Bart D. Ehrman, The Lost Gospel of Judas Iscariot: A New Look at Betrayer and Betrayed (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 138. 
86 Kasser, et al., The Gospel of Judas, 2007. 
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sensationalism surrounding the event of the publication: here is an ancient gospel 
that turns on its head what the Church has always taught by making the greatest 
villain of the canonical gospels into the hero of the passion story.87





Indeed, when the photos became available, a wider circle of scholars was able to look at 
the actual text, and fierce debates over translation choices ensued particularly regarding 
the nature of Judas’ moral character.  April DeConick soon provided a translation which 
differed substantially, discussing the disputes in detail.89  As one example, she talks about 
the fact that Judas is referred to as a daimon.  The National Geographic team chose to 
translate this as “spirit,” avoiding the negative connotation of the English “demon” and in 
fact, using this translation as support in interpreting Judas as a positive figure.  Such a 
translation is possible, but DeConick argues that it is not plausible in the time period the 
text was written.  She maintains that pneuma would be the more probable term if “spirit” 
had been intended.90
                                                   
87 See page 157 of Einar Thomassen, “Is Judas Really the Hero of the Gospel of Judas?,” in The Gospel of 
Judas in Context: Proceedings of the First International Conference on the Gospel of Judas, Paris, 
Sorbonne, October 27th–28th, 2006 (ed. Madeleine Scopello; NHMS 26; ed. Stephen Emmel and Johannes 
van Oort; Leiden: Brill, 2008), 157–170. 
 She sees Judas represented not as a hero but as the one who is 
condemned to the fate of betraying Jesus.  Such a betrayal is motivated by the demons 
which control him.   
88 Thomassen, “Is Judas Really the Hero of the Gospel of Judas?,” 157. 
89 In fact, several scholars mention critiques of the National Geographic team’s translation surfacing first at 
the Université de Laval in Québec, Canada under scholars such as Wolf-Peter Funk and Louis Painchaud.  
Painchaud’s article provides a good overview: “Polemical Aspects of the Gospel of Judas,” in The Gospel 
of Judas in Context: Proceedings of the First International Conference on the Gospel of Judas, Paris, 
Sorbonne, October 27th–28th, 2006 (ed. Madeleine Scopello; NHMS 26; ed. Stephen Emmel and Johannes 
van Oort; Leiden: Brill, 2008), 171–86. 
90 DeConick, The Thirteenth Apostle, 48–51. 
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 Judas’ Ambiguous Representation  
Some scholars, however, interpret the portrayal of Judas as ambiguous rather than 
either wholly good or bad.  Indeed, this perspective has ramifications for understanding 
the way in which the text reflects early Christian views regarding the care of the soul.  In 
particular, Ismo Dunderberg has done a remarkable job of reading the Gospel of Judas in 
terms of its articulation of a way to care for the self, focusing on the way in which the 
text elaborates Stoic ideals of ethics and morality regarding the value of total extirpation 
of the passions.91  He hopes to “move beyond the polarized hero-or-villain debate,”92 
which he feels is often too simplistic and “far too dualistic.”93 He finds the alternative 
interpretation offered by the revisionists plausible, but he does not feel they necessarily 
offer convincing proof of the original editors of the text necessarily being wrong or of 
their interpretation being impossible.94
                                                   
91 The discussion below is based on Dunderberg, “Judas’ Anger and the Perfect Human,” 201–221.  In  
Beyond Gnosticism, Dunderberg has argued for the influence of Stoicism on early Christian thought: 
Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 2008.  For discussions of anger in antiquity, see also Harris, Restraining 
Rage, 2001.  Finally, Tage Petersen also discusses the Gospel of Judas as engaged in philosophical 
dialogue in “From Perplexity to Salvation: The Gospel of Judas Read in Light of Platonic Didactic 
Strategies,” in The Codex Judas Papers: Proceedings of the International Congress on the Tchacos Codex 
held at Rice University, Houston, Texas, March 13–16, 2008 (ed. April D. DeConick; NHMS 71; ed. 
Johannes van Oort and Einar Thomassen; Leiden: Brill, 2009), 413–434. 
  Thus, he carefully points out the ways in which 
the text seems to be focused on the theme of overcoming the passion of anger with Judas 
serving as a model of one who is partially (but only partially) able to do so.  Dunderberg 
explains that while at first he read the text as more aligned with the Platonic and 
Aristotelian ideals which allow for the expression of anger when injustice needs to be 
 
92 Dunderberg, “Judas’ Anger and the Perfect Human,” 203. 
93 Dunderberg, “Judas’ Anger and the Perfect Human,” 219. 
94 Dunderberg, “Judas’ Anger and the Perfect Human,” 202, n.5. 
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addressed and combated, he came to find the text more in agreement with Stoic ideals 
which uplift a total rooting out of and abandonment of anger.95
The theme of anger emerges in the following passage:  
    
And one day he was with his disciples in Judea, and he found them seated and 
gathered together practicing their piety.  When he [approached] his disciples, 
gathered together and seated and offering a prayer of thanksgiving over the bread, 
[he] laughed.  [And] the disciples said to him,  “Master, why are you laughing at 
[our] prayer of thanksgiving? Or what did we do? [This] is what is right (to do).”  
He answered and said to them, “I am not laughing at you.  You are not doing this 
because of your own will but because it is through this that your god [will 
receive]  thanksgiving.”  They said, “Master, you  [---] are the son of our god.  
Jesus said to them, “In what way do [you] know me? Truly [I] say to you, no 
generation of the people that are among you will know me.” And when his 
disciples heard this, [they] started getting angry and infuriated, and began 
blaspheming against him in their hearts.  And when Jesus observed their lack of 
understanding, [he said] to them, “Why has this agitation led (you) to anger?  
Your god who is within you and [his ---] have become angry together with your 
souls.  [Let] any one of you who is [strong enough] among human beings bring 
out the perfect human and stand before my face.” And they all said, “We have the 
strength.” But their spirits could not find the courage to stand before [him], except 
for Judas Iscariot (33,22–35,9).96
Using the analogy of a “morality ladder” to discuss the idea that in antiquity, 
figures could be thought of as more or less advanced in terms of moral perfection, 
Dunderberg argues that Judas himself is positioned ambiguously.  On the one hand, he is 
not classed with the disciples referred to in this passage, who exhibit a great deal of anger 
and are later roundly criticized, and he is the one who will have special visions in the 
passages that follow and the one to whom Jesus will impart certain secrets regarding the 
Kingdom.  He is the only one who even begins to approach the status of the “perfect 
 
                                                   
95 Dunderberg notes that for the Stoics, even anger for a just cause, or metropatheia, (as advocated by 
Aristotle) was inappropriate for those who were truly advanced in caring for their souls. See “Judas’ Anger 
and the Perfect Human,” 203–205. 
96 It is interesting to note that Jesus laughs just as he laughs in the Apocalypse of Peter.  He carefully 
clarifies, however, that he is not laughing at the disciples. 
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human” as he alone dares to stand before Jesus in this passage.  Referring to Seneca’s 
Epistle 75, Dunderberg explains that  
The concept of “the perfect human” looms large in the works of ancient 
philosophers as indicating the ultimate goal of moral progress. The most 
prominent characteristic of the perfect human is freedom: this figure is free of 
emotions, of all worldly concerns, and, as Seneca summarizes, of the fear of 
humans and gods.97
The fact that Judas “stands” is indeed important. “Standing” often connotes a 
sense of being firmly positioned in an unwavering state of rest, free of passion and 
entanglement in the world of sense perceptions.  To be “immovable” is to be stable and at 
rest–cured of volatile, shifting emotions. Such is impossible for a person who has not 
been cured of passions.
 
98
However, Judas seems to represent someone who will never be among the few 
who become completely perfect.  He is characterized as a daimon, and like many other 
scholars, Dunderberg feels this term has a negative connotation.  Moreover, Dunderberg 
acknowledges that Judas is not allowed to enter the divine realm that he sees in his vision, 
but is subject instead to a certain fate related to his star (45,12–14; 56,23). What the text 
embodies is his struggle, his wrestling with the whole issue of caring for his soul with 
Jesus’ help.  Such a representation provides an honest portrayal of the struggle involved 
   
                                                   
97 See Dunderberg, “Judas’ Anger and the Perfect Human,” 205. 
98 See Michael A. Williams, “Stability as a Soteriological Theme in Gnosticism,” in The Rediscovery of 
Gnosticism.  Vol 2: Sethian Gnosticism (ed. Bentley Layton; SHR 41; Leiden: Brill, 1981), 819–829; 
Michael A. Williams, The Immovable Race: A Gnostic Designation and the Theme of Stability in Late 
Antiquity (Leiden: Brill, 1985).  Lance Jenott also picks up on Williams’ important discussion in his 
translation: The Gospel of Judas, 2011.  See especially pages 35, 475.  Elaine Pagels and Karen L. King 
also discuss Williams’ explication of this theme in Reading Judas: The Gospel of Judas and the Shaping of 
Christianity (New York: Viking Penguin, 2007),  131–32. 
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in being a follower of Christ, one that brings to mind Paul’s confession of doing that 
which he does not wish to do (Romans 7:15).   
  This ambiguity in the text is quite enlightening, especially as Judas’ struggles are 
fully represented.  He receives both special revelation and Jesus’ teaching, but wrestles 
with understanding and acting as one who is “perfect.”  If perfection could be equated 
with reaching the top rung on a ladder of moral progress, Judas has climbed only part-
way up.  In this sense, his portrayal parallels Peter’s in the Apocalypse of Peter (as 
discussed above).  Both figures seem to function usefully as tools in a pedagogical 
discussion of what it would mean to be fully healed of the crippling and destructive 
effects of anger or fear. Such portraits are compelling and perhaps easier to relate to than 
those of the glorified heroes of proto-orthodox apostolic succession.  Stephen Emmels 
suggests that the Gospel of Judas may have been intended for those who “stand apart 
from the ordinary group of Christians . . . but do not (or may not, or do not clearly, or do 
not yet) belong among the most spiritual.”99
Several other scholars see Judas as represented ambiguously as well.  By 
comparing several texts in which Judas features prominently, Pierluigi Piovanelli 
insightfully demonstrates that it is not information about a historical Judas that can be 
gleaned from texts but rather insights about how he is represented.  Overall, Piovanelli 
  Such a suggestion fits well with the kind of 
pedagogical purpose Dunderberg ascribes to the text and seems applicable to the 
Apocalypse of Peter as well. 
                                                   
99 See page 38 of Stephen Emmel, “The Presuppositions and the Purpose of the Gospel of Judas,” in The 
Gospel of Judas in Context: Proceedings of the First International Conference on the Gospel of Judas, 
Paris, Sorbonne, October 27th–28th, 2006 (ed. Madeleine Scopello; NHMS 26; ed. Stephen Emmel and 
Johannes van Oort; Leiden: Brill, 2008), 33–39. 
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argues that the Gospel of Judas provides us “a more sophisticated and humanized picture 
of the disciple”—not a simplistic hero or villain.100
The idea that Judas may change within the pages of the text is also noted by 
Marvin Meyer who is not sure whether daimon is the final characterization of Judas in 
the text.
 
101 He goes on to suggest certain parallels between Judas and the figure of Sophia.  
These parallels bring to mind the striking analysis of Ismo Dunderberg regarding the way 
in which the Sophia myth may be a Valentinian reflection on the therapy of emotions as 
Christ actually heals Sophia of her passions.102
Specifically, in tracing the struggle to translate the term “set apart” and whether 
Judas is “set apart for” or “set apart from” others (45,13–46,18), Meyer says that he is 
increasingly convinced that the translation should be the latter and that “Judas is one who 
is enlightened but estranged in this world—rather like Allogenes the Stranger in the next 
tractate, also Sethian, in Codex Tchacos, and perhaps like Sophia in Pistis Sophia.”
  
103
In particular, with regard to Judas ruling over the thirteenth aeon, Meyer discusses 
the fact that on the one hand, the realm of the evil demiurge is that of thirteen aeons, and 
here the implication may be “that the fate of Judas is that he is destined to become no 
  
                                                   
100 See page 235 of Pierluigi Piovanelli, “Rabbi Yehuda versus Judas Iscariot: The Gospel of Judas and 
Apocryphal Passion Stories,” in The Codex Judas Papers: Proceedings of the International Congress on 
the Tchacos Codex held at Rice University, Houston, Texas, March 13–16, 2008 (ed. April D. DeConick; 
NHMS 71; ed. Johannes van Oort and Einar Thomassen; Leiden: Brill, 2009), 223–239. 
101 Marvin Meyer, “Interpreting Judas: Ten Passages in the Gospel of Judas,” in The Gospel of Judas in 
Context: Proceedings of the First International Conference on the Gospel of Judas, Paris, Sorbonne, 
October 27th–28th, 2006 (ed. Madeleine Scopello; NHMS 26; ed. Stephen Emmel and Johannes van Oort; 
Leiden: Brill, 2008), 41–55. 
 
102 See chapter six of Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 95–118. 
103 Meyer, “Interpreting Judas: Ten Passages in the Gospel of Judas,” 45–46 
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more than a lackey of the demiurge by joining him in the thirteenth aeon.” 104
In that case, perhaps the text means to proclaim that, in the end, Judas—like 
Sophia elsewhere—will overcome the demiurge and all his megalomaniacal 
forces, and through Judas the power of ‘that generation’ will be triumphant and 
will be extended over all the world.
 However, 
Meyer goes on to note that the text says that ultimately, Judas will rule over the thirteenth 
aeon:  
105
What is important here is not whether Judas will ultimately triumph or not but rather the 
comparison to Sophia in terms of the care of the soul.  Both Sophia and Judas are subject 
to their passions and in need of the freedom that Christ can provide.  
   
 In a second article, Meyer further elaborates some of these views.  He again 
points out that “themes associated with Wisdom, even personified Wisdom, may be 
disclosed as well in the person of Judas Iscariot as a figure of wisdom and a prototype of 
a person of knowledge in the Gospel of Judas.”106
 
  Then he goes on to say that both Judas 
and Sophia are associated with the thirteenth aeon.  This aeon is mentioned in Pistis 
Sophia and the Book of Jeu.  In Pistis Sophia, it is described as an intermediate dimension 
between this earthly world and the place of righteousness.  The description of Judas as a 
daimon who will end up in the thirteenth aeon may thus parallel the restoration of Sophia 
to the thirteenth aeon.   
                                                   
104 Meyer, “Interpreting Judas: Ten Passages in the Gospel of Judas,” 47. 
105 Meyer, “Interpreting Judas: Ten Passages in the Gospel of Judas,” 47. 
106 See pages 65–66 of Marvin Meyer, “When the Sethians were Young: The Gospel of Judas in the Second 
Century,” in The Codex Judas Papers: Proceedings of the International Congress on the Tchacos Codex 
held at Rice University, Houston, Texas, March 13–16, 2008 (ed. April D. DeConick; NHMS 71; ed. 
Johannes van Oort and Einar Thomassen; Leiden: Brill, 2009), 57–73. 
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Meyer states that Judas is  
neither a completely positive character nor a totally demonic being, but rather a 
figure, like Sophia, and like any gnostic being, who is embroiled in this world of 
mortality yet is striving for gnosis and enlightenment. . . . Judas, like Sophia, is 
caught between the worlds of mortality and immortality, looking for liberation.107
Again, intriguingly, Ismo Dunderberg has commented extensively on the way in 
which the restoration of Sophia takes place when Christ is able to heal her of her 
passions.  Such an interpretation nicely parallels Dunderberg’s thinking with regard to the 
Gospel of Judas—that Judas is represented neither as a hero nor a villain but as an 
ambiguous figure who is able to become more morally advanced because Jesus helps him 
to manage his anger (though not to completely eradicate it).  Judas cannot achieve the 
status of a “perfect human,” but he will manage to enter the thirteenth aeon.
 
108
 Elaine Pagels also points to possible ambiguities in the text, pointing out that 
characters’ moral status are not necessarily fixed within a narrative framework but often 
develop within it.  She argues that Jesus’ teaching on baptism may serve to help the 
reader understand its transformative and liberating power.  She encourages us to consider 
the possibility that Judas himself may be transformed by this teaching rather than 
  In effect, 
these interpretations point to the way in which the text serves as a vivid depiction of the 
human quest for healing.   
                                                   
107 Meyer, “When the Sethians were Young,” 73. 
108 Meyer, “When the Sethians were Young,” 68–73. For dissenting opinions, see Turner’s comments in 
“The Sethian Myth in the Gospel of Judas: Soteriology or Demonology?,” 132, n. 70.   Also see page 255 
of April DeConick, “Apostles as Archons: The Fight for Authority and the Emergence of Gnosticism in the 
Codex Tchacos and Other Early Christian Literature,” in The Codex Judas Papers: Proceedings of the 
International Congress on the Tchacos Codex held at Rice University, Houston, Texas, March 13–16, 2008 
(ed. April D. DeConick; NHMS 71; ed. Johannes van Oort and Einar Thomassen; Leiden: Brill, 2009), 
243–288.  These two scholars argue that Meyer is incorrectly applying ideas from fourth century works to 
the earlier Gospel of Judas.   
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remaining static throughout the text and questions analyses that see him as incapable of 
change and asking, “Where, after all, do one-sided interpretations leave us?”109
 Unfortunately, Jesus’ teaching regarding baptism is one of the places where a 
significant number of lines are missing.  However, Lance Jenott has supplied part of the 
textual puzzle with his newly-published translation of the Gospel of Judas which 
incorporates a fragment hitherto missing from the critical edition and other translations.  
In this fragment, Jesus says that baptism in his name “will wipe out the entire race of 
earthly Adam” (56, 4–6).  Jenott interprets this as a reference to physical, human bodies,  
suggesting that in baptism, the initiate’s human body is liberated from demonic forces 
and subjugation to astrological and cosmic powers.  Jenott refers to Paul’s similar belief 
in such liberation as expressed, for example, in Romans 5.  In addition, a connection 
exists between baptism and Jesus’ death.  Baptism is a symbolic death that “wipes away” 
the power of demonic forces in a person’s life just as Jesus’ death wiped away the power 
of these forces in the universe as a whole (a Christus Victor theory of atonement).  Jenott 
goes on to propose a reconstruction of the text involving the exaltation of “the [fruit] of 
the great race of Adam”  (57,8–14).  Jenott points out that earlier (43,12–44,2) Jesus has 
associated “fruit” with the heavenly ascent of the soul.  The “fruit” consists of those souls 
 
                                                   
109 See page 355 of Elaine Pagels, “Baptism in the Gospel of Judas: A Preliminary Inquiry,” in The Codex 
Judas Papers: Proceedings of the International Congress on the Tchacos Codex held at Rice University, 
Houston, Texas, March 13–16, 2008 (ed. April D. DeConick; NHMS 71; ed. Johannes van Oort and Einar 
Thomassen; Leiden: Brill, 2009), 353–366. Johanna Brankaer makes a similar point, noting that Judas 
seems to change, or be transformed from 56,21 on.  This is just after the section beginning with 55,24 
where Jesus has started to talk about baptism.  See page 409 of Johanna Brankaer, “Whose Savior?  
Salvation, Damnation, and the Race of Adam in the Gospel of Judas,” in The Codex Judas Papers: 
Proceedings of the International Congress on the Tchacos Codex held at Rice University, Houston, Texas, 
March 13–16, 2008 (ed. April D. DeConick; NHMS 71; ed. Johannes van Oort and Einar Thomassen; 
Leiden: Brill, 2009), 387–412. 
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who have been baptized.110  Moreover, Judas sees this “great race” ascending to a large 
house which Jenott has argued resembles that in Jewish apocalyptic literature 
(specifically, the Book of the Watchers in 1 Enoch 14).  Judas describes the holy 
members of this “great race” as “standing” in this heavenly temple which reminds the 
reader of the connotations associated with “standing” as being in a place of transcendent 
rest free from the movement in the sensory world.  There is additionally the connotation 
of their becoming more like the angels in Jewish and Christian apocalyptic literature.111
In fact, then, according to Jenott, the perspective that Jesus’ death allowed for the 
destruction of demonic forces and that Christians are themselves saved through baptism 
is similar to that of proto-orthodox thinkers.
    
112
                                                   
110 Jenott, Gospel of Judas, 31–34.   
  This is not a “Gnostic” text with a 
111 Jenott, Gospel of Judas, 35.   
112 It should be noted that Bas van Os, Einar Thomassen, and John Turner see the Gospel of Judas as 
critical of the practice of baptism.  None of these critiques, however, include the fragment to which Jenott 
refers.  Bas van Os explicitly critiques the martyrdom hypothesis, pointing out that the text does not 
explicitly mention persecution by Roman authorities. Thus, he feels it is the actual sacraments of the 
Eucharist or, even more likely, baptism that are being criticized as many early Christians conceived of 
baptism as a kind of death.  See “Stop Sacrificing!  The metaphor of sacrifice in the Gospel of Judas,” in 
The Codex Judas Papers: Proceedings of the International Congress on the Tchacos Codex held at Rice 
University, Houston, Texas, March 13–16, 2008 (ed. April D. DeConick; NHMS 71; ed. Johannes van Oort 
and Einar Thomassen; Leiden: Brill, 2009), 367–86. Einar Thomassen concurs. He discusses the idea that 
Jesus’ denunciation of sacrificial acts is an allusion to baptism on page 164 of “Is Judas Really the Hero of 
the Gospel of Judas?”:  “[T]he polemic there is directed against the baptismal practice of the proto-
orthodox Christian Church, which the author of the Gospel of Judas equates with human sacrifice because 
that baptism hands the initiates over to the evil ruler of the material cosmos, the realm of corruption and 
death.” He then notes, “It has been suggested by scholars in the debates following the publication of the 
Gospel of Judas that the polemic against sacrifice in the text is directed against the extolling of martyrdom 
by the proto-orthodox church. I am not convinced by this interpretation, since the characterization of proto-
orthodox practices as human sacrifice is embedded in a list of other abominable acts such as fornication and 
homosexuality” (see p. 165, n. 20). John Turner argues that baptism is a referent as well, but he feels that 
this is in addition to the Eucharist and possibly even martyrdom.  See “The Place of the Gospel of Judas in 
Sethian Tradition,” 187–237.  On page 213, he notes a “hostile stance toward the practice of ordinary 
Christian baptism in Jesus’s name (55,22–56,1) and indeed toward any formal use of his name (38,22–40, 
26).” Also see “The Sethian Myth in the Gospel of Judas: Soteriology or Demonology?,” 95–133. On page 
127, he says, “Rather than creating a new spiritual race that has superseded the fleshly race of the Jews, 
their sacrificial practices only confirm their membership in a similarly worldly and material race. Markedly 
singled out are their ritual practices such as baptism in the name of Jesus by which one participates in his 
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“Docetic” Christology.  Overall, Jenott argues that figures such as Irenaeus and 
Epiphanius harshly condemned this text for its critique of the proto-orthodox leaders, a 
theme to which we now turn. 
Critique of Apostolic Succession in Terms of the Care of the Soul 
John Turner colorfully describes the Gospel of Judas’ characterization of the 
successors to the disciples as “ministers of error, doomed angelic lackies of the lord 
ruling the universe.”113
All of this becomes clear in the following passages.  The first is one in which the 
apostles speak with Jesus, asking him where he had gone after leaving them, and Jesus 
  This phrase aptly describes the scholarly consensus regarding the 
text’s vehement critique of the proto-orthodox leaders, the successors to the disciples. 
Jenott, for example, extends Dunderberg’s emphasis on the theme of anger management 
by pointing out that the primary error of the disciples is their rage.  It is their emotional 
state of being that constitutes their blasphemy against Jesus and therefore allows Judas to 
be so starkly contrasted with them.  In Stoic terms, the disciples are not healed of passion.  
While Judas is not “perfect” in this respect, he is clearly not as ill as they are.  In this 
respect, the twelve apostles, who will stone Judas to death out of their anger over his 
betrayal of Jesus, serve as counterpoints to the ideal of persons able to engage 
successfully in the cure of the passions.   
                                                                                                                                                       
death and resurrection, the practice of fasting like angels who need no food, and especially their priestly 
offering of Eucharistic sacrifices at the altar in the name of Jesus, whether those offerings be personal acts 
of abstemious loyalty or material elements such as bread and wine or fish or other animals—and perhaps 
even humans whose martyrdom echoes that of Jesus—symbolizing the redemptive death either of Jesus or 
of the sinful nature of the communicants themselves. Since they do not know that there is a higher God, 
they betray the name of Jesus by offering sacrifices to the wrong god, the God of Israel, and thus cannot 
join the higher, holy generation” (emphasis added). 
113 See Turner, “The Sethian Myth in the Gospel of Judas: Soteriology or Demonology?,” 127. 
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replies, “I went to another great and holy generation (36,16–17).  The disciples then 
respond, “Lord, what is the great generation that is superior to us and holy (36,19–20) 
and Jesus actually laughs (36,23) and tells them that “no one born [of] this aeon will see 
that [generation]  . . . and no person of mortal birth will be able to associate with it” 
(37,3–8).  When they hear this, they are “troubled in [their] spirit” (37,18–19).  Clearly, 
they are not members of “the strong and holy generation.” 
Later, the apostles tell Jesus that they have had a vision (37,22) in which they saw 
an altar with twelve priests.  The priests were engaged in all kinds of immoral sacrifices, 
including sacrifices of their very own wives and children.  They were also engaged in 
eating the bodies and blood of these sacrifices.  Jesus tells them that they themselves are 
those priests and that they are mistaken in thinking that he comes from the god who is 
pleased by such sacrifices: 
“We [have] seen a great house [with a] large altar [in it, and] twelve men—they 
are the priests, we would say; and a name < --- >; and a crowd of people is 
waiting at that altar, [until] the priests [finished] [presenting] the offerings.  We 
[also] kept waiting.” [Jesus said], “What are [---] like?”  And they [said], “Some 
[--- for] two weeks; [others] sacrifice their own children, others their wives, in 
praise [and] in humility with each other; others sleep with men; others are 
involved in slaugh[ter]; still others commit a multitude of sins and deeds of 
lawlessness. [And] the men who stand [before] the altar invoke your [name]. And 
while they are involved in all the deeds of their sacrifice, that [altar] is filled” 
(38,1–39,3).114
After this, the disciples are “quiet” (39,4) because they are “troubled” (39,5).  Jesus then 
says to them,  
 
Why are you troubled?  Truly I say to you, all the priests who stand before that 
altar invoke my name.  And again I say to you, my name has been written on [---] 
of the generations of the stars by the human generations.  [And] they have planted 
trees without fruit, in my name, in a shameful manner (39,6–17). 
                                                   
114 All citations from the Gospel of Judas come from Kasser, et al., The Gospel of Judas, 2007. 
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He then says,  
It is you who are presenting the offerings on the altar you have seen. That one is 
the god you serve, and you are the twelve men you have seen. And the cattle that 
are brought in are the sacrifices you have seen—that is, the many people you lead 
astray before that altar (39,18–40,1).   
He goes on to equate priests with “ministers of error” (40,22–23) and commands them: 
“Stop sac[rificing ---] (41,1–2).   
The charges of human sacrifice—that of the priests’ own children and wives—are  
particularly striking.  Many scholars have recognized that the charge of human sacrifice 
was a discursive strategy in the ancient world by which one group could cast another as 
cultural barbarians associated with a practice deemed crude and barbaric.115  Jenott 
emphasizes this fact and in his most recent work, he sees no more in this passage than a 
stock list of polemics meant to disparage the leaders of the proto-orthodox churches.116
Philip Tite also expounds on the nature of the use of negative moral exempla (of 
which the disciples seem to be examples par excellence) and the use of virtue and vice 
lists in marking the presence of paraenesis, or moral exhortation.
  
117 Such lists derive 
from the Stoic perspective that linked knowing a particular truth with the ability to act 
virtuously in a certain respect.118
                                                   
115 See J. Rives, “Human Sacrifices Among Pagans and Christians,” JRS 85 (1995), 65–85.   
  Indeed, the list of accusations against the apostles 
functions much like one of these vice lists.  These are clearly not models for imitation or 
figures of authority to whom one should be submitting.   
116 See Jenott, Gospel of Judas, 58–60. 
117 See Tite, “Valentinian Ethics and Paraenetic Discourse,” 133–44. Tite analyzes Valentinian texts, but 
his analysis seems applicable to the Sethian text of the Gospel of Judas as well.  
118 Tite, “Valentinian Ethics and Paraenetic Discourse,” 137.   
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Tite identifies five features common to paraenesis: the use of the imperative or 
hortative subjunctive, discussion of figures who serve as moral exemplars, vice/virtue 
lists, two-way schema, and household codes.  The Gospel of Judas manifests three of 
these five features: imperatives, moral exempla (the disciples serving as negative 
exempla and Judas as an ambiguous one), and vice lists.  Overall, Tite argues that 
paraenetic texts function as “discursive voices” that attempt to persuade their readers 
regarding morality.119 Indeed, it is with this type of argument—that texts categorized as 
Gnostic have much to say about morality—that Dunderberg also concurs when he 
describes the Gospel of Judas as a reflection on anger management in a manner 
reminiscent of Stoic thought.120
For Jenott, the argument is not so much over the practice of Eucharist itself as 
over who has the right to conduct it and the moral character of those who are claiming the 
exclusive right of officiating: 
  Thus, although Tite’s insightful dissertation was 
published prior to the Gospel of Judas, it could well be argued that its narrative 
framework functions as moral exhortation.  Such paraenesis functions as a call to engage 
in the therapy of the emotions and the care of the soul. 
The author of Judas responded by writing the equivalent of a modern political 
attack ad: a smear campaign against the twelve disciples that cut at the very root 
of the clergy’s authority.  The target of the Gospel of Judas’s criticism is neither 
the Eucharist, nor the ideology of sacrifice, nor the sacrificial interpretation of 
Jesus’ death, but the twelve disciples and their corrupt moral character. The 
author takes issue with the form of church leadership which established itself 
upon the doctrine of apostolic succession. Thus he carefully develops a portrayal 
of the Twelve as men who were confused about the true identity of Jesus and the 
god they served. Although they believed they worshipped the true God and father 
                                                   
119 Tite, “Valentinian Ethics and Paraenetic Discourse,” 300. 
120 This is also a primary argument of Dunderberg’s Beyond Gnosticism.   
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of Jesus, in actually their god is nothing more than an apostate angel who afflicted 
their souls with bitter passion. As a consequence of their devotion to such a god, 
the disciples themselves became enflamed with anger and contention, were 
morally debased, and ultimately led their followers into sin and error. By telling 
the story of the twelve disciples this way, Judas challenges the foundational myth 
held by many Christians who maintained that the Twelve were the authoritative 
group to whom Jesus entrusted his teaching, commissioned to evangelize the 
world, and who established the only legitimate, apostolic churches to which all 
true Christians must belong (emphasis added) .121
Certainly many other scholars have discussed the negative depiction of the 
apostles and the critique of apostolic authority.  Einar Thomassen does so at length, 
arguing that the Gospel of Judas portrays the disciples with even less intelligence or 
understanding than other texts such as the Gospel of Thomas, the Gospel of Mary, and the 
four New Testament gospels.  In the Gospel of Judas, the apostles are completely beyond 




The Gospel of Judas is clearly a very unusual document.  It uses a genre, the 
revelation dialogue of Jesus and the disciples, that is normally used to legitimise 
certain doctrines as secret apostolic tradition. But it totally subverts this genre by 
discounting the disciples altogether and by portraying Judas Iscariot as 
simultaneously the worst and the best of the disciples. Judas receives a revelation, 
but he is utterly unable to profit from it, because his destiny has already been 
decided. So who is supposed to profit from the revelation? This is another of the 
enigmas of the Gospel of Judas. Normally in revelation dialogues, the recipient, 
or recipients, of the revelation are models of identification for the readers. The 
reader, by identifying with the recipient disciple, himself becomes the recipient of 
the revelation divulged by the written text.  That cannot be the situation here. . . . 
Jesus is seen as the source of revelation, but every single one of his disciples is 
rejected as able to receive and transmit his revelation.
 Later, he notes,  
123
                                                   
121 Jenott, Gospel of Judas, 41. 
  
122 Thomassen, “Is Judas Really the Hero of the Gospel of Judas?,” 160.   
123 Thomassen, “Is Judas Really the Hero of the Gospel of Judas?,” 168–70. 
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April DeConick actually interprets the text as a parody in which even Judas, 
corrupt as he is, understands who Jesus is better than twelve of his other apostles do, but 
that fact only underscores the ways in which these twelve greatly lack understanding of 
Jesus.  It does not make Judas a hero.  She compares the portrayal of the apostles in the 
Gospel of Judas to that in the Gospel of Mark where the twelve repeatedly fail to “get” 
who Jesus is and what he is about.124
In fact, DeConick and virtually all scholars regardless of their position with 
respect to Judas’ moral character agree in seeing the text as a critique of what she refers 
to as “apostolic,” “catholic,” or “mainstream” Christianity (also termed proto-orthodox 
Christianity by many scholars).
   
125  She argues that the text bitterly lampoons the notion 
of apostolic succession and the church structure based on that hierarchy,126 as well as the 
practice of sacrifice and the doctrine of the atonement as a sacrifice pleasing to and even 
willed by God.  Thus, while scholars vigorously debate the nature of Judas’ character,127 
they concur in seeing the text serving as a critique of practices and theological beliefs 
centered around sacrifice.128
                                                   
124 DeConick, The Thirteenth Apostle, 103–08. 
  In fact, for those scholars who see Judas as represented 
125 DeConick, The Thirteenth Apostle, 6. 
126 DeConick, The Thirteenth Apostle, 169, 180–182.  Lance Jenott refers to this specifically when he says 
that the focus on the critique of sacrifice has been too far entwined with the discussion surrounding the 
moral character of Judas.  See Jenott, Gospel of Judas, 23.   
127 Simon Gathercole notes that a delineation of Judas’ character is really not the main point of the text as a 
whole.  He feels that the vision which Judas sees is the main theme rather than a denigration or vindication 
of Judas per se: The Gospel of Judas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
128 The dissenting voice is that of Lance Jenott who, as discussed above, feels the text reflects a vision of a 
Christus Victor theory of atonement.  His argument is well-made and does much to dispel the notion that 
Gnostic texts are “anti-atonement.”  However, it is quite plausible that the author is at odds with the 
conception of a substitutionary atonement, which is a major theme in some early Christian writers such as 
 121 
unfavorably, Judas’ very act of sacrificing Jesus serves to epitomize and underscore the 
negative representation of sacrifice in the text.  Einar Thomassen, for example, contends:   
The Gospel of Judas generally holds a very negative opinion of sacrifice . . . . 
When the author chooses to describe Judas’ handing over of Jesus as an act of 
sacrifice, that can hardly, therefore, be intended as a positive characterization.  
The phrase ‘you will exceed all of them’ may even be taken to imply the opposite: 
by performing his particular sacrifice, Judas is even worse than the others.129
Louis Painchaud shares this opinion as well, stating that in no way does this text 
rehabilitate Judas.
   
130  Rather, Judas “is the ruling ‘archon’ presiding over this sacrificial 
ideology and governing those who adhere to it and curse him.”131  He commits “the worst 
of inequities” in sacrificing Jesus and is worse even than the other twelve apostles.132
DeConick has also described the text as one in which “[a] harsher treatment of the 
doctrine of apostolic authority could not be had!”
   
133
                                                                                                                                                       
Ignatius of Antioch.  In these texts, martyrdom is linked to this particular interpretation of Jesus’ death as 
well. 
  She goes on to say that “[t]he twelve 
disciples are little more than puppets of the archons.”  For her, the genre is that of a 
tragedy:   
129 Einar Thomassen, “Is Judas Really the Hero of the Gospel of Judas?,” 166.  Thomassen does go on to 
say that there is a certain ambiguity even here, however, as Judas is represented as better than the others in 
certain ways. 
130 Painchaud, “Polemical Aspects of the Gospel of Judas,” 177. See also Louis Painchaud, ‘You will 
sacrifice the man who bears me.’ (Gos. Jud. 56.19–20) (paper presented at the annual meeting of the SBL, 
Chicago, 17 November 2012). 
131 Painchaud, “Polemical Aspects of the Gospel of Judas,” 178. 
132 Painchaud, “Polemical Aspects of the Gospel of Judas,” 183–84. 
133 See page 254 of April DeConick, “The Mystery of Betrayal.  What does the Gospel of Judas Really 
Say?,” in The Gospel of Judas in Context: Proceedings of the First International Conference on the Gospel 
of Judas, Paris, Sorbonne, October 27th–28th, 2006 (ed. Madeleine Scopello; NHMS 26; ed. Stephen 
Emmel and Johannes van Oort; Leiden: Brill, 2008), 239–264.   
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Judas is linked to the cosmic system in such a way that he becomes inseparable 
from Ildabaoth and his evil plans against Jesus.  He is tied to Ildabaoth’s realm 
and his cloud of operations, the thirteenth aeon, and Ildabaoth’s persona as the 
King of the Archons.  He is identified with the archdemon ruling over his twelve 
assistants, a coincidence in number that was exploited by the Sethians to expose 
the illegitimacy of apostolic authority.  The mainstream Church’s appropriation of 
knowledge handed down from the apostles is ridiculous when the apostles are 
recognized as the lesser archons ignorant of God and powerless over their 




by betraying Jesus, Judas has offered Jesus’ body as a sacrifice to Ildabaoth, a 
sacrifice more evil than any the other apostles would ever make (56,17–21).   
By framing Judas’ sacrifice of Jesus alongside that of the other apostles who sin 
by also offering Ildabaoth evil sacrifices (c.f. Gospel of Judas 56,11–13; 39,18–
40,1), the gospel goes a long way to critique and mock mainstream interpretations 
of Jesus’ death in sacrificial terms.  This criticism and mockery includes a strong 
condemnation of eucharist theology.135
Further Critique of Sacrifice and Martyrdom   
 
Anna Van den Kerchove most clearly points out the details which help us to see 
how the Gospel of Judas may indeed be offering incisive critique of the glorification of 
sacrifice and both the Eucharist and martyrdom conceived of as symbolizing or imitating 
sacrifices of substitutionary atonement desired by God.136
                                                   
134 DeConick, “The Mystery of Betrayal,” 256–257. 
  She clearly points out the 
135 DeConick, “The Mystery of Betrayal,” 261.  Franklin Trammell notes a similar critique of the apostles 
but in the Apocalypse of James which immediately precedes the Gospel of Judas in the Codex Tchacos.  
See “The God of Jerusalem as the Pole Dragon: The Conceptual Background of the Cosmic Axis in 
James,” in The Codex Judas Papers: Proceedings of the International Congress on the Tchacos Codex held 
at Rice University, Houston, Texas, March 13–16, 2008 (ed. April D. DeConick; NHMS 71; ed. Johannes 
van Oort and Einar Thomassen; Leiden: Brill, 2009), 337–349. 
136 Anna Van den Kerchove, “La Maison, l’Autel et les Sacrifices: Quelque Remarques sur la Polémique 
dans l’Évangile des Judas,” in The Gospel of Judas in Context: Proceedings of the First International 
Conference on the Gospel of Judas, Paris, Sorbonne, October 27th–28th, 2006 (ed. Madeleine Scopello; 
NHMS 26; ed. Stephen Emmel and Johannes van Oort; Leiden: Brill, 2008), 311–29.  
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ways in which the author of the Gospel of Judas seems to be inscribing himself (or 
herself) into inner-Christian debates regarding specific interpretations of the Eucharist 
and martyrdom that were prevalent in Christian discourse of the second and third 
centuries.  She argues that the author most certainly belongs to a social context in which 
accusing a group of making human sacrifices is a general way of accusing them of social 
deviance, but it is important not to overlook the possibility that this critique may well be 
referring to specific practices involving particular interpretations of the Eucharist and 
martyrdom.  She argues that the author specifically uses two discursive strategies to do 
this: 1) attributing a literal meaning to phrases commonly used metaphorically in early 
Christian communities, and 2) amalgamating the ritual practices of the Jewish temple 
(where sacrifice was offered until its destruction in 70  C.E.)137
                                                   
137 Van den Kerchove argues that the conflation of associations regarding Jewish temple practices and early 
Christian ones is a critique of both.  Others discuss this point as well.  Majella Franzman has noted the 
critique of Jewish temple worship: “What is also striking is that the Jewish themes in this gospel are one of 
its most negative aspects. One of the strongest negative themes concerns ritual or prayer to a false god, in 
this case summed up in images including the temple (a great house with an altar, 38,1–3), and sacrifices by 
priests (38,1–39,3). These unworthy sacrifices are offered to the Jewish god (Yaldabaoth/Nebro) who is the 
object of pious observance by the Twelve (“your god,” 34,10–11,25; “their god,” 36,4)” See page 113 of 
“Judas as an Abraham Figure in the Gospel of Judas,” in The Gospel of Judas in Context: Proceedings of 
the First International Conference on the Gospel of Judas, Paris, Sorbonne, October 27th–28th, 2006 (ed. 
Madeleine Scopello; NHMS 26; ed. Stephen Emmel and Johannes van Oort; Leiden: Brill, 2008), 113–121.   
 with the discourses of 
Also see John Turner, “The Sethian Myth in the Gospel of Judas: Soteriology or Demonology?,” 95–133. 
On page 126, Turner comments specifically on the anti-sacrifice theme saying that the Gospel of Judas 
contains vicious polemic against the sacrificial theology of the so-called apostolic churches of the later 
second century; they have been defiled by perishable wisdom (43,26–44,5).  It portrays them as still mired 
in the fleshly ritual practices of the Jews that many Christians believed they had superseded with their so-
called “spiritual” or “rational” sacrifices. On page128, he notes that “Christian sacrificial theology is a mere 
perpetuation of the Israelite temple cult.”  A little later on pages 131–32 he says that the Gospel of Judas is 
unique in “its vilification of the fraudulent sacrificial practices of a proto-orthodox church that has no 
knowledge of the nature and origin of the true Jesus.” Judas is the only one who even begins to approach 
understanding Jesus’ true identity, but “he too was unwittingly fated to be the demonic agent of a lower god 
whose wrath was believed to be appeased only through blood sacrifice as the requirement for gaining 
entrance into his ‘kingdom of the heavens’ ruled by deceitful astral powers.”  
In work prior to his dissertation, Lance Jenott has written about the way in which the description of the 
temple in Judas’ vision (as a temple encircled by “lightning” or “fire” corresponds to parallels of the 
description of the Jewish temple in the Book of the Watchers, 1 Enoch, and 3 Enoch.  In this article, he says 
 124 
early Christian communities in which both the Eucharist and martyrdom were associated 
with sacrifice. 
Specifically, Van den Kerchove refers to the passage in which the male disciples 
tell Jesus of their vision, a vision in which twelve priests are making sacrifices of children 
and women in a house with an altar before which a crowd of people is waiting.  She 
points out that the specific Coptic words used for “house” and “altar” conjure up 
associations both with the temple in Jerusalem and the altar where sacrifices had been 
made prior to its destruction as well as with the homes in which Christians met and the 
table they used for the celebration of the Eucharist.  Likewise, the crowd is said to be 
“waiting before the altar.”  The phrase is one that is not found commonly in Greek 
literature or the Hebrew Bible but which occurs eleven times in the New Testament as 
well as in texts by Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and Cyprian, and in the Acts of Peter.  
The verb has the sense of “persevering” before the altar and is associated with activity 
which is accomplished near the Eucharist table.  The use of this phrase may serve to 
invoke connotations with the point of view in which some Christians saw Christ’s 
sacrifice (and the Eucharist which commemorates it) as a replacement for the kinds of 
sacrifices made in the Jerusalem temple.  Of course, at the time the Gospel of Judas is 
being written, the temple has almost certainly been destroyed, but by alluding to temple 
worship and conflating it with celebration of the Eucharist, the author critiques those 
                                                                                                                                                       
that the earthly temple and the heavenly temple are being contrasted in order to criticize the way in which 
the Eucharist—and martyrdom conceived of as a eucharist sacrifice—are being conceived.  See page 476 in 
“The Gospel of Judas 45,6–7 and Enoch’s Heavenly Temple,” in The Codex Judas Papers: Proceedings of 
the International Congress on the Tchacos Codex held at Rice University, Houston, Texas, March 13–16, 
2008 (ed. April D. DeConick; NHMS 71; ed. Johannes van Oort and Einar Thomassen; Leiden: Brill, 2009), 
471–-77. 
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Christian groups who interpret the Eucharist as a sacrifice or the imitation or 
commemoration of a sacrifice.  More specifically, I would add that it may well be 
directed to those who see this practice as a commemoration of a substitutionary 
atonement (as opposed to the kind of sacrifice envisioned in a Christus Victor theory of 
atonement).   
Van den Kerchove also points out that in the Gospel of Judas 40,22, the priests 
are described as “ministers of error.”  The term for “minister” is diakonos, the word 
commonly used in early Christian texts for deacons, or leaders in Christian churches, 
persons authorized to serve the Eucharist.  In other words, the author of the Gospel of 
Judas is using the very terms and phrases that Christian authors use to speak about the 
Eucharist in a variety of texts, leading one to believe that possible critique on the part of 
the author with regard to the interpretations of these practices cannot be excluded.   
Van den Kerchove also points out that while references to the sacrificing of 
children have several classical precedents, accusations of sacrificing women are less 
common.  She refers to the fact that both Polycarp and Tertullian talk about the bodies of 
women as altars and sites of intercessory prayer that is efficacious for others.  While the 
sacrifice of women could be relevant in some way to the evolving discourse about purity, 
chastity, and asceticism, she goes on to say that the joint charge of sacrificing both 
children and women may well have associations with the practice of martyrdom 
conceived of as a sacrifice.  Citing numerous examples of martyrdom interpreted in this 
way (in the Recognitions of Pseudo-Clement, the Martyrdom of Polycarp, a letter of 
Cyprian, Ignatius of Antioch’s Letter to the Romans, and Irenaeus’ Against Heresies), she 
argues that the author of the Gospel of Judas may be referring to and critiquing the 
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practice of martyrdom (or, more accurately, the interpretation of it as a sacrifice) in 
mentioning the sacrifice of children and women.  She goes on to say that it is not the 
practice itself that is being questioned so much as the particular interpretation of it and 
any glorification of it within an ecclesiological context.  Thus, in  summary, she argues 
that in associating the altar and the house with human sacrifice, the author critiques his 
adversaries, probably Christians belonging to another “rival” community and their 
manner of living and accomplishing certain ritual acts.  Though she does not discuss the 
fact that Jesus specifically states that these male disciples are “leading people astray,” this, 
too fits with the overall argument as does his injunction to “stop sacrificing!” 
These details mesh well with the argument of a review appearing shortly after the 
publication of the critical edition of the Gospel of Judas.138
In Reading Judas, Karen King and Elaine Pagels extensively argue that a critique 
of martyrdom exists in the Gospel of Judas.
 This article discusses the 
Gospel of Judas’ portrait of the male disciples as reflecting the author’s critique of the 
church leaders for endorsing or encouraging martyrdom and leading others to accepting it 
uncritically.  For this author, sacrifice is in vain, and such leaders are no better than those 
who would lead innocent sheep to slaughter.   
139
                                                   
138 Eduard Iricinschi, Lance Jenott, and Philippa Townsend, “The Betrayer’s Gospel” (review of Rodolphe 
Kasser and Gregor Wurst, eds., The Gospel of Judas Together with the Letter of Peter to Philip, James, and 
a Book of Allogenes from Codex Tchacos: Critical Edition), New York Review of Books, June 8, 2006.   
  In this book, they argue that fierce 
disagreements over the value and significance of martyrdom are at the heart of the text.  
They point out that a variety of texts existed that glorified martyrdom and encouraged or 
exhorted Christians toward this path.  Certainly some Biblical passages represent Jesus’ 
139 Pagels and King, Reading Judas, 2007. 
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death as a substitutionary atonement.  I Corinthians 5:7 calls Christ a “paschal lamb.” 
First- and second-century writers such as Ignatius of Antioch (and others discussed in 
chapter two) think of their impending martyrdom in these terms—as the imitation of 
Jesus’ sacrifice.  Other treatises (Tertullian’s Scorpiace being a notable example) also 
glorify martyrdom.  Other sermons, accounts (Polycarp’s and Justin’s being particularly 
notable), and histories (especially that of Eusebius) also did so.140 Robin Darling Young’s 
work on the way in which martyrdom functioned and was represented as a “public 
liturgical sacrifice” complements Pagel’s and King’s well.141  Noting the strident anger of 
the tone (which Pagels and King insist must be viewed within the context of its time and 
place in an era of frightening persecution when perspectives on martyrdom had very 
concrete consequences for believers),142
The author of the Gospel of Judas could not reconcile his belief in a deeply loving, 
good God with a particular idea that other Christians held at the time: that God 
desired the bloody sacrificial death of Jesus and his followers.  In this author’s 
view, Christian leaders who called on their fellow Christians to ‘glorify’ 
themselves that way were murderers.  They had totally misunderstood Jesus’s 
teaching and were worshipping a false god.
 they comment:  
143
They carefully note:  
 
 
the problem for the author of the Gospel of Judas is not simply resistance to 
martyrdom.  He does not criticize the martyrs themselves, nor does he say that 
dying as a martyr is a bad thing.  Rather, he is angry at the meaning other 
Christians give to the deaths of Jesus and his followers, targeting those who claim 
that God desired Jesus’s death as a sacrifice that God not only wills but 
                                                   
140 See Pagel’s and King’s discussion on pp. 49–57. 
141 Young, In Procession Before the World, 2001. 
142 Pagels and King, Reading Judas, 100. 
143 Pagels and King, Reading Judas, xvi. 
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commands.  For some Christians contemplating their own deaths came to 
understand Jesus’s death—and their own—as sacrifice.   
King and Pagels point out the irony of a certain contradiction:  
 
that while Christians refuse to practice sacrifice, many of them bring sacrifice 
right back into the center of Christian worship—by claiming that Jesus’s death is 
a sacrifice for human sin, and then by insisting that Christians who die as martyrs 
are sacrifices pleasing to God.144
Many Christians even prided themselves on having superseded the kind of sacrifice 
practiced in the Jerusalem temple and at pagan altars; nonetheless, an emphasis on such 




They go on to say that it is of course impossible to know if the author had seen 
church leaders encouraging martyrdom but that the strong language and tone of the text  
 
conveys the urgency of someone who wants to unmask what he feels is the 
hideous folly of religious leaders who encourage people to get themselves killed 
this way—as though their suffering would guarantee the martyrs’ personal 
resurrection to huge rewards in heaven.146
 
 
King and Pagels acknowledge that the author believes that Jesus’s death and those 
of his followers (including Judas himself) should be thought of as sacrifices.  Then they 
state: 
But what he thinks is wrong is when bishops like Ignatius and Irenaeus teach that 
those who ‘perfect’ themselves through a martyr’s death are ensuring that God 
will reward them by raising them physically from the dead—they are wrong both 
in the ‘God’ they worship and in thinking that the physical body will be raised to 
eternal life.147
They go on to present some of the questions the author seems to be raising:  
 
                                                   
144 Pagels and King,  Reading Judas, 59. 
145 Pagels and King, Reading Judas, 68. 
146 Pagels and King, Reading Judas, 59. 
147 Pagels and King, Reading Judas, 60.   
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What does such teaching make of God?  Is God, then, unwilling or unable to 
forgive human transgression without violent bloodshed—from either the cut 
throats of goats and bulls, or—worse—human sacrifice?  Are Christians to 
worship a God who demands what the Hebrew Bible says that the God of 
Abraham refused—child sacrifice, even that of his own son?  What kind of God 
would require anyone—much less his own son—to die in agony before he accepts 
his followers?148
Of course, it is crucial to realize that there were multiple points of view within the 
early Christianities, not just two.  Regarding the issue of sacrifice itself, Aulén has 
pointed to the fact that many early Christians saw Christ’s death in terms of a Christus 
Victor theory of atonement, not in terms of the kind of substitutionary atonement that the 
questions above presuppose.  Lance Jenott has done a remarkable job of explaining the 
difference between the two and pointing out that an author such as that of the Gospel of 
Judas may have actually embraced the Christus Victor perspective.  Thus, it is not even 
the case that such an author fails to see Jesus’ death as a sacrifice but rather that he 
vehemently opposes a substitutionary atonement perspective. 
 
Certainly many scholars have recently been at pains to point out alternatives to 
substitutionary atonement in the discourses of the early Christianities as well.  Marcus 
Borg, for example, discusses the fact that a view of Christ’s death as a substitutionary 
atonement did not become entrenched and gain dominance until the Middle Ages under 
the influence of Anselm149
                                                   
148 Pagels and King, Reading Judas, 66. 
 while Nakashima Brock and Parker have pointed to the 
plenitude of images of paradise in early Christianity and the relative scarcity of 
149 Marcus Borg, Speaking Christian: Why Christian Words Have Lost Their Meaning and Power—and 




King and Pagels insightfully point out that a diversity of viewpoints regarding 
sacrifice had existed within the various forms of Judaism as well.  Prophets such as Amos, 
Hosea, and Isaiah emphasized loving God and doing justice over mere rituals and insisted 
that the latter could never substitute for the former. Greek and Roman philosophers, too, 
argued for the care of the soul rather than bloody rituals.
  While such discussion is very helpful in illuminating the diverse 
perspectives and opinions circulating in the second and third centuries when the Gospel 
of Judas was written, the presence of a substitutionary atonement perspective in some 
texts (those discussed in chapter two) cannot be denied, and the Gospel of Judas provides 
a clear critique of such.   
151  Porphyry, for example, said 
“The best sacrifice to the gods is a pure mind and a soul free from passions.”  The Gospel 
of Judas adds greatly to our understanding of the fact that such perspectives existed 
within the early Christianities as well.152
For writers such as Irenaeus, a refusal to accept the doctrine of a fleshly 
resurrection “offended their sense of justice.”
  
153  Irenaeus believed that those who 
suffered in the body “should be rewarded in the body.”154
                                                   
150 Rita Nakashima Brock and Rebecca Ann Parker, Saving Paradise: How Christianity Traded Love of 
This World for Crucifixion and Empire (Boston: Beacon, 2008). 
 
151 For attitudes toward martyrdom per se, see Daniel Boyarin’s Dying for God (discussed in chapter one). 
152 Pagels and King, Reading Judas, 69–71 who provide this comment of Porphyry’s. 
153 Pagels and King,Reading Judas, 84. 
154 Pagels and King, Reading Judas, 84.  Joyce Salisbury has also developed this idea extensively in her 
book, The Blood of Martyrs, 2004. 
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For the author of the Gospel of Judas, to suggest that God desires or even wills 
sacrifice is wrong.  The immortal life of the soul is a very real thing, but spiritual 
transformation is the goal not a fleshly resurrection.  Encouraging belief in the latter 
makes people complicit in murder.  By teaching that Jesus died in agony “for the 
sins of the world” and encouraging his followers to die as he did, certain leaders 
send them on a path toward destruction—while encouraging them with the false 
promise that they will be resurrected from death to eternal life in the flesh.155




While scholars are fiercely divided over the character of Judas himself and many 
disagree with King, Pagels, and others who have portrayed Judas in this way, many 
scholars acknowledge King’s and Pagels’ point regarding the critique of martyrdom 
within the text. 
  Texts such as the Gospel of Judas complement and add to our 
understanding of the array of perspectives within the second and third centuries as well.   
Marvin Meyer, for example, notes: 
Elsewhere in the Gospel of Judas, Jesus is made to be very critical of sacrifice, 
and that criticism may be interpreted at celebrations of the Christian eucharist, 
sacrificial interpretations of the crucifixion story, and as Karen L. King and Elaine 
H. Pagels propose, the sacrifices that take place in acts of martyrdom.  Those who 
advocate such sacrifice, as in acts of martyrdom, may be the ‘slayers of children’ 
referred to at 40, 10–11 and in other passages of the Gospel of Judas.157
Later, he says that the Gospel of Judas  
   
is harshly critical of anything that smacks of sacrifice, whether that is the death of 
Jesus understood as sacrifice, or the celebration of the eucharist as a sacrificial 
                                                   
155 Pagels and King, Reading Judas, 74. 
156 Pagels and King, Reading Judas, 101. 
157 Meyer, “Interpreting Judas: Ten Passages in the Gospel of Judas,” 52.  
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meal, or, as Elaine Pagels and Karen King suggest, participation in Christian 
martyrdom as an emulation of the sacrificial death of Jesus.158
Louis Painchaud also comments extensively on the polemics in the Gospel of Judas.  He 
feels it contains incisive critique of  
  
proto-orthodox Christianity delivered with regard to numerous points of doctrine, 
ritual and discipline, such as the identity of the god of the scriptures, christology 
and the interpretation of the passion, baptism and eucharist (here differences have 
more to do with interpretation of the rituals than with the rituals themselves), the 
exercise of ecclesiastical authority, and martyrdom (emphasis added).159
He concludes:  
  
 
there is good reason to believe that the Gospel of Judas is a polemical text, 
reacting against the sacrificial ideology that grew and established itself in the 
Christianity of the second century.  The Gospel of Judas views this ideology as a 
perpetuation of the Jewish sacrificial cult, which it sees as being addressed to the 
archon Saklas, and which Jesus wished his disciples to abolish. This polemic is 
primarily aimed at the sacrificial interpretation of the death of Christ and the 
eucharist, but this does not exclude the possibility that it is also aimed at the 
ideology of martyrdom which was coming into being at this time, especially given 
the passage dealing with priests who sacrifice their wives and children under the 
guise of a blessing (38,16–18).160
Pierluigi Piovanelli, too, discusses the presence of a critique of martyrdom in the 
Gospel of Judas.  He comments specifically on the idea that differing view regarding the 
way in which Jesus’ death served as a sacrifice may have contributed to differing 
viewpoints regarding the value or necessity of dying as a martyr.
 
161
Gesine Schenke Robinson dates the text later than some other scholars, pointing 
to the bitter inner Christian polemic it contains and says: 
 
                                                   
158 Meyer, “When the Sethians were Young,” 61. 
159 Painchaud, “Polemical Aspects of the Gospel of Judas,” 171–86. 
160 Painchaud, “Polemical Aspects of the Gospel of Judas,” 184. 
161 Piovanelli, “Rabbi Yehuda versus Judas Iscariot: The Gospel of Judas and Apocryphal Passion Stories,” 
238. 
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However, when at the end of the second century the Christological battles 
between orthodox and Gnostic Christianity were growing more violent, the 
combined text could have been augmented with the vitriolic vision reports. The 
dramatic change in tone suggests a fairly well-advanced state of mutual 
exclusivity. Severe disturbances, such as persecutions and excommunications 
from orthodox Christian communities, may also have brought about an 
enlargement of the incipit, now characterizing the gospel as a final judgment on 
the church and its leaders, who were apparently perceived as continuing the old 
ways of the failed Jewish religious practices in new clothes, as exemplified by the 
temple cult with its sacrificial rituals. The acts of piety attacked include fasting, 
the agape meal or eucharist, and baptism, but the polemic centers on the concept 
of Christological interpretation of Jesus’ death as a necessity for salvation.  A 
further rationale for the schism becomes particularly discernible in the mention of 
sacrificing wives and children. This Christian-Gnostic community ostensibly 
despised and turned against the readiness for any kind of martyrdom as a 
pointless sacrifice to an inferior God who himself will perish at the end. There is 
no hope of salvation for anyone in this sacrificial approach (emphasis added).162
Nicola Denzey also finds Pagels’ and King’s reading “compelling”:  
 
Elaine Pagels and Karen King have read the disciples’ Temple vision allegorically 
as a reference to the Church and the perceived corruption of apostolic authority; 
they see the monstrous activities of the priests—namely human sacrifice—
connected to the exhortations to martyrdom by some Christians following in 
apostolic tradition.  Given the parallel here with the Testimony of Truth where the 
Christians who boast of their salvation through martyrdom do so through the 
“agency of the wandering stars,” this way of reading the text is compelling 
(emphasis added).163
Preparation for Martyrdom 
 
 Another possibility for fresh, creative ways of interpreting texts such as the 
Gospel of Judas is to think of them as “preparation for martyrdom” texts.  In other words, 
it is conceivable that a variety of attitudes toward the care of the self and more 
specifically, toward martyrdom, existed in the early centuries of the Common Era.  This 
                                                   
162 Robinson, “The Gospel of Judas: Its Protagonist, its Composition, and its Community,” 91. 
163 See pages 54–55 of Nicola Denzey Lewis, “Fate and the Wandering Stars: The Jewish Apocalyptic 
Roots of the Gospel of Judas,” in The Codex Judas Papers: Proceedings of the International Congress on 
the Tchacos Codex held at Rice University, Houston, Texas, March 13–16, 2008 (ed. April D. DeConick; 
NHMS 71; ed. Johannes van Oort and Einar Thomassen; Leiden: Brill, 2009), 289–304. 
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range of attitudes can be seen by examining the full spectrum of early Christian writings.  
Karen King takes this approach.164  Her argument helps us begin to think in terms of a 
variety of ways in which self-formation was being conceived rather than a distinct binary 
opposition between orthodox and heretical (or “Gnostic”) views.  King is careful to note 
that it is the meaning of martyrdom that is at stake for various groups rather than a simple 
dichotomy of embracing or shying away from it.  In conceiving of these texts as part of a 
new kind of genre which could be thought of as “preparation for martyrdom” texts,165
                                                   
164 King, “Martyrdom and Its Discontents,” 23–42. 
  
King points out that not only the actual content of a particular text but also its grouping as 
well as the order of texts within a codex that may be significant in the elaboration and 
nuancing of certain themes in relation to each other. She notes that not only the Gospel of 
Judas but the two texts which precede it, the Letter of Peter to Philip and the First 
Apocalypse of James, articulate views about the meaning of martyrdom.  Thus, the codex 
as a whole reflects a range of perspectives regarding martyrdom for the readers to 
consider.  In the Gospel of Judas, the idea that sacrifice is pleasing to God is angrily 
challenged.  Both Jesus and Judas suffer and die at the hands of others. However, for 
King, their deaths are not portrayed as meaningful sacrifices.  She notes that an actual 
reason for even Jesus’ suffering is not explicitly given.  In the Letter of Peter to Philip 
and the First Apocalypse of James, encouragement is given to those who are facing 
martyrs’ deaths.  In short, if one is able to understand and accept Jesus’ true teaching, one 
will be freed from fear, able to act and to preach the gospel, and also able to accept death 
with equanimity.  In the Letter of Peter to Philip, it is the apostles themselves who are 
165 King, “Martyrdom and Its Discontents,” 24.  
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given this message. By contrast, in the Gospel of Judas, “the twelve” are severely 
admonished for participating in evil acts and abominable sacrifices to a false god.  In a 
sense, then, this text, poses a strong counterpoint not only to others in the Tchacos Codex 
but to one such as Ignatius’ Letter to the Romans.  King insightfully remarks:  “What sets 
these Christians apart is not that they sought to avoid martyrdom nor were not put to 
death as Christians, but rather that the meaning they gave to their suffering and deaths 
was distinctive.”166
 Marvin Meyer, too, notes an insight similar to King’s.  Citing a private 
conversation with Rodolphe Kasser, he notes that all the texts in Codex Tchacos are 
similar in that they relate discussions and revelations that Jesus has with various people 
  In all three texts, however, Jesus reveals to one or more of his 
apostles that the true and immortal self is not the same as the body. Even if the body 
suffers, this is not necessarily the ultimate fate of the soul.  King’s overall thesis—that 
understanding the Gospel of Judas as one of a number of texts which provide insight into 
the array of attitudes regarding martyrdom and a variety of responses as to how to face 
it—is most helpful for the larger project of elucidating early Christian attitudes toward 
the care of the soul.  Moreover, her insight into the fact that a number of authors 
emphasize the importance of receiving, understanding, and accepting the teaching of 
Jesus is likewise crucial for conceptualizing early Christian notions regarding the care of 
the soul.  Such an insight resonates with those of Dunderberg regarding Jesus’ teaching 
about the therapy of emotions. 
                                                   
166 King, “Martyrdom and Its Discontents,” 41. 
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before his crucifixion.  They also “are unified in their common concern for death and life 
in this world and beyond.”167
Alistair Logan likewise discusses the other documents included with the Gospel 
of Judas and reflects on the choice of these particular texts and what significance their 
order in the codex as a whole could have had for those that wrote and read them.  He, too, 
notes that all of the texts involve revelations to disciples and that those texts in which 
Peter and James figure prominently come first in the codex.  These two were well-known 
for having suffered persecution and martyrdom.  The dominant themes seem to center 
around how one overcomes suffering and how one deals with persecution.  Whether one 
should seek it, avoid it, or merely endure what comes are all questions for discussion.
  
168
Finally, Stephen Emmels weighs in on the significance of the Gospel of Judas 
regarding preparation for martyrdom:  
  
And is there not also a still deeper message?  Perhaps the reader is also meant to 
be ready to betray the man or woman that bears his or her own spirit, to be a 
betrayer of his or her own body.  I wonder if the Gospel of Judas, because of its 
focus on Judas the betrayer, is not finally a work about death.  I wonder if its 
message is not finally that the reader need not be afraid of death, just as Jesus is 
portrayed in this gospel as not in the least concerned about the coming sacrifice of 
‘the man who bears’ him.169
He goes on to say, “If the reader is meant somehow to identify with Judas, then he (or 
she) is also meant in some sense to be a betrayer.”
 
170
                                                   
167 Meyer, “Interpreting Judas: Ten Passages in the Gospel of Judas,” 43, n. 6. 
  He continues:  
168 Logan, “The Tchacos Codex: Another Document of the Gnostics?” 3–21. 
169 Emmels, “The Presuppositions and the Purpose of the Gospel of Judas,” 39. 
170 Emmels, “The Presuppositions and the Purpose of the Gospel of Judas,” 38. 
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But a betrayer of what?  Perhaps, metaphorically, a betrayer of “the man that was 
bearing” the spirit that was Jesus’ essential being.  Such a message might have 
been meant as a call to the reader to reject allegiance to the religious cult of the 
wonder-working body in which Jesus appeared on earth, which body was killed 
by crucifixion, and the death of which body is now commemorated by Christians 
in a ceremony (the eucharist) that the gospels report as having been instituted by 
Jesus in a scene that the Gospel of Judas brilliantly omits by spotlighting Judas on 
the outside, committing his betrayal on the street.  Is the reader expected to join 
Judas in the street, unafraid of the curses that will surely come as a result?171
Definitive answers remain elusive, but the Gospel of Judas provides new and valuable 
insights into the controversies prevailing among Christians in the second and third 
centuries of the Common Era.  Simultaneously, the text provides insight into 
conversations regarding themes of anger management and other issues related to the care 
of the soul.  
 
Further Discussion Regarding the Resurrection of the Flesh 
 All of the texts mentioned above also bear consideration regarding debates over 
whether the resurrection of the bodies of Christians is a fleshly one, one involving the 
reconstitution of the very same material parts they had before dying.  The Apocalypse of 
Peter criticizes those who believe in a “restored Christ” (74,10) or “cleave to the name of 
a dead man” (74,14–15).  Moreover, the text asserts the triumph of the immortal soul 
rather than the resurrection of the earthly body, which is ruled by a soul filled with 
passion: “For every soul of these ages has death assigned to it . . . because it is always a 
slave, since it is created for its desires” (75,16–20).   
In the Gospel of Judas, King and Pagels specifically state: “Jesus teaches Judas 
that at death, the bodies of all human beings will perish—there is no resurrection of the 
                                                   
171 Emmels, “The Presuppositions and the Purpose of the Gospel of Judas,” 38–39. 
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flesh.  Only the souls of the great and holy race will be lifted up when their spirits 
separate from them (8,3–4).”172
Those disciples who truly understand, like Judas, are the ones who reject the idea 
that Jesus’s flesh brings salvation. . . . They are the ones who rightly understand 
Jesus’s teaching in the Gospel of John that “the flesh is useless.”  Jesus will be 
crucified, but it is his ascent to heaven—and the ascent of those he draws with 
him—that is the true meaning of salvation.
  Likewise, they state:  
173
Others, like Jenott, do not see Judas as filled with understanding.  His sacrifice of 
Jesus is an evil act.  However, in accordance with a two-natures Christology, it is only the 
human nature of Jesus that perishes, not the divine spirit.  The divine spirit triumphs over 
death and demons.  There is no fleshly resurrection. 
   
In the other three texts, too, different as they are from each other, there is no 
affirmation of a fleshly resurrection.  In the Testimony of Truth, the author exhorts the 
readers/hearers: “Do not expect the carnal resurrection” (36,31).  Basilides believes in the 
transmigration of souls, not a fleshly resurrection.  In the fragment of Valentinus, there is 
not enough context to be sure of the author’s views, but the phrase “have been immortal” 
implies a belief in a pre-existent soul that will live eternally rather than the resurrection of 
a fleshly body.   
Indeed, fierce controversies over the nature of the resurrection are prevalent in 
this period.  Carolyn Walker Bynum gives a fine exposition of what is at stake in these 
debates.174
                                                   
172 Pagels and King, Reading Judas, 77. 
  She helps us to see that the insistence on a fleshly resurrection—and, indeed, 
the resurrection of exactly the same particles of flesh (or sarx) that constituted one’s body 
173 Pagels and King, Reading Judas, 131. 
174 Bynum, The Resurrection of the Body, 1995. 
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prior to death—is a theological development of the second century rather than the first.  
In fact, the doctrine of a fleshly resurrection emerges in the context of persecution.  She 
points out that there existed (and, indeed, exists) a horror of decay and putrefaction.  
Those facing martyrdom wished for reassurance that even if they were devoured by 
beasts, burned, or improperly buried, all would be well.  Theologians such as Irenaeus 
and Tertullian spoke to these fears in a very pastoral way, assuring their fellow Christians 
that God could raise them intact, so to speak.175
Such a theory actually contrasts with that found in the oldest writings of the New 
Testament, those of the apostle Paul.  Paul clearly lays out a belief in a bodily 
resurrection in I Corinthians 15, but he characterizes the body prior to death as the “seed” 
of the transformed, resurrected body.  The English translation for this latter body is 
“spiritual body,” but scholars such as Troels Engberg-Pedersen and Dale Martin explain 
that such a translation is misleading.  The actual phrase is pneumatic body.  These 
scholars feel that Paul was influenced by Stoicism, and for the Stoics, pneuma was real, 
tangible matter. Thus, Paul is not saying that the resurrected body is merely spiritual; 
rather, he feels it is of a different caliber altogether—still altogether material but of a 
different quality than the fleshly body one has prior to death.
 
176
                                                   
175 Joyce Salisbury develops this matter further when she discusses the development of the theology of the 
resurrection of the flesh in the context of persecution.  She writes that conceiving of the resurrection in this 
way resonated with a sense of justice for those facing persecution. See Salisbury, The Blood of Martyrs, 
2004. 
   
176 For discussions of the various beliefs regarding resurrection in the New Testament, see Troels Engberg-
Pedersen, Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul: The Material Spirit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010).  I am particularly indebted to Dale Martin for delineating the Stoic understanding of pneuma in his 
lecture entitled “Epistemologies of the Body in the New Testament” at the Rocky Mountains Great Plains 
SBL/AAR/ASOR luncheon at the Iliff School of Theology, March 19, 2011.  For a helpful exposition of 
distinctions in the various early Christian conceptions of the resurrection, see also Gregory J. Riley, 
Resurrection Considered: Thomas and John in Controversy (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995). 
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  It is important to recognize that to speak of the resurrection of the flesh is to 
reflect a particular theological choice.  It may be that those who believed in Jesus as the 
healer of the emotions but who did not believe in a fleshly resurrection simply could not 
accept the development of the kinds of theology reflected in the writings of Irenaeus, 
Tertullian, and others, and indeed, in the passages of 1 Clement, the Letters of Ignatius, 
and the Martyrdom of Polycarp discussed in chapter two. However, in voicing their 
concerns and presenting alternate views, allying themselves with the Pauline conception 
of the resurrection, they disrupted the discourse of martyrdom and the suffering self, 
which was gaining enormous momentum—as Judith Perkins traces in The Suffering Self.  
Such debates have come down to us as doctrinally based, but indeed, they may well have 
been rooted in different practices and conceptions regarding the best way to care for the 
soul. 
 One important caveat is in order.  Groups that tended to place their emphasis on a 
kind of spiritual transformation emphasizing the therapy of the emotions were not 
necessarily disloyal to the faith or lacking in courage or a willingness to endure 
martyrdom.  Indeed, as we have seen, the reader/hearer is exhorted in various ways not to 
be afraid of anything, including death.  Rather, they simply may not have seen such 
practices as most conducive to the practice of their faith.  Indeed, the emotional theatrics 
and drama associated with the practices of voluntary martyrdom may have seemed to be 
in direct conflict with the disassociation from the emotions advocated in philosophical 
circles.177
                                                   
177 Certainly this was an issue for the Stoics, and perhaps the Valentinians felt similarly. As mentioned 
above, the Stoic emperor Marcus Aurelius remarks in Meditations 11.3, “What a soul that is which is ready, 
if at any moment it must be separated from the body, and ready either to be extinguished or dispersed or 
  Dunderberg himself notes that the opponents were not balanced or neutral in 
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presenting the views of those with whom they disagreed, completely failing to mention 
the presence of moral exhortation and focusing instead on issues of difference.178
Moss astutely notes that the discursive strategies of both Clement and Irenaeus 
have been unwittingly assumed as factual and used to 
 
[marshal] support for a rather sharp divide between orthodox Christians, who 
practiced martyrdom, and Gnostics, who avoided it. Elaborations of this binary 
have drawn in contrasting concerns about the body, resurrection, and creation as 
ways to flesh out these different positions . . . . The contention that Gnostics 
disregarded both the body and martyrdom has been largely adopted by martyrdom 
scholars…who [have] argued that the Gnostics were opposed to martyrdom on 
principle. This recapitulation of Clement’s Gnostic/orthodox binary both obscures 
the thickly braided discourse of martyrdom in antiquity and advances an agenda 
that reifies and denigrates the Gnostics. The contributions of Gnosticism or 
Gnostic texts to the discourse of martyrdom in the early church are ripe for 
reconsideration.179
 In conclusion, one has to ask why the disagreements are so fierce. Ultimately, all 
the groups involved in the debates believe in Jesus—he is represented as alive—and none 
of the texts discussed here portray him as merely a good man who was put to death and 
remained in his grave.  They all depict him as their leader, model, redeemer, or revealer 
of the divine.  However, not all early Christians buy into the discourse of the glorification 
of martyrdom and suffering that was often linked to the idea that Christ was transformed 
in the flesh.  Pheme Perkins comments insightfully: 
 
The distinction between the Gnostic and the undefiled Savior that is introduced in 
1 ApocJas presents a problem that will come to preoccupy theologians in later 
centuries.  What is the relationship between Jesus and the humanity he came to 
save?  Both Gnostic and orthodox Christians begin with the presupposition of the 
                                                                                                                                                       
continue to exist; but so that this readiness comes from a man’s own judgment, not from mere obstinacy, as 
with the Christians, but considerately and with dignity and in a way to persuade another, without tragic 
show.” See Marcus Aurelius, Meditations of Marcus Aurelius, 285. 
178 Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 8–10. 
179 Moss, Ancient Christian Martyrdom, 157–158. 
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sinlessness of Jesus.  However, when sin is associated with defilement by bodily 
and psychic (the passions) reality, then the Savior cannot be caught in the same 
trap as humanity.  So Gnostics minimalize the connection between the Savior and 
the body required for his presence in this world.  Some even go so far as to argue 
that he never took the final step of assuming a mortal body at all.  He merely used 
the psychic one.  He does not have to assume the former, since he has not 
descended to save what is material (cf. Haer I 6,1).  Though people today are 
uncomfortable with the picture of an impassible savior that resulted from this 
division, it corresponds to a widespread ascetic ideal in Gnostic, Christian, and 
philosophical circles.  The perfected soul represents the apatheia of God.180
Perkins’s insight regarding “the perfected soul” as representing “the apatheia of God” is 
most illuminating.  This passage is also helpful in seeing the difficulty of escaping 
interpretation of Gnostic texts through presuppositions such as their inherent Docetism 
even by scholars as astute as Perkins, whose work has been seminal in paving the way for 
appreciation of these texts.  Whether Gnostics were actually Docetists or whether they 
ascribed to a two-natures Christology is, of course, a point discussed above.  They may 
have been “minimaliz[ing] the connection” no more or less than proto-orthodox figures 
who held this position. 
 
 Elaine Pagels also discusses the fact that the theology of the Gnostics differed 
from that of Irenaeus, wondering  
But what is so heretical, so dangerous, so blasphemous, about this interpretation 
of Christian doctrine?  I am convinced that we cannot find the answer to this 
question as long as we consider controversies between orthodoxy and heresy, as 
scholars traditionally have, exclusively in terms of the history of dogma.  When 
we investigate the writings of the “fathers of the church” and of their gnostic 
contemporaries to see how Christology actually functions in each type of 
literature, we may see that it involves specific practical issues—often social and 
political ones—as well.  Specifically, controversy over the interpretation of 
Christ’s passion and death involves, for Christians of the first and second 
centuries, an urgent practical question: how are believers to respond to 
persecution, which raises the imminent possibility of their [?] own suffering and 
death? 
                                                   
180 Perkins, Gnostic Dialogue, 185–86. 
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Irenaeus’ defense of martyrdom is precisely the context of his attack on gnostic views of 
Christ’s passion (Haer. 3.16.1–3.18.5).181
                                                   
181 Pagels, “Gnostic and Orthodox Views of Christ’s Passion,” 265.   
 Thus, such a comment brings us full circle to 
the thesis of chapter one: that in focusing on practices regarding the care of the soul 
rather than the history of doctrine, many useful insights can be gleaned regarding the 
competing visions of early Christian groups and the falsely simplistic opposition between 
“Gnosticism” and “orthodoxy” can be exposed. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: COMPLEMENTARY REPRESENTATIONS OF THE CARE 
OF THE SOUL IN THE GOSPEL OF MARY AND THE MARTYRDOM OF 
PERPETUA AND FELICITY 
 




Thus far, we have explored the significance the care of the soul as a concept in 
Greco-Roman antiquity.  Foucault has illuminated the manner in which it dominated 
philosophical discourse, arguing that “the care of the soul” is the overarching theme 
around which Greco-Roman philosophical discourse circulates.  In particular, as scholars 
continue to reveal the influence of Stoic thought on the early Christianities, its 
pervasiveness becomes clearer, especially in discourse regarding the therapy of emotions 
(see chapter one).  In the Greco-Roman world and especially in the Stoic thought that 
influenced the writers of the New Testament and of Christian texts of the first three 
                                                   
1 This particular sentence is a conflation of two verses: the beginning of Ps 1:3 (“They are like trees planted 
by streams of water”) and Ps 62:2: (“[God] alone is my rock and my salvation, my fortress; I shall never be 
shaken”). As I became more aware of the way in which ancient texts equate immovability with emotional 
stability, I realized that I had encountered this theme as a child when my congregation sang a chorus 
containing this line.  
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centuries of the Common Era,2
Once we understand and acknowledge the significance of the care of the soul and 
the role that technologies of the self played in Greco-Roman thought during the first three 
centuries of the Common Era, we are able to recognize these themes in Christian texts 
including those that represent women in these terms—as those who have successfully 
engaged in a specific kind of the care of the soul (the therapy of emotions) and have been 
 such care of the soul entailed engaging in “technologies 
of the self” that constituted participation in the therapy of emotions.  With Caroline 
Walker Bynum, we have also explored the way in which care of the soul morphed into 
care of the body and became associated with an emphasis on a fleshly resurrection in the 
context of persecution and martyrdom.  In this social milieu, the discourse of the 
suffering self emerged and proved crucial in the formation of proto-orthodox Christian 
identity, as Judith Perkins helped us see. Eventually, as G. E. M. de Ste. Croix and Paul 
Middleton argue, martyrdom was glorified to such a degree that some even desired it 
(chapter two).  Third, we have shown how such glorification was disrupted by the 
discourses of texts that continued to see the Christ as the one who effected the care of the 
soul as the therapy of emotions (being “cured” or “healed” of passions) needed for the 
transcendence of the immortal soul into higher, heavenly realms upon its release from the 
earthly body.  This approach also emphasized the extirpation of emotions such as fear 
and anger but without glorifying suffering and martyrdom (chapter three).  In this chapter, 
we explore the implications of the varying attitudes toward the care of the soul for 
women in the early Christianities. 
                                                   
2 See discussion in previous chapters. An excellent reference for exploring this issue is Rasimus, Engberg-
Pedersen, and Dunderberg, Stoicism in Early Christianity, 2010). 
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“healed,” or “cured,” of their passions, particularly the emotions of fear and anger, 
through their interactions with the Savior.  It is rather remarkable that these texts 
represent women as examples par excellence of such a cure and the spiritual maturity it 
connotes,3 given a cultural predisposition to depict women as weaker than men.4
                                                   
3 Of course, one can never make sweeping, general statements regarding the status of women but must 
carefully nuance such discussions. Erika Mohri makes this case well with regard to Mary Magdalene in 
Maria Magdalena: Frauenbilder in Evangelientexten des 1. bis 3. Jahrhunderts (Marburg: N. G. Elwert 
2000), 11. Assessing the roles of women in early Christian texts often categorized as gnostic has been the 
subject of considerable discussion. See James E. Goehring, “Libertine or Liberated: Women in the So-
Called Libertine Gnostic Communities,” in Women in Early Christianity, ed. David M. Scholer, vol. 14 of 
Studies in Early Christianity: A Collection of Scholarly Essays (New York: Garland, 1993), 183–98, 
previously published in Images of the Feminine in Gnosticism (ed. Karen L. King; Philadelphia: Fortress, 
1988), 329–44;  Lynne C. Boughton, “From Pious Legend to Feminist Fantasy,” JR 71 (1991): 362–83; Jo 
Ann McNamara, “Sexual Equality and the Cult of Virginity in Early Christian Thought,” in Women in 
Early Christianity (ed. David M. Scholer; vol. 14 of Studies in Early Christianity: A Collection of Scholarly 
Essays, ed. Everett Ferguson, David M. Scholer, and Paul C. Finney; New York: Garland, 1993), 219–32; 
Elizabeth A. Clark, “Holy Women, Holy Words: Early Christian Women, Social History, and the 
‘Linguistic Turn,’” JECS 6 (1998): 413–30; Shelly Matthews, “Thinking of Thecla: Issues in Feminist 
Historiography,” JFSR 17.2 (2001): 39–55; Robert L. Wilken, Remembering the Christian Past (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995), 141. 
  
4 Plato (ca. 429–347 B.C.E.), for example, was open to educating women and allowing them to fulfill 
leadership roles if suited to doing so (Resp. 5.451b–457b), but in the Timaeus he recounts a creation myth 
that portrays women as the manifestations of men who lived immorally and so are reborn to an inferior 
status as women as a kind of punishment (42b–c). See Plato, Timaeus (trans. Donald Zeyl; Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 2000). Aristotle (384–322 B.C.E.) assumes the cultural norms of his time—that women are inferior, 
weaker, and subordinate, passive receivers of that which creates life (The Generation of Animals, 726 b30, 
729 a20–30). He also states that the soul comes from the man (738 b25–26). Moreover, “the male is by 
nature superior, and the female inferior; and the one rules, and the other is ruled; this principle, of necessity, 
extends to all mankind” (Pol. 1254 b13–15), and men are more fit to rule: “A husband and father . . . rules 
over wife and children . . . For although there may be exceptions to the order of nature, the male is by 
nature fitter for command than the female” (Pol. 1259 a39–1259 b3). For a useful overview of passages 
reflecting Greco-Roman philosophers’ views of women including some of those above, see Mary R. 
Lefkowitz and Maureen B. Fant, Women’s Life in Greece and Rome: A Source Book in Translation (2d ed.; 
Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 38–54. Also, Clement of Alexandria firmly 
expresses the belief that men are more active and superior to women (Paed. 3.3.19, 1). In particular, he 
comments that a man full of vice is still superior to even a virtuous woman. See Strom. 4.8. For a classic, 
general introduction, see Sarah B. Pomeroy, Goddesses, Whores, Wives, and Slaves: Women in Classical 
Antiquity (New York: Schocken Books, 1975), esp. 93–119. See also Julia O’Faolain and Lauro Martines, 
eds., Not in God’s Image: Women in History from the Greeks to the Victorians (New York: Harper & Row, 
1973), esp. 1–33. See also Nancy Tuana, The Less Noble Sex: Scientific, Religious, and Philosophical 
Conceptions of Woman’s Nature (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993). See also the discussion by 
Gail P. C. Streete, Redeemed Bodies: Women Martyrs in Early Christianity (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster 
John Knox, 2009), 14–24, 126–29.  
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In this chapter, we juxtapose the roles of two early Christian women, Mary 
Magdalene and Perpetua of Carthage as represented in the Gospel of Mary5 and the 
Martyrdom of Perpetua and Felicity,6
                                                   
5 Carl Reinhardt bought the manuscript that contains the most complete version of the text (in what is 
known as the Papyrus Berolinensis or Codex Berolinensis [BG] 8502 from a Cairo antiquities dealer in 
1896, but it was not actually published until 1955. A burst water pipe destroyed the edition prepared by 
Reinhardt as it lay in the editing house, and then the outbreak of the two world wars further delayed 
publication. The first published version of the Coptic text appeared in 1955 alongside a German translation: 
W. C. Till, Die gnostischen Schriften des koptischen Papyrus Berolinensis 8502: Zweite, erweiterte Auflage 
bearbeitet von Hans-Martin Schenke (TU 60; Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1972). There are two other 
published Coptic editions of the text as well. One is in the series in which the Nag Hammadi codices were 
published even though this work is not among those found near Nag Hammadi: R. McL. Wilson and G. W. 
MacRae, “The Gospel according to Mary BG, I: 7,1–19,5,” in Nag Hammadi Codices V,2–5 and VI with 
Papyrus Berlinensis 8502,1 and 4 (ed. D. M. Parrott; NHS 11; Leiden: Brill, 1979), 453–71. An English 
translation is included as well. The other is that of Anne Pasquier in L’Evangile selon Marie, (Bibliothèque 
copte de Nag Hammadi, Section “Textes” 10; Québec: Les Presses de l’Université Laval, 1983). This 
contains a French translation. There are two other existing manuscripts, although each consists of only a 
short fragment: the Oxyrhynchus Papyrus (POxy) 3525 and the Rylands Papyrus (PRyl) 463. The first 
edition of the former is P. J. Parsons, “3525: Gospel of Mary,” in The Oxyrhynchus Papyri (London: Egypt 
Exploration Society, 1983), 50:12–14, and the latter is C. H. Rylands Library, “463: The Gospel of Mary,” 
in Catalogue of the Greek Papyri in the John Rylands Library (Manchester University Press, 1938), 3:18–
23. The most recent critical edition of the text is that by Christopher Tuckett, The Gospel of Mary (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), 86–118. Tuckett also provides a good overview of the different 
manuscripts and translations, 3–9. Karen King has also provided a careful, inclusive, English translation in 
The Gospel of Mary of Magdala: Jesus and the First Woman Apostle (Santa Rosa: Polebridge, 2003), 13–
18, which is the one used for quotations in the chapter. Another noteworthy English translation is that of 
Esther A. de Boer in The Gospel of Mary: Listening to the Beloved Disciple (London: Continuum, 2005), 
18–21. 
 respectively, two early Christian texts probably 
6 There are both Latin and Greek manuscripts of this passio, or martyrdom account. Lucas Holstenius 
discovered the most complete Latin version in 1661 at the Benedictine Monastery at Monte Cassino. 
Rendel Harris found the Greek one in 1889 at the Convent of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem. See 
discussion in the most recent critical edition: Jacqueline Amat, Passion de Perpétue et de Félicité suivi de 
Actes (Sources Chrétiennes 417; Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1996), 84–88. See also Rex D. Butler, The 
New Prophecy and “New Visions”: Evidence of Montanism in The Passion of Perpetua and Felicity 
(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2006), 2–3. However, most scholars agree that 
the Latin text is older than the Greek. See J. Armitage Robinson, ed., The Passion of S. Perpetua in Texts 
and Studies: Contributions to Biblical and Patristic Literature, 1, no. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1891; repr., Nendeln/Liechtenstein: Kraus Reprint, 1967), 1–9.  In the Acta Minora, there are also 
two shorter versions that are included in Amat’s critical edition. These contain some textual variants. For 
example, Perpetua is depicted as less sympathetic to her father’s pleas and more willing to reject her son. 
These changes are intriguing and may reflect an attempt to make her transgression of existing social norms 
less palatable and acceptable to readers in a post-Constantinian world where Christianity had been accepted 
but where Roman social norms regarding the family were still firmly ensconced. See Streete, Redeemed 
Bodies, 49–72. However, these differences are not of direct relevance for this chapter. All citations for the 
discussion in this chapter are from the widely used critical edition of the longer, Latin text into English: 
Musurillo, Acts of the Christian Martyrs, 106–31. Musurillo’s translation of Perpetua’s account of her time 
in prison and her visions (though not the account of her ordeal in the arena) are also in the widely 
accessible Lefkowitz and Fant, Women’s Life in Greece and Rome, 313–18. 
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written within roughly a century of each other.7 The former is one of the only surviving 
Christian gospels8 featuring and focused on a woman, while the latter is a very early 
example of a Christian text that represents itself as written (at least partially) by a 
woman.9
                                                   
7 The martyrdom of Perpetua is usually dated to 203 C.E., and the text recounting it has been traditionally 
thought to date to about this time. See Musurillo, Acts of the Christian Martyrs, xxvi–xxvii; Barnes, “Pre-
Decian Acta Martyrum,” 521–25. For discussion of the complexity of the dating and textual issues, 
however, see Moss, Ancient Christian Martyrdom, 130–32. However, dating the Gospel of Mary is 
problematic. Most scholars date it to the second century C.E.  Karen King dates it to the first half of the 
second century based on the fact that debates about women’s authority in Christianity were particularly 
heated then. See Gospel of Mary of Magdala, 184. See also p. 628 of Karen L. King, “Gospel of Mary 
Magdalene,” in A Feminist Commentary (ed. Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza; vol. 2 of Searching the 
Scriptures; New York: Crossroad, 1994), 601–34. Anne Pasquier dates it to the second half of the second 
century, a date that would place its composition closer to that of the Martyrdom of Perpetua and Felicity. 
See L’Évangile selon Marie, 3–4. Dating of early Christian texts is difficult. Karen King discusses the 
circularity in reasoning that sometimes occurs in the process (Gospel of Mary of Magdala, 184). 
 Mary Magdalene has always played a part in the Christian tradition, but 
8 For a discussion of what the term gospel actually means, see Helmut Koester, Ancient Christian Gospels: 
Their History and Development (Philadelphia: Trinity, 1990). In the case of the Gospel of Mary, the text 
contains a colophon at the end containing the exact phrase “Gospel of Mary.” 
9 It is highly probable that Christian women were writing long before 200 C.E.  However, unfortunately, 
many Christian texts have been lost or suppressed. Christoph Markschies notes that Theodor Mommsen, 
the renowned nineteenth-century classicist at the University of Berlin, once wrote that an estimated 85% of 
known second-century texts no longer remained. See “Lehrer, Schüler, Schule: Zur Bedeutung einer 
Institution für das antike Christentum,” in Religiöse Vereine in der römischen Antike. Untersuchungen zu 
Organization, Ritual und Raumordnung (ed. Ulrike Egelhaaf-Gaiser and Alfred Schäfer; Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 2002), 97–120. Secondly, it is impossible to know whether Perpetua herself wrote the account. 
Many commentators feel it is not unreasonable to assume that we may believe the editor when he/she tells 
us: “Now from this point on the entire account of her ordeal is her own, according to her own ideas and in 
the way that she herself wrote it down” (8.2). Both Jacqueline Amat and Ǻke Fridh carefully e xamine this 
issue. See Amat, Passion de Perpétue et de Félicité suivi de Actes, 19–27; Ǻke Fridh, Le problème de la 
passion des Saintes Perpétue et Félicité (Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensis 26; Stockholm: Almqvist 
& Wiksell, 1968), 5, 8, 83. See also Moss, Ancient Christian Martyrdom, 132–33. Francine Cardman 
reminds us that “regardless of how they are titled or whom they include, the acts of the martyrs do not 
allow direct access to the experience of those memorialized. Rather, the reader views their passion through 
the scrim of the authors’ sensibilities—their perceptions of the martyrs and their estimate of their 
audience’s expectations.” See “Acts of the Women Martyrs,” in Women in Early Christianity (ed. David M. 
Scholer; vol. 14 of Studies in Early Christianity: A Collection of Scholarly Essays, ed. Everett Ferguson, 
David M. Scholer, and Paul C. Finney; New York: Garland, 1993), 98–99. However, what is important for 
our purposes are the way in which Perpetua is represented within the text regardless of whether or not she 
actually wrote it down. Some have thought Tertullian to be the editor: P. de Labriolle, La crise montaniste 
(Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1913), 345–53. However, this hypothesis currently enjoys less scholarly support. See 
Butler, New Prophecy and “New Visions,” 49–57, 156–60.  
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theologians with a patriarchal bias10 distorted her role in the New Testament gospels and 
other early Christian texts11 grossly over the centuries.12 However, over the past three 
decades contemporary scholars have rediscovered and reexamined early Christian texts 
that represent her as a strong leader, bringing her role as the apostle to the apostles into 
sharper focus.13
                                                   
10 The seminal work that provides an articulate overview of this issue is Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, In 
Memory of Her: A Feminist Theological Reconstruction of Christian Origins (tenth-anniversary ed.; New 
York: Crossroad, 2004). 
 Likewise, Perpetua’s story of courageous resistance and bravery in 
facing martyrdom has long been a part of Christian history and inspired Christians 
11 Many early Christian texts include Mary: the Gospel of Mark, the Gospel of Matthew, the Gospel of 
Luke, the Gospel of John, the Epistula Apostolorum, the Gospel of Peter, the Secret Gospel of Mark, the 
Coptic Gospel of Thomas (NHC II,2), the Gospel of Mary, the Sophia of Jesus Christ (BG 8502 and NHC 
III,4), Eugnostos the Blessed (NHC III,3 and V,1), the last part of the Codex Askewianus, the Pistis Sophia, 
the Dialogue of the Savior (NHC III,5), the Gospel of Philip (NHC II,3), the Manichaean Psalms, and the 
Acts of Philip. See François Bovon, “Le privilège pascal de Marie-Madeleine” NTS 30 (1984): 50–62, 
translated by Jane Haapiseva-Hunter as “Mary Magdalene’s Paschal Privilege,” in New Testament 
Traditions and Apocryphal Narratives (PTMS 36; Allison Park, Pa: Pickwick, 1995), 147–57, 228–35. 
12 The many, varying representations of Mary Magdalene through the centuries are detailed in Susan 
Haskins, Mary Magdalene: Myth and Metaphor (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1993). See also Ingrid Maisch, 
Between Contempt and Veneration . . . Mary Magdalene: The Image of a Woman Through the Centuries 
(trans. Linda M. Mahoney; Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical, 1998). The distortion of Mary’s representation 
from that of a courageous apostle, teacher, and leader to that of an emotional, passion-filled prostitute in a 
sermon by Gregory the Great is particularly arresting. See Jane Schaberg, “How Mary Magdalene Became 
a Whore: Mary Magdalene Is in Fact the Primary Witness to the Fundamental Data of Early Christian 
Faith,” BRev 8 (1992): 30–37, 51–52; Jane Schaberg, The Resurrection of Mary Magdalene: Legends, 
Apocrypha, and the Christian Testament (New York: Continuum, 2002), 65–120. For a compelling 
argument regarding Mary’s apostleship which underscores her essential role as a witness, see Ann Graham 
Brock, Mary Magdalene, The First Apostle: The Struggle for Authority (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2003). For an insightful overview of the depiction of Mary Magdalene in the medieval period, see 
Katherine L. Jansen, The Making of the Magdalen: Preaching and Popular Devotion in the Later Middle 
Ages (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
13 While it is hard to date the resurgence of her apostolic role precisely, François Bovon’s article listing the 
early Christian texts in which she is mentioned seemed to have been extremely important in this regard.  
Certainly, the questioning of the legitimacy of conflating her with the prostitute mentioned in Luke 7:37–50 
begins much earlier, notably in the Reformation with John Calvin as well as a French priest, Jacques 




As we use feminist theology, postmodern critical theory, and historiography to 
pay attention to discursive strategies used to represent Mary and Perpetua, we see that the 
depictions in both texts provide rich, complex opportunities for reflecting on the ways in 
which they function as models of those who have achieved a goal much admired in their 
Greco-Roman cultural context—a “cure” from their enslavement to passions such as 
anger and fear.  Of course, postmodern historiography helps us to understand the 
difficulty of recovering a historical Mary Magdalene or a historical Perpetua.  We read 
with the understanding that texts are representations and that issues of power are always 
present in the ways that human beings are portrayed as well as in the way each generation 
interprets these portrayals.  Through the lens of the care of the soul, however, powerful 
new understandings emerge regarding the way in which Mary Magdalene and Perpetua 
function as model disciples: steadfast, loyal, courageous, fearless, and lacking in anger 
toward those who persecute them. 
 However, her representation also contains certain troubling 
ambiguities, which are discussed below.  
The Representation of Mary Magdalene in the Gospel of Mary 
The foremost example of a woman who demonstrates emotional stability is Mary 
Magdalene.15
                                                   
14 Theologians in the early church including Tertullian, Augustine, and Quodvulteus remark favorably on 
her courage, though, at the same time, they carefully qualify her leadership role. For good overviews of the 
reception history of Perpetua, see Joyce Salisbury, Perpetua’s Passion: The Death and Memory of a Young 
Roman Woman (New York: Routledge, 1997), 149–79, 204–08; Streete, Redeemed Bodies, 49–72, 132–36. 
 The Gospel of Mary provides a particularly strong representation of her 
15 The word Magdalene does not appear in the text; however, most scholars recognize this Mary as the 
Magdalene. See Karen L. King, “Why All the Controversy: Mary in the Gospel of Mary,” in Which Mary? 
The Marys of Early Christian Tradition (ed. F. Stanley Jones; SBLSymS 19; Atlanta: Society of Biblical 
Literature, 2002), 53–74. See also Antti Marjanen’s piece in the same volume, “The Mother of Jesus or the 
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character in terms of the care of the soul and the therapy of the emotions.  This text is the 
only surviving gospel whose title contains the name of a woman16 and is most likely a 
text composed in the second century  C.E.17 Most scholars judge the genre to be a 
postresurrection dialogue,18 although Judith Hartenstein has argued that the vision Mary 
relates may be one that she had prior to the Savior’s death even if she is recounting it in a 
postresurrection context.19 The key thing to focus on for our purposes is that the author of 
the Gospel of Mary represents Mary Magdalene as steadfast, resolute, and calm.20
                                                                                                                                                       
Magdalene? The Identity of Mary in the So-Called Gnostic Christian Texts,” 31–41. For a dissenting view, 
see the accompanying article by Stephen Shoemaker, “A Case of Mistaken Identity? Naming the Gnostic 
Mary,” 5–30. For general discussion of this issue, see Tuckett, Gospel of Mary, 14–18.  
 The 
keys to seeing that the author of the text represents Mary Magdalene as one who has 
successfully engaged in the therapy of emotions are noticing (a) the vocabulary the writer 
chooses in representing her (as one who did not “waver”), (b) the role the writer ascribes 
to her in the first part of the manuscript (as a courageous disciple who stands, faces the 
male disciples, and boldly exhorts them to preach the gospel in spite of their fear of 
possible persecution), (c) the fact that she is considered worthy of receiving a vision 
16 See the interesting discussion of this in De Boer, The Gospel of Mary, 93–94.  
17 As with many ancient texts, it is hard to date the Gospel of Mary precisely (as discussed above). 
18 See Perkins, The Gnostic Dialogue, 1980. See also King, “Gospel of Mary Magdalene,” 602; Elaine 
Pagels, The Gnostic Gospels (New York: Random House, 1978), 15; King, Gospel of Mary of Magdala, 
29–34; and Tuckett, Gospel of Mary, 31–41. For general discussion of this genre, see James M. Robinson 
and Helmut Koester, Trajectories through Early Christianity (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1971); Koester, 
Ancient Christian Gospels.  
19 Judith Hartenstein, Die Zweite Lehre: Erscheinungen des Auferstandenen als Rahmenerzählungen 
frühchristlicher Dialoge (TUGAL 146; Berlin: Akademie, 2000), 128–30, 152–55. Karen King discusses 
Hartenstein’s view on pp. 64–65 in “Why All the Controversy,” 53–74, and in Gospel of Mary of Magdala, 
174–75, 209. 
20 Toward the end, she weeps (10.5), but this does not necessarily undermine the strength of her depiction 
as a whole, a point discussed at more length below. 
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(characteristic of one who is “healed” of her passions), and (d) the particular content of 
that vision (a description of the ascent of the soul to a place of rest and stability). 
The Positive Connotation of Not Wavering 
In the text, the Savior praises Mary Magdalene “for not wavering” (7.3) when she 
saw him in a vision.21 The Coptic phrase is ΑΤКΙΜ and in Greek would be asaleutos.22 
In fact, this short phrase had significant, positive philosophical connotations.  Ancient 
Greco-Roman writers applied the designation of being unwavering or immovable to 
objects, races, and as in this case, to individual persons.23
                                                   
21 All citations come from Karen King’s inclusive translation in The Gospel of Mary of Magdala, 2003. 
 To be unwavering had the 
connotation of being emotionally stable and free of the volatile, shifting sensations 
caused by the passions.  In fact, the very term passion had strongly negative associations.  
As Long and Sedley explain, passion represented “the source of unhappiness, wrong-
doing and the flaws of character which issue in wrong-doing.” Four passions were 
22 See De Boer, Gospel of Mary, 75–76.  
23 Michael A. Williams has traced the concept of immovability and its relationship to being free of passion 
extensively. See Williams,  Immovable Race, 1985. His main focus is the illumination of the term 
immovable race in Sethian writings, but he provides extensive support for the positive connotation that 
being motionless, or asaleutos, had in a wide variety of both Jewish and Greco-Roman philosophical 
contexts. Throughout this section, I am greatly indebted to his discussion and his translations of certain key 
passages in ancient texts. See especially pp. 8–9, 27–28, 55, 77, 114–15, 128, and 178–79. Esther de Boer’s 
discussion of Stoic influences on the Gospel of Mary has also been very helpful. See especially chapter 
three, “Character and Purpose of the Gospel of Mary,” in The Gospel of Mary, 35–59 as well as pp. 71 and 
76–78. De Boer also discusses these issues in “A Stoic Reading of the Gospel of Mary: The Meaning of 
‘Matter’ and ‘Nature’ in Gospel of Mary 7.1–8.11,” in Stoicism in Early Christianity (ed. Tuomas Rasimus, 
Troels Engberg-Pedersen, and Ismo Dunderberg; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2010), 199–219. For an 
insightful discussion of the influence of Stoicism and Stoic notions of apatheia on the Gospel of Mary, see 
also King, Gospel of Mary of Magdala, 43–47. One of the first to argue for the influence of Stoicism on the 
Gospel of Mary is Anne Pasquier (though she focuses on cosmology rather than the therapy of emotions per 
se): see pages 48–56 of  “L’eschatologie dans L’Évangile selon Marie: étude des notions de nature et 
d’image,” in Colloque international sur les textes de Nag Hammadi (Québec, 22–25 août 1978) (Ed. B. 
Barc; Québec: Les Presses de Université Laval, 1981), 390–404.  
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considered primary: “appetite, pleasure, fear, and distress.”24
the instability excited by the archons and demons takes its characteristic form in 
the churning nausea of deep-seated passions (grief, fear, desire, anger, etc.)—as 
difficult to root out as ingested bacteria.  These turbulent passions, aroused deep 
within the individual, had to be eradicated in order for one to be perfect and 
therefore “immovable.”
 Long and Sedley go on to 
explain that the passion of appetite included anger, and those of fear and distress included 
hesitancy and confusion as well as jealousy, grief, worry, and annoyance.  A quote from 
Philo of Alexandria captures the negative view of passion well: “For the soul faints and 
loses all power through passion when it receives from the body the flood of tossing surge 
caused by the storm wind which sweeps down in its fury, driven on by unbridled 
appetite” (Prelim. Studies 60 [Colson and Whitaker]).  Michael Williams describes the 
beliefs of ancient thinkers this way:  
25
In fact, God himself was thought to be perfect and thus completely immovable in 
this sense.  Philo of Alexandria, for example, says that “so vast in its excess is the 
stability of the Deity that he imparts to chosen natures a share of his steadfastness to be 
their richest possession” (Dreams 2.223 [Colson and Whitaker, LCL]; emphasis added).  
Later, Clement of Alexandria discusses the pillar of fire that led the Hebrews in the 
wilderness (mentioned in Exod 13:21) as a reflection of “God’s stable permanence and 
his unchanging light, which no form can catch” (Strom. 1.163.6 [Ferguson]; emphasis 
added).  Thus, humans who exhibited this kind of stability were also admired greatly. 
  
                                                   
24 Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 1:419. See also Nussbaum, “The Stoics on the 
Extirpation of the Passions,” 129–77.  
25 Williams, Immovable Race, 152. Here Williams is discussing the representation of the passions in the 
Apocryphon of John. Christopher Tuckett notes possible parallels between the Apocryphon of John and the 
Gospel of Mary in his critical edition on pp. 175–180. 
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In addition, Greco-Roman texts contain portrayals of various male heroes 
described in terms of their immovability (with physical stability symbolizing emotional 
strength of character).  The followers of Socrates, for example, described him as standing 
immovable in contemplation for twenty-four hours at a time.  Later, Iamblichus, a third-
century Syrian Neoplatonist, describes Pythagoras as making a voyage in which he 
remained in the same position without moving for three nights without eating or sleeping 
(Vit. Pythag. 16).26
Jewish texts also describe heroes in this way.  For example, Philo of Alexandria 
portrays Abraham and Moses
 
27 in terms of their standing fixed and immovable before 
God in Gen 18:22 (when Abraham stands before the Lord while the guests he has just 
hosted turn toward Sodom in order to destroy it) and Deut 5:31 (when Moses continues to 
stand beside the Lord on Mount Sinai to receive the commandments) respectively.28
for when should we expect a mind to stand and no longer sway as on the balance 
save when it is opposite God, seeing and being seen.  For it gets its equipoise 
from these two sources: from seeing, because when it sees the Incomparable it 
does not yield to the counter pull of things like itself; from being seen, because 
the mind which the Ruler judges worthy to come within His sight He claims for 
the solely best, that is for Himself (Dreams 2.226–27 [Colson and Whitaker]).   
 
Philo says of Abraham,  
                                                   
26 See discussion in Williams, Immovable Race, 6, 28. 
27 It is interesting that Philo chooses Moses since Moses was not allowed to enter the promised land 
because he struck a rock in anger and, in this sense, did not demonstrate control over his passion. See Num 
20:11. 
28 See also discussion in Williams, Immovable Race, 27; De Boer, Gospel of Mary, 76–77; Peter Brown, 
The Body and Society: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity (twentieth-anniversary 
ed.; New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 31–32. 
 155 
With regard to Moses, Philo says, “For that which draws near to God enters into affinity 
with what is, and through that immutability becomes self-standing” (2.228).  Williams 
summarizes Philo’s position well:  
Persons such as Moses, wise men, filled with virtue, belong to a group whom God 
draws to himself and grants participation in his own stability.  They belong to a 
group which God has firmly fixed near himself—like Moses to whom he said, 
“Stand here by me” (Deut. 5:31, SAC 8).  Philo is particularly interested in the 
ethical dimensions of this—the instability of the fool tossed by passions vs. the 
immovability of virtue and the wise men who possess it.  But the achievement of 
ethical excellence is portrayed by Philo as an ascent to the Olympian realm of 
virtue (Post. 31) where divine stability is to be found.  Those who follow virtue 
are set above everything that is earthly and mortal (Det. pot. ins. 114).  Like 
Moses, they “stand at rest, firm and unwaveringly, in God alone” (Ques. Exod. 
frag 11, trans. Loeb Classical Library).29
Philo was, of course, writing in the first century of the Common Era, but at the end of the 
third century C.E., many of the Christian apologists continued to appropriate the thought 
of Philo, and the Christian Clement of Alexandria makes the same point that Philo did 
with regard to Abraham and Moses.
  
30
 In some of the writings that Christians adopted, the ability to “not be moved” is an 
ideal as well, particularly in the Psalms.  In Psalms 15:5, those who live righteously 
“shall never be moved.” Likewise, Psalms 21:7 says that the king who “trusts in the 
Lord” and experiences “the steadfast love of the Most High . . . shall not be moved.”
 In the New Testament, too, one also finds references to immovability.  Second 
Thessalonians 2:2 contains an exhortation “not to be quickly shaken in mind or alarmed, 
either by spirit or by word or by letter.” Likewise, the writer of James 1:6–8 admonishes 
the readers in terms reminiscent of Philo’s: “But ask in faith, never doubting, for the one 
  
                                                   
29 Williams, Immovable Race, 76. 
30 Williams, Immovable Race, 55. 
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who doubts is like a wave of the sea, driven and tossed by the wind; for the doubter, 
being double-minded and unstable in every way, must not expect to receive anything 
from the Lord.”31
 As we move into Christian texts of the first centuries of the Common Era, we find 
a continuation of this theme.  Ignatius of Antioch, for example, commends the church in 
Smyrna as “wise” by saying, “I observed that you are established in an unshakeable faith, 
having been nailed, as it were, to the cross of the Lord Jesus Christ in both body and 




Then the materials prepared for the pyre were placed around him; and as they 
were also about to nail him, he said, “Leave me as I am; for the one who enables 
me to endure the fire will also enable me to remain on the pyre without moving” 
(13.3). 
 Likewise, the narrator of the Martyrdom of Polycarp carefully notes that 
Polycarp does not need to be nailed down when the Romans light the fires that will 
consume his body.  He is completely immovable even without physical constraints:  
Clement of Alexandria also writes about one transformed by perfect knowledge who 
ascends mystically into a state of stability: “into the chamber of the Father, to the abode 
which is truly the Lord’s, to be, as it were, an eternally standing and abiding light, totally 
immutable” (Strom. 7.57.5).   
 Clement also discusses the Son of God’s lack of passion in his form as the perfect 
Logos, or “impassible Human” (Strom. 7.5.5).  Clement says, “He was quite completely 
without passion, and into him slipped no passionate movement at all, neither pleasure nor 
                                                   
31 See discussion in De Boer, Gospel of Mary, 76. 
32 As in chapter two, the translation is that of Holmes, The Apostolic Fathers, 2007. Regarding this point, 
see the discussion in Williams, Immovable Race, 149. 
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grief (Strom. 6.71.2).  For Clement, Christian perfection lies in becoming like Christ in 
this way.  In fact, he describes the apostles as those who were completely free from 
passion, remaining in a state of complete self-control after the resurrection of their Savior 
(6.71.3). 
Male Disciples’ Fear vs. Mary’s Lack of Fear 
 Interestingly, however, in the Gospel of Mary, we do not find the male disciples 
represented in these glowing terms.  Jesus has just appeared to them and told them to go 
and preach the gospel (8.21–22).  After he departs, the text says:  
But they were distressed and wept greatly.  “How are we going to go out to the 
rest of the world to announce the good news about the Realm of the child of true 
Humanity?” they said.  “If they did not spare him, how will they spare us?” (5.1–
3).33
As Esther de Boer notes, “the disciples . . . bring forth passion, which arises from their 
despair, which is a result of focusing on the suffering of Man.”
  
34
 It is at this point that Mary stands up and exhorts them to be steadfast rather than 
afraid:  
 In short, the text depicts 
them in precisely the terms noted above—as fearful, hesitant, confused, and worried.   
Then Mary stood up.  She greeted them all, addressing her brothers and sisters, 
“Do not weep and be distressed nor let your hearts be irresolute.  For his grace 
will be with you all and will shelter you.  Rather, we should praise his greatness, 
for he has prepared us and made us true Human beings.” When Mary had said 
these things, she turned their heart [to]ward the Good, and they began to deba[t]e 
about the wor[d]s of [the Savior]  (5.4–9). 
                                                   
33 It is interesting that the text contains no hint of Docetism, the belief that Christ did not actually suffer and 
die. Docetism was a common accusation against supposed Gnostics. See Silke Petersen, “Zerstört die 
Werke der Weiblichkeit!”: Maria Magdalena, Salome und andere Jüngerinnen Jesu in christlich-
gnostischen Schriften (ed. S. Emmel and H. J. Klimkeit; NHMS 48; Leiden: Brill, 1999), 135, n. 197. See 
also De Boer, Gospel of Mary, 6, and Tuckett, Gospel of Mary, 14.  
34 De Boer, Gospel of Mary, 89. 
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In this context, it is clear that the one who embodies a lack of fear and the emotional 
stability associated with advanced spiritual status is Mary:  
Throughout the Gospel, Mary is clearly portrayed as an exemplary disciple.  She 
doesn’t falter when the Savior departs.  She steps into his place after his departure, 
comforting, strengthening, and instructing the others.  Her spiritual 
comprehension and maturity are demonstrated in her calm behavior and especially 
in her visionary experience.  These at once provide evidence of her spiritual 
maturity and form the basis for her legitimate exercise of authority in instructing 
the other disciples.  She does not teach in her own name, but passes on the words 
of the Savior, calming the disciples and turning their hearts toward the Good.  Her 
character proves the truth of her revelation and by extension authorizes the 
teaching of the Gospel of Mary.35
Thus, it is, in fact, the content of her character that qualifies her as a leader of the 
disciples. 
  
Indeed, Mary’s spiritual status in many ways parallels that of the Savior himself.  
Esther de Boer notes the similarity of the beginning of the Gospel of Mary, in which 
Jesus speaks and then departs, to the departure of Jesus in Luke 24:50–51; Acts 1:9, and 
John 14 and 16:16–23, but whereas Jesus himself encourages the disciples to rejoice in 
the Gospel of John, it is Mary who takes on the role of the encourager in the Gospel of 
Mary.36
                                                   
35 King, Gospel of Mary of Magdala, 90. See also pp. 30–31, where King discusses Mary’s position as 
“parallel to that of the Savior.” In fact, King sees the role Mary plays in this first part of the text as that in 
the first of three dialogues that are embedded within each other in order to draw the reader into increasingly 
deeper understanding. In this first dialogue, the conversation is between Mary and other disciples, and 
Mary instructs the others. The second layer is one in which Mary models the way a true disciple acts, while 
the third layer describes the triumph of the soul as it moves upward into joy and rest. King remarks: “Both 
the content and the configuration [of these three layers] lead the reader inward toward the stability, power 
and freedom of the true self, the soul set free from the false powers of ignorance, passion, and death.” In 
this sense, “the structure of the Gospel of Mary reproduces the same message as the Savior’s teaching” at 
the very beginning of the text (4.2 and 4.5–7).  
 Erika Mohri notes that “Mary replaces the sovereign position of the Savior, who 
has left the disciples” (“tritt Maria souverän an die Stelle des Erlösers, der die 
36 De Boer, Gospel of Mary, 24, 89. 
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Jüngerinnen und Jünger verlassen hat”).37 Christopher Tuckett also draws attention to 
Mary’s taking over character attributes and activities of Jesus.38 In this sense, Mary is 
like Christ.  However, the Gospel of Mary portrays this Christ-likeness in an entirely 
different manner than the imitatio Christi of the martyr accounts (discussed in chapter 
two).  In those cases, the focus is on freedom from passions such as fear and anger and on 
patient endurance but it is the patient endurance of torture, suffering, and death.  In the 
Gospel of Mary, Mary acknowledges those possibilities and advocates for facing them 
courageously, but the emphasis is on living with freedom from passion and refusing 
enslavement to any of the fears that would constrain one in pursuing a life that fully 
reflects Christ.39
 The idea that the Savior has “made us into human beings” is also an important 
part of this passage (9.12–24).  Using this particular phrase evokes the idea of being free 
 
                                                   
37 Mohri, Maria Magdalena, 265, see also 273. In conversation, Ann Graham Brock has pointed out a 
similar parallel representation of Mary as stepping into the role of the Savior in her depiction as a 
shepherdess in the Manichaean Psalms. Jesus is frequently depicted as the Good Shepherd in the New 
Testament. In the Manichaean Psalms, Mary is charged with leading eleven male disciples back. 
38 See Tuckett, Gospel of Mary: “Another possible verbal echo of New Testament language may occur at 
9.4–15, where Mary tells the other disciples ‘not to grieve or be irresolute’. . . the language may be similar 
to that of Matt. 28:17 where the disciples see the risen Jesus ‘but some doubted’. In general terms too, it is 
agreed by many that, in the Gospel of Mary, the figure of Mary takes over many of the characteristics 
and/or activities of Jesus himself. Hence it is possible that the note about the ‘doubt’ of the disciples (a 
statement by the author of Matthew, but placed on the lips of Mary here) may be a further link connecting 
these two passages. Hence the motif of Mary bidding the other disciples not to ‘doubt’ may be a 
recollection of Matthew’s resurrection scene in Matthew 28” (68–69). With reference to this point, also see 
Michel Tardieu, Écrits gnostiques: Codex de Berlin (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1984), 78, and Antti 
Marjanen, The Woman Jesus Loved: Mary Magdalene in the Nag Hammadi and Related Documents, 
(NHMS 40; Leiden: Brill, 1996), 107, n. 53. With reference to the “doubting” of the disciples upon seeing 
the resurrected Jesus, see Ap. John 2.2.10–11; Treat. Res. 47.2–3, 36–7, and Christopher Tuckett’s 
discussion in Nag Hammadi and the Gospel Tradition (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1986), 28, 70. For another 
point of view, see King, Gospel of Mary of Magdala, 93–118. King analyzes the Gospel of Mary in terms 
of its intertextuality rather than in terms of specific dependence on the New Testament gospels. 
39 For discussion of the way in which the motif of imitatio Christi functions in martyr accounts, see Moss, 
Other Christs, 2010. 
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from the passions.  Philo of Alexandria, for example, comments that Gen 6:9 describes 
Noah as a  
righteous human being . . . not according to the common form of speech, to the 
mortal animal endowed with reason, but to the one, who pre-eminently verifies 
the name by having expelled from the soul the untamed and frantic passions and 
the truly beast-like vices (Abraham 32 [Colson & Whitaker]). 
 
Interestingly, Michael Williams persuasively argues that texts idealizing the 
ability to become a “perfect human” or to achieve “immovability” are not distinctively 
“gnostic.” His discussion of the way these themes pervade Greco-Roman texts and 
writers such as Plotinus and Philo is illuminating.40
Mary as a Disciple Who Did Not Waver 
 
In the next section of the text, Mary begins to describe a vision, and she starts by 
recounting the Savior’s saying to her, “How wonderful you are for not wavering at seeing 
me! For where the mind is, there is the treasure” (7.3–4).41
                                                   
40 See especially Williams, Immovable Race, 5–7, 177–79. 
  
41 At 7.1, the text shifts from the initial appearance of Christ and the ensuing conversation among the 
disciples to Mary’s recounting of her vision. Scholars have debated whether or not this shift reflects the 
joining of two texts into a composite one (or insertion of material into the text). Indeed, the editors of the 
first published edition, Walter Till and Martin Schenke, support this theory. See Till, Die Gnostischen 
Schriften, 26. See also Henri-Charles Puech and Beate Blatz, “The Gospel of Mary,” in Gospels and 
Related Writings (ed. Wilhelm Schneemelcher, trans. and ed. R. McL. Wilson; vol. 1 of New Testament 
Apocrypha; Cambridge: James Clarke and Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1991), 391–95; R. McL. 
Wilson, “The New Testament and the Gnostic Gospel of Mary,” NTS 3 (1957): 236–43; Markschies, 
Gnosis: An Introduction, 42. In particular, Anne Pasquier has pointed out the dissonance between Peter’s 
attitude in the first section, where he calls Mary his sister and asks her to tell them what the Savior has 
related to her, and the section near the end where he becomes angry and says that surely the Savior did not 
speak alone with a woman and reveal things to her alone. See L’Evangile selon Marie, 7–10, 96–101. 
However, Antti Marjanen sees Peter’s (and Andrew’s) criticism as more likely pertaining to Mary’s vision 
than her exhortation at the beginning (The Woman Jesus Loved, 103) as does Judith Hartenstein (Die zweite 
Lehre, 136). Others, too, do not necessarily feel the text to be composite, seeing a unity of form and content 
throughout. See Michel Tardieu, Écrits gnostiques, 22–23; G. P. Luttikhuizen, “The Evaluation of the 
Teaching of Jesus in Christian Gnostic Revelation Dialogues,” NovT 30, 1988, 158–68; King, “Gospel of 
Mary Magdalene,” 626–22; Marjanen, The Woman Jesus Loved, 100–104; Petersen, “Zerstört die Werke,” 
59; Mohri, Maria Magdalena, 266–72; De Boer, Gospel of Mary, 15. Understanding this unity is most 
relevant to the thesis of this chapter, which emphasizes Mary’s representation as a steadfast, emotionally 
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The fact that the Savior uses the term not wavering is very significant.42
When she sees the vision of the Savior, Mary is praised for not wavering.  Not 
wavering or stability is a metaphor . . . derived from the tradition of philosophic 
mysticism.  It expresses the final state of the soul at rest with the divine.
 As 
mentioned above, the term for not waver is ATKIM in Coptic and would be asaleutos in 
Greek, the very term Williams pays such close attention to and traces in his study on 
immovability.  Pheme Perkins notes precisely this point:  
43
Antti Marjanen also comments: 
 
The special spiritual status of Mary Magdalene is underlined by her “not wavering 
at the sight of Jesus”. . . . In ancient thought immovability was considered to be a 
spiritual virtue. . . . The fact that Mary’s mind is directed to the “good” implies 
that she is able to partake in the treasure of a direct revelation from the Savior.44
Karen King also emphasizes the fact that the text uses this word: 
 
The term “wavering” carries important connotations in ancient thought where it 
implies instability of character.  Mary’s stability illustrates her conformity to the 
unchanging and eternal spiritual Realm, and provides one more indication of her 
advanced spiritual status. . . . It is because Mary has placed her mind with God 
that she can direct others to the spiritual treasure of the Good.45
                                                                                                                                                       
stable character throughout the text, exhorting the other disciples in the first section and being described as 
“unwavering” in the second. Her worthiness to receive a vision and the fact that her relating it lead to a 
successful resolution—Levi and perhaps others (including herself) going out to preach at the end—are also 
important in terms of the unity of the content.  
 
42 The term wonderful is also interesting as its source can also be translated as “blessed. Although it is Mary, 
the mother of Jesus (Mary of Nazareth) who is called blessed in the Gospel of Luke (1:30), this term is also 
sometimes used of Mary Magdalene For a discussion of the use of the term blessed as it applies to Mary 
Magdalene in the Pistis Sophia, for example, see Ann Graham Brock, “Setting the Record Straight—The 
Politics of Identification: Mary Magdalene and Mary the Mother in Pistis Sophia,” in Which Mary? The 
Marys of Early Christian Tradition (ed. F. Stanley Jones; SBLSymS 19; Atlanta: Society of Biblical 
Literature, 2002), 43–52.  
43 Perkins, Gnostic Dialogue, 135. Perkins also notes the seminal work of Michael Williams, “The Nature 
and Origin of the Gnostic Concept of Stability” (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1977). 
44 Marjanen, The Woman Jesus Loved, 111. 
45 King, Gospel of Mary of Magdala, 63. See also King’s earlier article in Searching the Scriptures: 
“Gospel of Mary Magdalene,” 612. 
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Likewise, Christopher Tuckett comments on Mary’s not wavering:  
In the account of the conversation that follows, Mary is pronounced “blessed” 
because she did not waver when she saw Jesus.  This seems to be a clear 
indication of Mary’s high spiritual status: “wavering” is probably here the 
opposite of stability or immovability, and the latter was very highly regarded in 
the ancient world as a spiritual virtue.46
Esther de Boer notes an interesting symmetry between the respective 
representations of Mary and Peter in terms of their immovability in the Gospel of Mary 
and the book of Acts.  In Acts 2:25–26, Peter quotes from Psalms 16:8, saying, “I saw the 
Lord always before me, for he is at my right hand so that I will not be shaken; therefore 
my heart was glad, and my tongue rejoiced.” De Boer comments insightfully: “Seeing the 
Lord before him and keeping the Lord at his right hand cause Peter not to waver.  
Apparently this is an experience full of hope and joy.”
 
47
 The fact that the Savior refers to the mind being the treasure is also significant 
with regard to Mary’s exemplary, steadfast character (10.15–16).  Karen King explains 
that the text seems to posit a human being with a tripartite composition (body, soul, 
mind) in which the “mind” is 
 In the Gospel of Mary, of course, 
it is Mary rather than Peter who demonstrates the ability to stand firmly, calmly, and 
peacefully.  The contrasts between these two disciples in terms of their character 
constitute an important theme to which we will return below. 
the most divine part of the self, that which links it with God . . . rules and leads 
the soul, so that when the mind is directed toward God, it purifies and directs the 
soul toward spiritual attainment.48
                                                   
46 Tuckett, Gospel of Mary, 171. 
 
47 De Boer, Gospel of Mary, 76. 
48 King, Gospel of Mary of Magdala, 65. 
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The mind is that part of a human being which can see a vision.  The apologist Justin 
states: “the vision of God does not occur with the eyes, as with other living beings, but 
He can be grasped only by the mind, as Plato says; and I believe him” (Dial. 3).49 Origen, 
too, makes reference to the mind in this way: “God, moreover, is in our judgment 
invisible, because He is not a body, while He can be seen by those who see with the heart, 
that is the mind, no indeed with any kind of heart, but with one which is pure” (Cels. 
6:69).50
Esther de Boer explains the significance of the mind with regard to the care of the 
soul in a way that greatly illumines the significance of the Gospel of Mary:  
 
Passion and confusion came into the created cosmos because of a power contrary 
to Nature.  Redemption consists in the fact that the Son of Man, the crucified and 
resurrected Jesus, as God did when creating truly living beings, once again blows 
the Spirit into the nous, the mind, which has the task of ordering the turbulence of 
the soul.  The Son of Man thus re-creates his followers into (true) Human Beings.  
Through his living within them they are empowered to bring forth his peace 
instead of passion and confusion which belong to the power contrary to Nature.  
They, having been restored to Nature’s Root by the Good One can indeed be 
“fully assured” (GosMary 8.7).  Opposite nature has no power over them.  They 
are thus prepared to proclaim the gospel of the Kingdom of the Son of Man.51
Mary’s Vision 
 
Mary then goes on to share a vision she has had of the Savior.  Unfortunately, six 
pages are missing from the Codex Berolinensis at this point, but what content we do have 
indicates that Mary can relate a vision regarding the ascent of the soul because she herself 
has undergone a transformation of “healing” from passion.  In other words, she is so 
                                                   
49 Also see discussion of the perspectives of Justin and Origen in King, Gospel of Mary of Magdala, 66–67. 
50 King, Gospel of Mary of Magdala, 67. 
51 De Boer, Gospel of Mary, 72. 
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emotionally stable that she is in a position to access this kind of knowledge.  It is not 
clear whether this is an upward movement that the soul of a living human being can 
experience here and through God’s grace in line with a realized eschatology or whether 
this is the rising of the soul after its release from a human body at death.52 There is also 
ambiguity regarding whether Mary has glimpsed the climbing of the soul of the Savior, 
whether her own soul has experienced this upward mobility, or whether she is describing 
a general phenomenon.  However, as Anne Pasquier notes, it is precisely because Mary 
really has become a true human being that she can envision the ascent of the soul so 
clearly and take on the role of proclaiming this good news.53
 Judith Hartenstein reaffirms this thought:  
 
Daß Maria Jesus in einer Vision sehen kann und dabei nicht einmal wankt, zeigt 
ihre hohe Einsichtsfähigkeit, die sie von den anderen unterscheidet und der 
Belehrungen Jesu würdig ist.  (That Mary can see Jesus in a vision and does not 
waver once shows her elevated ability to understand that differentiates her from 
the others and proves her worthy of the teachings of Jesus.)54
Moreover, through doing so, she serves as a model to the other disciples for conquering 
any “wavering” of their own.  Mary reveals what it really means to follow Jesus—to 
allow him to make one into a true human being—and how to live when Jesus renews 
one’s very mind.  In short, Mary shows those who are wavering how to achieve a state of 
stability.  This stability contrasts with the male disciples’ wavering.  They are 
 
                                                   
52 De Boer, 81. For an interesting point of comparison, see the description of Seneca’s vision of the soul’s 
ascent as described by Catharine Edwards, Death in Ancient Rome (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University 
Press, 2007), 16. 
53 Pasquier, L’Évangile selon Marie, 15–17. See also De Boer, Gospel of Mary, 29–30. 
54 Hartenstein, Die zweite Lehre, 154. 
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concentrating on the Savior’s suffering rather than his greatness.  In addition, by relating 
the vision that the Savior has given her, Mary  
shows that the soul’s way to Rest in Silence is not a road of suffering, but one of 
victory and joy.  Her knowledge about this may already be behind her words in 
GosMar 9.14–20 where she encourages the weeping disciples to praise the 
greatness of the Son of Man, instead of to fear his suffering.55
Mary’s Equanimity vs. Peter’s Passion 
 
After Mary relates the vision, however, Andrew and Peter react defensively to her 
words:  
Andrew responded, addressing the brothers and sisters, “Say what you will about 
the things she has said, but I do not believe that the S[a]vior said these things, 
f[or] indeed these teachings are strange ideas.” Peter responded, bringing up 
similar concerns.  He questioned them about the Savior: “Did he, then, speak with 
a woman in private without our knowing about it? Are we to turn around and 
listen to her? Did he choose her over us?” (10.1–4). 
Levi, however, reacts differently.  He defends Mary and rebukes Peter, calling him “hot-
tempered.” De Boer notes that the text uses this same word for wrath, the seventh power 
in Mary’s vision.  Thus, she believes the author of the text is making an analogy between 
Peter’s opposition of Mary and the way in which the adversaries in Mary’s vision try to 
oppose the soul, in other words—“the powers of passion.” Thus, when Levi makes a 
comparison between Peter’s conduct and that of the soul’s adversaries, the text indicates 
that “the powers are among and inside the disciples themselves.”56
Others have commented extensively on the conflict between Peter and Mary as 
well.  In a seminal early work, Pheme Perkins sees Peter as representing the “orthodox” 
 
                                                   
55 De Boer, Gospel of Mary, 88. See also preceding discussion on 77–88. 
56 De Boer, Gospel of Mary, 57, 91. 
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and Mary as representing the “Gnostics.”57 Ann Graham Brock has extensively examined 
a wide variety of early Christian texts and pointed out the significance of Peter’s 
challenges to Mary’s status.58 In the Gospel of Mary specifically, Karen King has pointed 
out the contrast between the two figures with particular attention to the issue of character 
traits, discussing the idea that Mary’s stability contrasts markedly with the 
contentiousness and fear of the male disciples.59 Christopher Tuckett also comments on 
this theme, noting that Mary is contrasted with the male disciples implicitly by displaying 
the kind of inner peace that they should be demonstrating.60
 With regard to the Gospel of Mary in particular, Anne Pasquier perceives such a 
contrast between Peter’s attitude toward Mary at the beginning and end of the text that 
she postulated that the text is a composite.  What needs to be underscored in this respect 
  
                                                   
57 Perkins, Gnostic Dialogue. See 133–37 for discussion of this issue in the Gospel of Mary specifically. 
Perkins expands her research in Gnosticism and the New Testament (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993). Her 
study of Peter is also very helpful: Peter: Apostle for the Whole Church (Columbia: University of South 
Carolina Press, 1994).  
58 Ann Graham Brock discusses the confrontation between Peter and Mary in the Gospel of Mary. See 
Brock, Mary Magdalene, The First Apostle, 81–86.  See also Mohri, Maria Magdalena, 278–81. 
59 King, Gospel of Mary of Magdala, 67. See also p. 177. Here King elaborates her discussion of the 
contrast between Peter and Mary in terms of their character extensively: “In the Gospel of Mary, Peter is 
portrayed as a jealous and contentious character, who cannot see beyond his own male pride and who 
clearly has not achieved inner stability and peace. . . . Mary, not yet tendentiously transformed into a 
repentant prostitute, is consistently represented as a faithful disciple.” It is not the fact that Mary herself 
saw the risen Lord or received his teaching (although this is true): “rather it is her exemplary 
discipleship. . . . This portrayal constitutes an explicit argument that the sure source of truth and authority 
can be confirmed only by the character of the disciple. . . . The Gospel of Mary framed the issue [of 
whether to accept Christian teaching as true] as a matter of character. Who can be relied upon to preach the 
gospel? The argument for the truth of its teaching is based on a contrast between Mary’s character and 
Peter’s.” 
60 Tuckett, Gospel of Mary, 166. Pasquier, L’Évangile selon Marie, 7–10 and 96–101 (noted by De Boer, 
Gospel of Mary, 29). Pasquier argues that Peter’s objection may actually be to Mary’s comments in 9.12–
20 when she addresses the male disciples directly, particularly her saying that he has made us into true 
human beings as she believes Peter represents “orthodox” objections to women having authority in the 
Christian community. De Boer, too, notes that “Peter, apparently, has rules about the roles of women and 
men. According to Peter, a man is not to listen to a woman, a man should not speak to a woman alone and a 
woman disciple is never above male disciples” (90). 
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is that at the beginning of the text, the contrast with Peter has to do with his fear (a fear 
he exhibits in the Apocalypse of Peter which is discussed in chapter three above).  At the 
end, however, the contrast is one of anger.  Thus, Peter contrasts markedly with Mary in 
terms of two significant passions.   
 Some interpreters feel that Mary’s weeping near the end of the text (10.5) 
somewhat mitigates this contrast and her overall strength of character.  Christopher 
Tuckett particularly emphasizes this, interpreting her weeping as a sign of weakness.  
However, he also notes that  
the weeping could be explained psychologically . . . as a natural human reaction 
to an unjustified attack on her integrity and/or her status by someone she might 
have expected support from; or as sorrow at Peter’s and Andrew’s failure to 
understand properly.61
De Boer, too, points out that Mary’s weeping reflects a momentary condition and does 
not necessarily reflect poorly on her character as a whole, noting an interesting parallel in 
Philo of Alexandria with respect to Abraham’s temporary doubt of his and Sarah’s ability 
to have a child.  Philo comments that perfect stability at every moment in this life is not 
possible for humans; only God is perfect in this way: “we are mixtures, with human and 
divine blended in us” (Names 184 [Colson and Whitaker]).  De Boer notes that this is the 
case in the Gospel of Mary as well: “Whereas the (male) disciples do not waver all the 
time, Mary is likewise not stable all the time.”
 
62
                                                   
61 Tuckett, Gospel of Mary, 188–89. 
 This does not, however, necessarily 
detract from the strong role she has played (a) in comforting and exhorting the other 
disciples at the beginning of the text, and (b) remaining unwavering and able to receive a 
62 De Boer, Gospel of Mary, 77–78. 
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vision that enables her to understand the possibility of the soul’s attaining stability and 
rest as discussed above.63
The End Result 
  
Moreover, these expressions of passion on the part of Peter and possibly Mary are 
not the end of the story.  The very last phrase declares “they started going out [to] teach 
and to preach” (10.14).64 Thus, it is Mary’s ability to perceive the true teaching of Jesus 
in a vision (because of her emotional stability and lack of passion) as well as her 
steadfastness and perseverance in relating this teaching to the other disciples and serving 
as a Christ-like figure of encouragement that results in the preaching of the Gospel.65
Moreover, Karen King points out the manner in which a text like the Gospel of 
Mary indirectly offers a means to reflect on resistance to earthly powers:  
  
The Gospel of Mary makes it possible for people to see the struggle against 
violence in their own situations as part of a necessary and justified resistance 
                                                   
63 Interestingly, even Jesus weeps at one point—when he learns of the death of his friend Lazarus (John 
11:35), but this is not usually characterized as a moral failing or weakness. 
64 For De Boer, this is a positive ending. See Gospel of Mary, 57. Tuckett, however, notes that the Greek 
fragment has he rather than they. Thus, it may be Levi alone who goes to preach. Even if this manuscript 
were to prove older or more accurate, Tuckett notes that this does not necessarily preclude the preaching of 
Peter and the others. See pp. 195–96. I would add that it most certainly does not preclude Mary’s preaching 
either. For King, the ending is ambiguous. See Gospel of Mary of Magdala, 85–86 (where she also 
comments on the use of he vs. they) and 109. 
65 Certainly other extracanonical texts confirm a very positive portrait of Mary. I am grateful to Ann 
Graham Brock for pointing out that Pistis Sophia also portrays her self-control in particular, saying that 
“Mary remains strong” (2.94), and in the Manichaean Psalms, she is the one who rallies the others and 
strengthens them. It is also worthwhile to compare the depiction of “Mariamme” in the Acts of Philip in this 
respect. The critical edition is that edited by François Bovon, Bertrand Bouvier, and Frédéric Amsler, Acta 
Philippi (vol. 11 of Corpvs Christianorvm, Series Apocryphorum, Association pour l’etude de la literature 
apocryphe chrétienne; Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 1999). This is probably a fourth-century text written in 
the form of a novel, which provides a literary representation rather than a source of historical information 
about a first-century Mary (who may or may not be Mary Magdalene). See Bovon, “Le privilège pascal de 
Marie-Madeleine,” 155–57, 234–35. However, the text’s representation of a woman as the one who 
embodies the traits of one who has been “cured” of passion is remarkable. Mariamme is both 
compassionate and courageous. She admirably demonstrates one “healed” of both anger and fear who 
encourages others to live lives reflecting freedom from passion as well.  
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against Powers that seek to keep people enslaved to their of passions: anger, 
desire, lust, envy, greed.  The mythic framework of the Gospel Mary allows the 
spiritual, the psychological, the social, the political, and the cosmic to be 
integrated under one guiding principle: resistance to the unjust and illegitimate 
domination of ignorant and malevolent Powers.  It also offers a strategy for that 
resistance: preaching the gospel and appropriating the teachings of the Savior in 
one’s own life.66
A little later she says,  
 
Viewed as a purely internal event, ascent could be apolitical and individualistic.  
Yet the account of the rise of the soul unites internal spiritual development with 
resistance to external forces of evil in the practice of preaching the gospel to 
others.  In so doing, the Gospel of Mary promulgates an alternative vision of the 
world, one that has the potential to overcome the passions and the violence that 
separate the soul from God.67
Scholars have sometimes conceived of supposedly gnostic texts as less resistant to 
existing sociocultural norms or forces of domination;
  
68 however, King helps us to see that 
this is not necessarily true, although the critique may be disguised.69
Parallels between Mary and Perpetua 
 
There are also examples of courage, boldness, and a lack of fear typical of one 
who has successfully engaged in the therapy of the emotions among other early Christian 
women.70 Some of the most vivid are those in martyr accounts.71
                                                   
66 King, Gospel of Mary of Magdala, 79. 
 A great example is 
67 King, Gospel of Mary of Magdala, 81. 
68 Williams, Rethinking “Gnosticism”, 96–115. 
69 For those living in a society where critique is punished, this kind of resistance may be the only kind 
possible. See James Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven, Conn.: 
Yale University Press, 1990), 103–107, 124, 198–99. See also King, Gospel of Mary of Magdala, 76–81. 
70 This chapter focuses on the contrast between the representation of Mary Magdalene and that of a 
recorded martyr, Perpetua. However, another of the most popular accounts of an early Christian woman 
who exhibits the courage, boldness, and lack of fear typical of one who has successfully engaged in the 
therapy of emotions is that of Thecla, a woman who heard the teaching of Paul, converted to Christianity, 
baptized herself, and then traveled widely with the apostle. Though Thecla was almost martyred several 
 170 
Perpetua,72 a young Roman matron who boldly endured the arena in Carthage in 203 
C.E.,73 writing in a diary of her desire to suffer and die.74
                                                                                                                                                       
times, she died a natural death. For an account of her life excerpted from the Acts of Paul and Thecla, see 
Lefkowitz and Fant, Women’s Life in Greece and Rome, 311–13. Jan Bremmer discusses the possibility 
that Perpetua heard or read about Thecla: “Magic, Martyrdom and Women’s Liberation in the Acts of Paul 
and Thecla,” in The Apocryphal Acts of Paul and Thecla (ed. Jan N. Bremmer; Kampen, Netherlands: Kok 
Pharos, 1996), 44. 
 Her story is a popular and oft-
recounted one, perhaps because the written account of her imprisonment and death 
71 For a fascinating account of women martyrs discovered and translated by a modern woman, Agnes Lewis 
Smith, see Select Narratives of Holy Women from the Syro-Antiochene or Sinai Palimpsest as written 
above the Old Syriac Gospels by John the Stylite, of Beth-Mari-Qanūn in A.D. 778 (Studia Sinaitica 10; 
London: C. J. Clay & Sons/Cambridge University Press, 1900; repr. Nabu). The most often cited critical 
edition of martyrdom accounts with translation into English is that of Musurillo, Acts of the Christian 
Martyrs, 1972. 
72 Several versions of Perpetua’s martyrdom exist in Latin, and there is one in Greek as well as discussed 
above. 
73 As mentioned earlier, there are disputes over the actual date and the dating of the accounts. The dating of 
the Gospel of Mary has also been discussed in this note. It could have preceded the Martyrdom of Perpetua 
and Felicity by more than a century, but it is plausible that the two were written within a few decades of 
each other. For the difficulty of dating texts and the circularity in reasoning that occurs when so doing, see 
Karen King, Gospel of Mary of Magdala, 184. 
74 Modern scholars question whether Perpetua’s account is actually her own self-representation. Musurillo 
comments, “The passio has been held by most scholars as an authentic reflection of the period of the 
persecution in Africa about 200, even though one need not accept all the details, or even believe that the 
author is accurately quoting the words of the martyrs themselves. Indeed, the style of the framework 
passages is quite different from that of the narrations in the first person, and more closely approaches to 
what we are familiar with from the works of Tertullian” (Acts of the Christian Martyrs, xxvii). See also 
Barnes, “Pre-Decian Acta Martyrum,” 521–25; J. A. Robinson, The Passion of S. Perpetua, 43–47; Butler, 
New Prophecy, 44–49. See also Frend, Martyrdom and Persecution, 363. Frend says that it is “difficult to 
imagine anyone besides Perpetua herself writing the poignant and repetitive scenes between herself and her 
father, or her physical experiences in connection with the suckling of her infant.” Frend’s remarks are, of 
course, simply conjecture. See also his “Blandina and Perpetua: Two Early Christian Heroines,” in Women 
in Early Christianity (ed. David M. Scholer; vol. 14 of Studies in Early Christianity: A Collection of 
Scholarly Essays, ed. Everett Ferguson, David M. Scholer, and Paul C. Finney; New York: Garland, 1993), 
87–97. Elizabeth Castelli cautions against thinking of the account as an autobiography as the very term 
belongs to the Enlightenment; however, she usefully situates the martyrdom account within Foucault’s 
framework of self-writing as a discursive strategy used in the care of the soul (also discussed in chapter one 
above). See Castelli, Martyrdom and Memory, 70–78, 85–92, 233–35, 237–41. Emanuela Prinzivalli 
characterizes Perpetua’s account as a “rare jewel,” noting how few women in this time period have left any 
written records at all and then says, “It is moving to see this woman of the ancient past daring to 
appropriate a form of narrative expression generally denied her sex—and by this act, placing herself at the 
center of a public turmoil (and at what a price!), outside that cycle of childbearing and care-giving reserved 
for women since time immemorial, a way of life that gave them no opportunity to influence current events 
or politics” (119–20). See “Perpetua the Martyr,” in Roman Women (ed. Augusto Fraschetti; trans. Linda 
Lappin; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 118–40, 221–25.  
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contains more details than exist in many other cases75 and because her story resonates 
powerfully on an emotional level with a wide range of readers.  Her courage has been 
much admired by the “orthodox” 76 through the ages, and modern commentator-scholars 
continue to paint her in glowing terms in recent works.77
Perpetua’s narrative parallels the representation of Mary Magdalene in the Gospel 
of Mary in a number of ways.  The text strongly frames Perpetua’s character in terms of 
her steadfast endurance, self-control, and courage—that is, in terms characteristic of one 
  
                                                   
75 See Musurillo, who refers to her account as the “archetype of all later Acts of the Christian martyrs” 
(Acts of the Christian Martyrs, xxv). See also Prinzivalli, “Perpetua the Martyr,” 132. 
76 Many scholars have also pointed out that Perpetua may actually have belonged to the New Prophecy 
movement (Montanism). A classic study is that of P. de Labriolle, La crise montaniste, 1913. For the best, 
recent overview, see the published dissertation of Rex D. Butler (The New Prophecy & ‘New Visions’). 
Butler argues for Montanist influence but gives a thorough review of other scholars’ opinions. Joyce 
Salisbury argues against necessarily assuming Montanist influence as she feels “the church in Carthage had 
not yet split into such clear distinctions.” She also notes: “That both the orthodox and the heterodox could 
value the same text is testimony to the fact that the religious sensibilities of the two groups were very 
similar in 203” (Perpetua’s Passion, 158). It should be noted that characterizing a work as Montanist has 
been a means of marginalizing it by categorizing it as heretical. Frederick Klawiter argues that the writer of 
the martyrdom account of Perpetua is Montanist, but he carefully notes, “It is significant that even as late as 
the fifth century, Perpetua was remembered as a martyr in both the catholic and Montanist communities of 
North Africa. Very probably, the persecution of 203 happened when the New Prophecy had not yet been 
rejected by the Carthaginian catholic community” (“The Role of Martyrdom and Persecution in Developing 
the Priestly Authority of Women in Early Christianity: A Case Study of Montanism,” CH 49 [1980]: 251–
61; repr. in Women in Early Christianity [ed. David M. Scholer; vol. 14 of Studies in Early Christianity: A 
Collection of Scholarly Essays, ed. Everett Ferguson, David M. Scholer, and Paul C. Finney; New York: 
Garland, 1993], 105–15). 
77 The popularity of Perpetua is enormous. In addition to whole books and entire articles devoted to her, 
there are innumerable texts that choose her as a key example in discussions of early Christian women or of 
Roman women. However, she has some detractors. Frend, for example, depicts her as “a fanatic” 
(“Blandina and Perpetua,” 91), noting the disruption of her transgressing social norms and commenting on 
“a real poignancy in her father’s continuous efforts to save her from humiliating death as a result of which 
the family itself would hardly recover” (94). Frend’s comments may be a good example of what Mary 
Lefkowitz comments on as “the consistent failure of male scholars to acknowledge the positive significance 
of femininity in the performance of certain heroic acts” (“The Motivations for St. Perpetua’s Martyrdom,” 
JAAR 44, no. 3 [1976]: 417–21). For more on this issue, see David Daube, Civil Disobedience in Antiquity 
(Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 1972), 5–6 and Rosemary R. Ruether, “Misogynism and 
Virginal Feminism in the Early Church,” in Religion and Sexism (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974), 
150–83; repr. in Women in Early Christianity (ed. David M. Scholer; vol. 14 of Studies in Early 
Christianity: A Collection of Scholarly Essays, ed. Everett Ferguson, David M. Scholer, and Paul C. 
Finney; New York: Garland, 1993), 262–95.  
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who has successfully engaged in the therapy of emotions and become free of passions 
such as fear and anger.  Like Mary, Perpetua is also a visionary.  As in Mary’s case, these 
include visions of ascent.  Similarly, these visions provide Perpetua with emotional 
fortitude and the ability to encourage others in concrete ways.  Indeed, at the beginning of 
the martyrdom account, the compiler refers to the purpose of recounting such deeds as 
helpful to others in their “achiev[ing] . . . spiritual strengthening” (8.1), and at the end he 
mentions that they can be read “for the consolation of the Church” (8.21).78
Representation of Perpetua’s Character 
 
First, it is helpful to discuss the way in which gladiatorial contests served as a 
means for philosophical reflection generally for Perpetua’s courageous participation in 
such an event is an important part of her representation.  For the Stoics in particular, the 
emphasis in philosophical discussions was on the idea that how one faces death is 
extremely important, an indication of one’s underlying moral character, given the fact 
that death is inescapable.79 A public death, honorably faced, is an opportunity to convey a 
powerful message to those who witness it.  Those who die in the arena can serve as 
models for how to reflect on and face death.  A contest in the arena “was not only a 
spectacle to amuse and divert the crowd but a . . . ritual designed to affect and transform 
the witnesses. . . . It was expected that the process of watching people die in the arena 
would have an impact on the viewer.” 80
                                                   
78 All citations come from Musurillo, Acts of the Christian Martyrs, 106–31. 
 Bettina Bergmann comments that the 
79 Edwards, Death in Ancient Rome, 10. In her chapter on Stoic attitudes toward death, there are many 
parallels with Perpetua (78–112). See also Moss, Ancient Christian Martyrdom, 36–37. 
80 Salisbury, Perpetua’s Passion, 124. See also 134. Also relevant is Edwards, Death in Ancient Rome, 53. 
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gladiatorial contest is an event discussed by the philosophers in terms of a “professional 
performance of . . . self-control, the performance of virtue.”81 This is in line with 
Seneca’s discussion of dying willingly and unconquered” (Ep. 37.2). Both imagery of 
performance in battle and discussion regarding control of the passions are common.82
As we turn specifically to Perpetua’s representation, it is important to note that the 
compiler consistently represents Perpetua as “a very strong personality” and leader.
 
83 He 
speaks, for example, of “her perseverance and nobility of soul” (8.16) and of the way in 
which she and the other Christians speak with “steadfastness” (8.17).  Indeed, the 
Martyrdom of Perpetua presents us with human beings who die honorably—as honorably 
and admirably as any of the Greek, Roman, or Carthaginian heroes or heroines present in 
the consciousness of those living in the Roman Empire during the second and third 
centuries C.E.84 This is also true of the slave Felicity and the men featured in the narrative, 
but Perpetua is the one whom the editor of the text features in detail.  She is every bit as 
dignified as Lucretia, Polyxena,85
                                                   
81 Bettina Bergman, introduction to The Art of Ancient Spectacle (ed. Bettina Bergman and C. Kondoleon; 
New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1999), 22.  
 Dido, or Arria (who, like Perpetua, draws the sword to 
82 Edwards, Death in Ancient Rome, 46–77, 90–100. 
83 Prinzivalli, “Perpetua the Martyr,” 129. Frend comments that the Passion of Perpetua and Felicity 
represents the martyrs as “the true leaders of the Church” (“Blandina and Perpetua,” 92–93). For the way in 
which Christians linked martyrdom and women’s leadership, see Klawiter, “The Role of Martyrdom and 
Persecution,” 105–15. See also Brown, Making of Late Antiquity, 54–80, for discussion of the ways in 
which the church elevated the status of martyrs as what he terms “the friends of God.”  
84 Salisbury discusses the particular Carthaginian admiration of women who give their lives as sacrifices, 
noting that the Carthaginians were even more steeped in the myths of such women than the Romans.  See 
Perpetua’s Passion, 33–57.  
85 Polyxena is particularly interesting because, like Perpetua, she takes an extra step in courage, undoing 
her clothing and offering her executioner a choice of her breast or her throat. Similarly to Perpetua’s 
covering her thigh with her tunic, Polyxena takes care “to fall in a seemly way, hiding what ought to be 
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her own throat, encouraging her husband who is about to follow her in death by telling 
him that “it does not hurt”; Pliny, Ep. 3.16.3).86 Society considered such a death 
honorable.87 When Seneca was forced to commit suicide and his wife wanted to die with 
him, he told her: “I will not grudge you such a noble example.  Let the fortitude of so 
courageous an end be alike in both of us, but let there be more in your decease to win 
fame” (Tacitus, Ann. 15A).88 Likewise, the mother in 4 Maccabees, a text greatly 
influenced by Stoic ideals, encourages each of her seven sons to commit what is 
represented as a heroic suicide and then follows them by taking her own life.89
Catherine Edwards astutely notes that Dido, Lucretia, and Cleopatra are all 
heroines who take their own lives in accordance with the founding of a new political 
order (the city of Rome, the Roman republic, and the Roman principate respectively).
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hidden from the eyes of men.” See Mary R. Lefkowitz, Women in Greek Myth (Baltimore, Md.: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1986), 100. 
 
In a sense, Perpetua’s death also marks the beginning of a new era, an era in which a 
86 See also discussion in Streete, Redeemed Bodies, 20. 
87 For a discussion of women’s deaths that are represented as honorable, see Edwards, Death in Ancient 
Rome, 179–206. Her discussion of Lucretia, a noble woman who committed suicide after being raped is 
especially notable, 180–83. Mary Lefkowitz also discusses the tradition of women heroines who commit 
suicide in various Greek myths, arguing that doing so is the most active role Greek women are given to 
play: Lefkowitz, Women in Greek Myth, 95–111. Joyce Salisbury focuses on a particular admiration for 
women’s deaths in Carthage in particular due to a long-standing tradition of such deaths occurring there. 
Dido, for example, came from Carthage. See Perpetua’s Passion, 53–57. 
88 See discussion of this incident in Streete, Redeemed Bodies, 20. 
89 For discussion, see Anne Jensen, God’s Self-Confident Daughters: Early Christianity and the Liberation 
of Women (trans. O. C. Dean; Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox, 1996); Streete, Redeemed Bodies, 
27, 34, 37.  
90 Edwards, Death in Ancient Rome, 186. Mary Lefkowitz interprets Perpetua’s resistance in social terms 
seeing martyrdom as an escape “releasing women from the hierarchical structure imposed by patriarchal 
society, which the church in its own organization would increasingly incorporate and emulate.” See 
Lefkowitz, “The Motivations for St. Perpetua’s Martyrdom,” 421. Other scholars question an emphasis on 
Perpetua’s resistance in strong political or social terms: Jensen, God’s Self-Confident Daughters, 104. 
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collective, Christian identity under the rubric of the “suffering self” (as Judith Perkins 
elaborated so well),91 is coalescing.  Indeed, the formation of this new group is 
particularly interesting in that it transcends existing social norms regarding class.  
Heroines who are not high-born like Perpetua are represented as equally courageous.  
Felicity, for example, is a slave who dies along with Perpetua.  At one point, Perpetua 
helps her to her feet (8.20).  Likewise, a slave named Blandina who perishes in the fierce 
persecutions of Lyons and Vienne, is especially noted for her courage.92 Thus, while 
dying for a worthy cause was in keeping with Roman social ideals,93 it is also important 
to note that the dignity of women from both high and low social classes serves to 
distinguish them as part of a new group who owe allegiance to a authority wholly 
different from that of the Roman Empire.  It is truly stories such as these, in which the 
high-born Perpetua stands hand in hand with the equally valiant slave Felicity (20.6–7), 
in which the upper-class Perpetua’s story is read alongside that of a slave such as 
Blandina, that perpetuate the establishment of a new Christian community.94
However, although Perpetua belongs to a long lineage of Greco-Roman women 
who exhort courage and honor in dying, it is important to note one major difference.  
Usually, these cases of noble death serve to reinforce the existing social norms, not to 
  
                                                   
91 See especially Perkins, The Suffering Self, 104–23. 
92 Musurillo, “The Martyrs of Lyons,” in Acts of the Christian Martyrs, 78–81. 
93 This issue is discussed in chapter two above. Nicola Denzey’s article is especially helpful: “Facing the 
Beast,” 176–98.   
94 This is, of course, the argument of Judith Perkins, Suffering Self. See especially 15–40. Streete discusses 
Perpetual and Blandina in relation to each other: Redeemed Bodies, 15–16. Jensen comments articulately 
on the lack of social distinctions among Christians: God’s Self-Confident Daughters, 124. See also Frend, 
Martyrdom and Persecution, 275. Edwards remarks on the way in which gladiators serve as models for the 
marginalized: Death in Ancient Rome, 68. 
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make a social statement against them.  Lucretia, for example, commits suicide after being 
raped.  Her death serves to release her from the shame of living with dishonor.95 
Remarkably, Mary and Perpetua are represented as exemplars96 in spite of the fact that 
they transgress accepted social norms for women.97 Women are most vulnerable to being 
portrayed as lacking in virtue when they speak out.98
Perpetua’s speaking out involves a considerable transgression of existing social 
norms.  We see this first during her time in prison.  She is resolute in the way she deals 
both with her father and the local authorities—a further indication of her courage.  In the 
Roman world, a father’s authority and legal status as the paterfamilias extended to his 
children and grandchildren from their birth until his death.
 In the texts we will examine, both 
Mary Magdalene and Perpetua are vocal figures.   
99
                                                   
95 Eve d’Ambra, Roman Women (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 58–59. 
 However, Perpetua 
96 It is crucial to note, of course, that literary depictions are indeed representations and may reflect idealized 
notions of what women should be rather than actual realities. See Sandra Dixon, Reading Roman Women: 
Sources, Genres, and Real Life (London: Duckworth, 2001), 16–25 for discussion of this idea as well as 
discussion regarding the importance of genre in shaping representations. 
97 Mary R. Lefkowitz notes that Christian martyrs who are women are different from other Greek and 
Roman women martyrs in that they “die courageously but in noticeable isolation from their families in 
defiance of, rather than in loyalty to, their husbands or fathers” (“Motivations,” 418). 
98 Determining norms is, of course, difficult, as ancient depictions of women are sparse. However, Origen 
argues against women prophesying in his commentary on 1 Corinthians. See J. Kevin Coyle, “The Fathers 
on Women and Women’s Ordination,” in Women in Early Christianity (ed. David M. Scholer; vol. 14 of 
Studies in Early Christianity: A Collection of Scholarly Essays, ed. Everett Ferguson, David M. Scholer, 
and Paul C. Finney; New York: Garland, 1993), 139. Karen King also comments on negative social 
evaluation of women who did not keep silent in “Prophetic Power and Women’s Authority: The Case of the 
Gospel of Mary (Magdalene),” in Women Preachers and Prophets through Two Millennia of Christianity 
(ed. Beverly M. Kienzle and Pamela J. Walker; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 21–41, esp. 
29. For modern discussion of the idea that silence was expected in public spaces, see Karen Torjesen and 
Virginia Burrus’s chapter “Household Management and Women’s Authority,” in Torjesen’s When Women 
Were Priests (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1993), 53–87.  
99 Fathers literally exercised the power of life and death over their families. Legally, fathers determined 
whether or not their newborn infants would be accepted or exposed to the elements. Society demanded an 
attitude of unquestioning obedience to fathers. This sense of hierarchy permeated the Roman Empire. 
Roman subjects even referred to the emperor as “father.” See Jo-Ann Shelton, As the Romans Did: A 
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unceasingly resists the repeated pleas of her father to recant her Christian faith and escape 
punishment and death.100 She is determined that he will not “shake” her “resolution” 
(8.3).  Moreover, she gives up her infant son.  In the eyes of Roman society, “Perpetua’s 
willingness to abandon her child made her . . . absolutely deviant from the ideal of the 
self-effacing woman, nourisher, and keeper of the house.”101
W. H. C. Frend, unsympathetically comments: “the example of Perpetua shows just how 
Christianity appealed to the bored and frustrated intelligent woman of the Greco-Roman 
world.  The social consequences for her family and traditional religion were 
disastrous.”
 A modern commentator,  
102 Francine Cardman notes that “conversion to Christianity, especially by 
women, begins the dismantling of the patriarchal household; impending martyrdom 
hastens its disintegration.”103
                                                                                                                                                       
Sourcebook in Roman Social History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 13, 18–19, 27–28, 31, 
and 234. 
 Interestingly, Perpetua’s action calls to mind a saying 
100 The representation of Perpetua is that of a mature woman, not a young one. The compiler gives her age 
as twenty-two. Girls often married around thirteen years of age, and it was common for people to die in 
their twenties and thirties. See Shelton, As the Romans Did, 20–21, 93. The text does not reveal whether the 
child she is weaning is actually her first and only one, but for an ancient reader, Perpetua would not 
necessarily have seemed young or immature even though the text does refer to her as “a delicate young 
girl” (8.20) when she is standing in the arena. (Such a depiction may serve to re-feminize Perpetua and 
mitigate the “manly” courage she has shown rather than to describe her accurately. See discussion below.) 
101 Prinzivalli, “Perpetua the Martyr,” 126. 
102 Frend, Martyrdom and Persecution, 283. Later, Frend notes “the utter disruption to family life and 
tradition that a conversion to Christianity could cause,” remarking especially on the disgrace Perpetua’s 
father felt and the contempt of the procurator for Perpetua’s father as well as the hostility of the mob in the 
arena toward those they felt had transgressed social norms (321–22). He also speaks of the “gulf between 
her adopted culture and that which she was leaving,” noting especially her defiance of her father and the 
procurator (364–65). However, see Mary Lefkowitz’s comment above, regarding the persistence of 
scholars in failing to accord unmitigated praise to heroic acts done by women. 
103 Francine Cardman, “Acts of the Women Martyrs,” 98–104, 101. Cardman also notes that the 
representation of women “as athletes engaged in mortal combat is strangely unsettling” for those inhabiting 
the second- and third-century Roman Empire (102). Finally, she says, “In their passage from death to life, 
women martyrs profoundly unsettled the social and familial relationships on which their world had 
depended for its coherence. Cultural sensibilities were shattered by the graphic demonstration of women’s 
suffering and the toleration of public violence against their bodies. The ambiguities of female sexuality—its 
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recorded by Tertullian from the New Prophecy movement: “Do not wish to die in bed, in 
miscarriage, or with debilitating fever, but in martyrdom, in order to glorify the one who 
suffered for you” (Fug. 9.4).104
 In addition, Perpetua is not afraid of her Roman jailers, and she leads the way in 
negotiating with them for her group with remarkable poise.  During her stay in prison, 
she demands better food for herself and her fellow prisoners, speaking of them and 
herself as “the most distinguished of the condemned prisoners” (8.16) and advocating for 
proper treatment in terms so strong that the official in charge of their care actually 
blushes (8.16).  Likewise, when the authorities try to make her and the others dress as 
priests and priestesses of Saturn and Ceres during their ordeal in the arena, she asserts 
their right not to do so according to previous negotiations: “We came to this of our own 
free will, that our freedom should not be violated.  We agreed to pledge our lives 
provided that we would do no such thing.  You agreed with us to do this” (8.18).
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beauty, vulnerability, and reproductive capacity—were heightened as female bodily experience was both 
confirmed and contradicted in martyrdom. For women especially, the making of a martyr meant the 
unmaking of her body—her own, as well as her world’s” (104). 
  
104 See discussion in Jensen, God’s Self-Confident Daughters, 160. 
105 While the idea of death as a sacrifice to the gods was present in the minds of the Romans, Perpetua 
refuses to accede to attempts to portray her death in this way. Perpetua staunchly refuses to be arrayed in 
the robes of priestesses of Saturn or Ceres. Wearing these garments would have allowed the spectators in 
the arena to conceive of her death as a pagan sacrifice. Aline Rouselle, Porneia: On Desire and the Body in 
Antiquity (trans. F. Pheasant; New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 116; Salisbury, Perpetua’s Passion, 138–
39; K. M. Coleman, “Fatal Charades: Roman Executions Staged as Mythological Enactments,” JRS 80 
(1990): 66. 
 
Moreover, the language ascribed to Perpetua is not the language of imitating Christ in terms of 
substitutionary atonement. Rather, the representation is one of her triumph over cosmic forces of evil—the 
devil himself—in her visions. This is in accord with a Christus Victor theory of atonement (as discussed in 
chapter three above). As Karen King notes, in both the Gospel of Mary and the Martyrdom of Perpetua and 
Felicity, the emphasis is the risen Christ rather than the suffering Savior. It is the former that Perpetua sees 
in her visions. See King, “Prophetic Power,” 41, n. 87. See also Moss, Ancient Christian Martyrdom, 123–
25; Moss, Other Christs, 97–102. 
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Perpetua’s Representation in the Arena Itself 
In going into and enduring the ordeal in the amphitheater itself, however, her 
representation emerges as that of one completely free of the passion of fear, one who 
exercises remarkable courage and self-control and acts with composed dignity.  This is 
consistent with a philosophical emphasis on the idea that death is better than slavery—
enslavement to one’s passions.106 Above all, she is not a victim but rather an active agent 
who refuses to allow others control over her life but instead takes charge of her death and 
makes it a “noble” one.107 It is perhaps in this sense, if any, that her death is voluntary.108 
Greco-Roman philosophers, particularly Stoics, do not conceive of this kind of 
willingness to die as negative or immoral.  In fact, quite the opposite is true.109 Death is 
“an act of heroism, something to be celebrated.” 110
Even on the day of sentencing, Perpetua writes that she and her companions 
“returned to prison in high spirits” (8.6), and on the day itself, they enter the arena calmly, 
 
                                                   
106 Edwards, Death in Ancient Rome, 70–72. 
107 For an overview of the meaning of the term noble death in Greco-Roman antiquity, see Droge and 
Tabor, A Noble Death, 1972.  
108 The text clearly presents one of the other martyrs, Saturus, as voluntarily turning himself in for arrest. 
One of the first to emphasize the sometimes voluntary nature of Christian martyrdom was de Ste. Croix, 
Christian Persecution, Martyrdom, and Orthodoxy, 2006. See also Bowersock, Martyrdom and Rome, 
1995, and Middleton, Radical Martyrdom and Cosmic Conflict in Early Christianity, 2006; Tite, 
“Voluntary Martyrdom and Gnosticism,” 2012. Discussions of whether or not Perpetua was an “orthodox” 
Christian or a heretical “Montanist” also frequently inform the understandings of particular scholars 
regarding the degree to which Perpetua may or may not have desired martyrdom. An interesting parallel 
with the representation of Thecla exists with respect to the issue of desiring martyrdom, as Thecla 
demonstrates bravery by voluntarily climbing up on a pyre to be burned (though God puts out the fire with 
a thunderstorm and she does not actually die). The relevant point is that both Perpetua and Thecla face 
death without fear. See Bremmer, “Magic, Martyrdom, and Women’s Liberation,” 49. 
109 Droge and Tabor’s A Noble Death provides a multitude of examples. Catharine Edwards also discusses 
gives an excellent overview of this belief in Death in Ancient Rome, esp. 1–18.  
110 Edwards, Death in Ancient Rome, 1. 
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joyfully, and free of fear.  It is as if they are “joyful collaborators”111 in their death.112 
Perpetua in particular marches “with shining countenance and calm step . . . putting down 
everyone’s stare by her own intense gaze” (8.18).  Catherine Edwards notes that 
spectators considered a steady gaze on the part of a gladiator a sign of invincibility;113
During their ordeal, the writer notes that they are in complete control of their own 
deaths as Christ answers previous prayer “by giving each one the death he had asked for” 
(8.19).  When Felicity is knocked to the ground, Perpetua retains the composure to help 
Felicity back to her feet and stands with her “side by side” (8.19).  Perpetua also 
encourages the others in terms reminiscent of Mary’s call to be courageous: “You must 
all stand fast in the faith” (8.20).  In addition, three gestures specifically point to 
Perpetua’s self-control, courage, and dignity.  Demonstrating remarkable composure in 
the face of torture, she pulls her tunic back over her legs when the “mad heifer” attacking 
her rips it (8.20).  Likewise, she smoothes out her hair and even has the composure to ask 
for a pin so that she can tie it up neatly (8.20)!
 
thus, the inclusion of such a detail is not necessarily arbitrary on the part of the compiler 
of the text.   
114
                                                   
111 Edwards, Death in Ancient Rome, 210.  
  
112 Rita Nakashima Brock and Rebecca A. Parker, too, speak of Perpetua’s death as represented in terms 
that emphasize her empowerment and moral agency. See Saving Paradise, 56–83. 
113 Edwards, Death in Ancient Rome, 61. See also Salisbury, Perpetua’s Passion, 138. 
114 Some interpreters see these gestures as part of a representation that re-feminizes Perpetua and 
emphasizes her femininity, mitigating any unseemly “manly” courage (Streete, Redeemed Bodies, 71). 
Salisbury comments that the insertions of these gestures into the text reflect the male perspective of the 
narrator, as Perpetua would hardly have had the time to think of such things (Perpetua’s Passion, 143). 
However, I would argue that these gestures are not unambiguously feminine. They also express a sense of 
remarkable composure and the ability to attend to the details that allow a woman to feel she is dying with 
her dignity intact. For an excellent analysis of the ways in which texts represent women martyrs 
ambiguously in both masculine and feminine terms, see Stephanie L. Cobb, Dying to Be Men: Gender and 
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Finally, most strikingly, she and the others approach their final dispatch at the 
hands of a gladiator with a sword by going “of their own accord” to the spot where he 
stands,115 and Perpetua herself guides the gladiator’s sword to her throat.  The text states, 
“It was as though so great a woman, feared as she was by the unclean spirit, could not be 
dispatched unless she herself were willing” (8.21).116
Spectators generally approved the gladiator who did not flinch and actually 
offered his neck to his opponent’s blade when vanquished.  Such a valiant action is 
specifically commended by Seneca for gladiators generally (Ep. 30.8).  He also remarks: 
  
This is Fortune who puts on games for herself.  “What are you holding yourself 
back for, low and fearful creature?” You will suffer more wounds and sustain 
more blows, because you do not know how to hold forth your throat.  But you will 
both live longer and die more easily, who accept the blade neither with bowed 
neck nor hands held up but with spirit.  One who fears death will never do 
anything worthy of a living man (Tranqu. 11.5–6).117
Even outside the arena, bravely offering one’s neck was seen as a mark of courage.  
Cicero, for example, leaned out of the litter he was traveling in and offered his neck for 
his head to be cut off by soldier sent to execute him when he was condemned by Mark 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
Language in Early Christian Martyr Texts (New York: Columbia, 2008).  Moss also comments on the 
ambiguities in Perpetua being represented in both masculine and feminine terms as though “her body never 
quite sets” (Ancient Christian Martyrdom, 139–40).  
115 Prisoners or defeated gladiators were often required to meet their final demise in a spot where the crowd 
could easily see them and note how they indeed behaved in their very final moments. See Edwards, Death 
in Ancient Rome, 62. 
116 Again, in this sense, the compiler’s comments seem in keeping with a Christus Victor theory of 
atonement rather than a theory of penal substitution (see discussion in chapter two). Perpetua’s fourth 
vision also supports this for she fights with and overcomes an Egyptian whom she feels symbolizes the 
devil. Thus, she expresses her struggle in terms of the overcoming of the cosmic forces of evil rather than 
in terms of the imitation of a blood sacrifice needed in order to propitiate a bloodthirsty god. Moreover, the 
representation is always that of victory, not of passive endurance of suffering. On this last point, see King, 
“Prophetic Power,” 41, n. 87. 
117 See Edwards, Death in Ancient Rome, 73. 
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Antony.118 Barton sees parallels in Cicero’s action with that of a gladiator’s “defiant 
complicity.”119
Perpetua’s Contemplation of Death in Visions 
 However, Perpetua goes one step farther in not only offering her neck but 
also actually guiding the sword.  
 Even before she approaches the arena, in her visions Perpetua perceives of her 
death as a victory,120 and she is represented as successfully imbuing her earthly demise 
with that meaning by clearly communicating the content of those visions—her ascent into 
paradise, her conquest of the Egyptian—in writing.121
                                                   
118 Edwards, Death in Ancient Rome, 61–74. 
 The first is a vision of ascent into 
heaven.  Interestingly, Perpetua is in charge even of her ability to dream.  She has this 
vision after her brother asks her to request one in order that they may know whether or 
not she will face martyrdom (8.4).  Especially noteworthy is the fact that, at the beginning 
of the vision, Perpetua steps on a dragon, or serpent, who is beneath the bottom rung of a 
ladder ascending into heaven: “Slowly, as though he were afraid of me, the dragon stuck 
his head out from underneath the ladder.  Then, using it as my first step, I trod on his 
119 Carlin Barton, The Sorrows of the Ancient Romans (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), 
39. 
120 Joyce Salisbury discusses the representation of the visions articulately: Salisbury, Perpetua’s Passion, 
31, 84–90. For the respect accorded to Christian visionaries in this period generally, see Fox, Pagans and 
Christians, 440–41, and Brown, Body and Society, 65–82. 
121 The fact that Perpetua not only dies but also contemplates her death is an important part of the way she 
is represented. See Edwards, Death in Ancient Rome, 18, 131–34. That she does so in writing is also 
significant. Self-writing is a “technology of the self” discussed by Foucault: Foucault, “L’écriture de soi,” 
207–22. Elizabeth Castelli elaborates on the way in which Perpetua engages in this activity as a means of 
identity formation in Martyrdom and Memory, 70–78, 85–92, 233–35, 237–41. For the way Perpetua 
expresses a sense of taking control of her body in her writing, see Maureen A. Tilley, “The Passion of 
Perpetua and Felicity,” in A Feminist Commentary (vol. 2 of Searching the Scriptures, ed. Elisabeth 
Schüssler Fiorenza; New York: Crossroad, 1994), 829–58. 
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head and went up” (8.4).  Such action symbolizes her courageous vanquishing of 
Satan.122
 The fourth is a vision in which she is actually transformed into a male gladiator 
who successfully defeats an Egyptian one by stepping on his head.  Upon awaking, 
Perpetua states her belief that she has been given a foreshadowing of her ability to fight 
and overcome the devil in the arena (8.10).  She will be successful not only in dying but 
also in doing so like a strong and courageous gladiator rather than a lowly criminal.
  
123 
Indeed, later in the account, the editor emphasizes the significance of this event by 
referring back to it, explaining that Perpetua starts to sing a psalm as “she was already 
treading on the head of the Egyptian” (8.18).124




But who has claimed that nature has dealt grudgingly with women’s natures and 
has restricted their virtues to a narrow field? Believe me they have as much force, 
as much capacity, if they choose, for virtuous action: they are just as capable of 
enduring pain and trouble when they are used to them (Marc. 16.1).
 Seneca, though, clearly thinks women capable of moral virtue:  
126
                                                   
122 Frend points out parallels with Jacob’s vision of a ladder in Gen 28:12 as well as the Shepherd of 
Hermas. Stepping on the head of the dragon brings to mind Gen 3:15. See Frend, Martyrdom and 
Persecution, 363. Salisbury also points out parallels with pagan concepts of ladders and the role they play 
in symbolizing an ascent to another world; see Perpetua’s Passion, 101. 
 
123 Prinzivalli, “Perpetua the Martyr,” 128. See also Frend, “Blandina and Perpetua,” 93; Salisbury, 
Perpetua’s Passion, 99–104. 
124 Salisbury, Perpetua’s Passion, 106–12. 
125 See Edwards’s discussion of the representation of Lucretia in Death in Ancient Rome, 187. Mary 
Lefkowitz, too, notes Augustine’s emphasis on this: Women in Greek Myths, 105. Gail Streete’s discussion 
in Redeemed Bodies is also helpful: 21, 26, 130. See also Moss, Ancient Christian Martyrdom, 28–33. 
126 See discussion in Edwards, Death in Ancient Rome, 189–90. 
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However, this statement is indeed a defense of women in light of the fact that many do 
not think of women in this way.  Perpetua actually exceeds all expectations in this respect 
by literally becoming a man in her fourth vision, a male gladiator who defeats the 
Egyptian he/she faces and conquers him by stepping on him with her foot.  Many 
commentators find the fact that Perpetua has to be represented as “manly” in order to be 
deemed courageous troubling; however, in the cultural context of that time, it is 
important to recognize, it was a clear declaration of admiration.127 This may seem 
extremely chauvinistic to contemporary readers, and it behooves us to recognize the 
inherent sexism.  Nonetheless, in the cultural context of the times, referring to a woman 
as exercising “manly” courage would have been a positive designation.128
                                                   
127 Noam Chomsky’s concept of deep structure and surface structure in language is helpful here. In 
conversation, Tink Tinker and Loring Abeyta have helped me to see how Chomsky’s distinction can be 
applied to culture, arguing that while human beings can transcend the assumptions of their surface culture, 
it is impossible to change the content of the deep culture one inherits. That courage is “manly” is an 
underlying assumption thoroughly embedded in the deep culture of Greco-Roman society. To expect 
writers in this social context to think differently is simply unreasonable. Rather than focusing on the 
inherent chauvinism in their doing so, it is important to note the intended connotation—that the heroine is 
indeed being represented as courageous. Interestingly, Mary Magdalene is also portrayed in this way. In the 
Gospel of Thomas, Jesus is portrayed as saying that if it indeed he must make Mary male in order for the 
other disciples to finally recognize the worth (that he already recognizes in her), he will gladly do so (log. 
114).  
 
128 In fact, Perpetua’s courage is represented so positively that later interpreters of her martyrdom are at 
pains to minimize or carefully qualify it: Brent Shaw, “The Passion of Perpetua—Christian Women 
Martyred in Carthage in A.D. 203,” Past and Present 56 (May 1993): 3–45. Augustine, for example, makes 
clear to emphasize that the courage of Perpetua and Felicity can be celebrated, but it cannot be imitated: 
“What is more glorious than these women, whom men may more easily admire than imitate?” See 
Augustine’s “Sermon 280—On the Birthday of the Martyrs Perpetua and Felicity.” See also Streete, 
Redeemed Bodies, 59; Salisbury, Perpetua’s Passion, 163–79; Edwards, Death in Ancient Rome, 212. 
Prinzivalli also notes Augustine’s focus on the socially acceptable values of piety and chastity rather than 
courage per se in his sermons where he cleverly makes a pun on the “perpetual felicity” of these martyrs: 
Prinzivalli, “Perpetua the Martyr,” 139–40. 
Lefkowitz wryly notes that while Christianity offered Perpetua a chance to separate from the patriarchal 
values in the Roman Empire, such values also existed in the Christian church. See Women in Greek Myth, 
104. 
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Interestingly, historians and theologians never conceive of Perpetua as a gnostic 
or an adherent of so-called gnostic dualism due to her having a vision of ascent in which 
she overcomes a cosmic adversary.  Neither does anyone identify the dragon with, say, a 
Gnostic archon.  De Boer insightfully argues this point.129 However, Perpetua’s orthodox 
status has been questioned.  Some have argued that Perpetua belonged to the New 
Prophecy (or Montanist) movement, which the “orthodox” eventually deemed heresy.130 
However, her story has resonated with Christians through the ages.  As Musurillo says, 
“the Montanist aspect of the work seems to have escaped the notice of Augustine and 
many of the early Fathers who admired its primitive charm and Christian fervour.”131
Perpetua’s Power of Intercession 
 
Perpetua also conveys her sense of empowerment and the strength of her soul in 
relating her ability to intercede for those who suffer.  Specifically, she tells of her ability 
to mediate for a younger brother who has already died and to relieve his suffering in her 
second and third visions.132
                                                   
129 De Boer, Gospel of Mary, 82–83. 
 In The Making of Late Antiquity, Peter Brown has explored 
130 See Frend, Martyrdom and Persecution, 17, 36, 361–62; Musurillo, Acts of the Christian Martyrs, xxvi; 
Frend, “Blandina and Perpetua,” 94; De Labriolle, La crise montaniste, 220; Robinson, “The Passion of St. 
Perpetua,” 50–52. For a recent, comprehensive discussion, see Butler, The New Prophecy and “New 
Visions,” 2006. Salisbury maintains that the work is not necessarily Montanist. See Perpetua’s Passion, 
158–61. 
131 Musurillo, Acts of the Christian Martyrs, xxvi.  
132 See discussion in Salisbury, Perpetua’s Passion, 97–98, 104–106. Anne Jensen also discusses the power 
accorded those who faced martyrdom in interceding and the fact that Perpetua is addressed with a term 
denoting special respect, domina and as someone with particular dignatio in the text. See God’s Self-
Confident Daughters, 119, 124. Jensen also comments on the power of intercession but notes the fact that 
even now translators often translate the term “female confessor” merely as “holy woman” (97, 114). For 
discussion of the high status of confessors (those who had publicly testified and were awaiting martyrdom), 
see also Fox, Pagans and Christians, 419, 440–41; Moss, Other Christs, 139–40; Streete, Redeemed Bodies, 
38. Klawiter’s article is also useful in delineating the contours of the power accorded those awaiting 
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“the rise of the friends of God” and the transference of regard for pagan holy men and 
women to the martyrs.133 The latter were believed to have special powers of 
intercession.134
Troubling Aspects of Perpetua’s Representation 
  
However, for all of the ways in which Perpetua is affirmed as a courageous witness of 
the faith, there are several troubling aspects in her representation.  First of all, proto-
orthodox writers make it clear that women should exercise such boldness primarily in the 
context of submitting their bodies to violence in the arena.  As Gail Streete notes:  
when women laid claim to institutional rather than spiritual or moral authority in 
the church in accord with these same virtues, they were censured for 
appropriating “male” roles.  Ironically, these pioneering women often made such 
claims with reference to heroines like Perpetua and Thecla, seeing their stories as 
more evidence of the power and divine sanction of their antisocial behavior.135
Frequently, women were criticized or prevented from occupying other positions as role 
models, leaders, preachers, or bishops.
 
136
                                                                                                                                                       
martyrdom. Klawiter discusses their being thought to have “the power of the keys,” that is, the ability to 
forgive sins. See “Role of Martyrdom and Persecution,” 108–14. 
 Tertullian, for example, declared:  
133 Brown, Making of Late Antiquity, 54–80. On the honor that Christians gave to confessors and martyrs, 
also see Frend, Martyrdom and Persecution, 362–63. 
134 This belief has a very long life in the Christian tradition as the cult of the saints, also articulately 
discussed by Peter Brown, dominated Christian tradition for centuries. See Peter Brown, The Cult of the 
Saints: Its Rise and Function in Latin Christianity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981). 
135 Streete, Redeemed Bodies, 11. See also discussion on 10–11, 21, 30, 41, and 53–54. For discussion of 
the parallels between Perpetua and Thecla, see Bremmer, “Magic, Martyrdom, and Women’s Liberation,” 
42–44. 
136 Gail P. Corrington suggests that there are only three main models for women’s empowerment in the 
Greco-Roman and early Christian worlds: that of being possessed by a male deity, martyrdom, and 
asceticism. See “The ‘Divine Woman’? Propaganda and the Power of Celibacy in the New Testament 
Apocrypha: A Reconsideration,” in Women in Early Christianity (ed. David M. Scholer; vol. 14 of Studies 
in Early Christianity: A Collection of Scholarly Essays, ed. Everett Ferguson, David M. Scholer, and Paul 
C. Finney; New York: Garland, 1993), 172. Citing Perpetua as an example of the way in which martyrdom 
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It is not permitted for a woman to speak in the church, nor is it permitted for her 
to teach, nor to baptize, nor to offer [the Eucharist], nor to claim for herself a 
share in any masculine function—least of all, in priestly office (Virg. 9). 
Martyrdom was the most certain means of approval.  In a passage praising the strength of 
the martyrs, Tertullian uses women for half of his examples (Mart. 4).137 Jo Ann 
McNamara notes that certain “reservations were nullified when the physical courage of 
the battlefield was transformed into that of the martyrs.”138
In the final analysis, Perpetua achieves high status in her Christian community 
only through willingly subjecting her body to violence and literally dying.  As Peter 
Brown says, 
 After all, Perpetua’s courage 
did not intercede or help in mediating the increasingly repressive patriarchy of the post-
Constantinian church, which successfully suppressed women’s voices and women’s 
leadership through the centuries with notable exceptions in the still small voices of 
mystics mentioned above.   
In Christian circles direct intimacy with God was so drastic as to incapacitate the 
recipient.  Put bluntly, the “power” of the martyr was unambiguous: but the life 
                                                                                                                                                       
could actually have been perceived as empowerment, Corrington states that martyrdom is a means of 
resisting control, the battleground being the woman’s body (173–74). 
137 Women could also be praised for their philosophic studies, scholarship, and learning. See McNamara, 
“Sexual Equality and the Cult of Virginity in Early Christian Thought,” 230, n. 14. She cites Tatian, 
Gregory of Nyssa, and Jerome as doing so. However, such praise is relatively rare. Of course, the New 
Testament portrays many women in leadership roles, depicting them as disciples, apostles, leaders of house 
churches, deaconesses, workers, and prophets. See discussion in King, Gospel of Mary of Magdala, 186. 
For two excellent introductions, see also Schüssler Fiorenza, In Memory of Her, and Jensen, God’s Self-
Confident Daughters. 
138 McNamara, “Sexual Equality and the Cult of Virginity in Early Christian Thought,” 221. Klawiter, too, 
ventures that perhaps “in the ‘catholic’ church woman was ‘liberated’ to become a minister as long as she 
participated in the suffering of Christ. The moment she was set free from the suffering of prison, she was 
placed back into the ‘imprisoning’ role of female subordinate to male” (“Role of Martyrdom and 
Persecution,” 115). 
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expectancy of such a wielder of power was, by definition, severely limited.  We 
touch on a very savage streak in the Roman world—exaltation by violence.139
Indeed, this is the most effective means of allowing her voice to be heard among the 
clamor of patriarchal voices.  As a result, religious conflicts were played out on the very 
bodies of martyrs, many of whom were women.
 
140
An admiration for patiently enduring or even subjecting oneself to suffering is 
particularly true with regard to women.  In one of the texts of late antiquity regarding the 
life of Mary the Mother, even Mary Magdalene is represented as eventually having 
become a martyr, although we have no reason to believe this portrayal is rooted in any 
kind of historical fact (Maximus the Confessor, The Life of the Virgin).  Some of the 
women who embodied the best of the Christian mystical tradition—Catherine of Siena, 
Teresa of Avila, Margery Kempe (known for her emotional weeping), and Julian of 
Norwich—are also represented as sufferers par excellence.
  
141 In modern contexts as well, 
counseling for Christian women has all too often encouraged enduring abuse silently and 
patiently.142
                                                   
139 Brown, Making of Late Antiquity, 66. 
 Moreover, Christian tradition has implied that virtue walks hand in hand 
with suffering. 
140 This is no less true today, although the bodies are those of Muslim women rather than Christian ones. 
For parallels between Christian and Islamic women martyrs, see Streete, Redeemed Bodies, 7–8, 112–122; 
Castelli, Martyrdom and Memory, 200–201; Fox, Pagans and Christians, 420.  
141 Discussion of these figures at length exceeds the scope of this chapter, but Bernard and Patricia McGinn 
provides an excellent introduction to the study of many of these remarkable women in their edited volume 
The Essential Writings of Christian Mysticism (New York: Random House, 2006). 
142 The large number of books recently published on this topic with an autobiographical or biographical 
focus is sobering. They include Jocelyn E. Andersen, Woman Submit! Christians and Domestic Violence 
(Auburndale, Fla.: One Way Café, 2007); Paul Hegstrom, Angry Men and the Women Who Love Them: 
Breaking the Cycle of Physical and Emotional Abuse (Kansas City: Beacon Hill, 2004); Lynn Heitritter and 
Jeannette Vought, Helping Victims of Sexual Abuse: A Sensitive Biblical Guide for Counselors, Victims, 
and Families (Minneapolis: Bethany House, 2006); Amy Madden, Stolen Beauty: Healing the Scars of 
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Moreover, as is common in the case of women, the compiler cannot resist the 
temptation to eroticize the deaths of the women.  The writer draws attention to the 
vulnerable nakedness of both Perpetua and Felicity (8.20).  In addition, as they enter the 
arena, they are re-feminized in certain respects.  They are matched with “a mad heifer” in 
order, the writer notes, “that their sex might be matched with that of the beast” (8.20).  
Feminine modesty returns as Perpetua covers her body (naked just moments before), and 
smoothes her hair.  For some, her representation is as much in terms of her propriety as 
her courage at this point.  Notably, in Perpetua’s fourth vision, even just after the moment 
of her ultimate conquest, her defeat of the Egyptian, the trainer who rewards her with the 
branch granted to the victor refers to her not as a male but as “daughter.” Evidently, she 
is a man no more (8.10).143 Overall, there is a certain malleability in the representations 
of women martyrs to which men are simply not subject.144
Both texts accepted by the “orthodox” (represented in this chapter by the Passion 
of Perpetua and Felicity) and those of other groups who have unfortunately been 
marginalized as so-called Gnostics and whose texts have been suppressed, lost, or 
neglected for centuries (such as the Gospel of Mary), coming to light only in the 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
Childhood Abuse (Minneapolis: Syren Book, 2007); Tammy Maltby, Confessions of a Good Christian 
Girl: The Secrets Women Keep and the Grace That Saves Them (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 2007); and 
Nancy Nason-Clark and Catherine Clark Kroeger, Refuge from Abuse: Healing and Hope for Abused 
Christian Women (Downers Grove, Ill.: Intervarsity, 2004).  
143 See discussion in Streete, Redeemed Bodies, 39. 
144 Sebastian Brock and Susan Ashbrook Harvey, Holy Women of the Syrian Orient (2d ed.; Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1998); Streete, Redeemed Bodies, 13, 31–32, 38–47, 70–72; Tilley, “Passion 
of Perpetua and Felicity,” 829–58. Edwards also delineates multiple ways in which women’s deaths are 
frequently represented differently than men’s, Death in Ancient Rome, 179–206. See also Virginia Burrus, 
“Torture and Travail: Producing the Christian Martyr,” in A Feminist Companion to Patristic Literature (ed. 
Amy-Jill Levine and Maria Mayo Robbins; Feminist Companion to the New Testament and Early Christian 
Writings 12; New York: T&T Clark, 2008). 
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nineteenth and twentieth centuries, represent women in terms of the care of the soul, as 
those who have successfully engaged in the therapy of emotions through their 
relationship with Christ and have received complete healing from fear and anger.  Thus, 
both proto-orthodox and other texts reflect an emphasis on a larger cultural value 
informing the social context of the Roman Empire. 
In the texts of the proto-orthodox, however, such courage surfaces primarily in the 
context of their subjecting the bodies to violence through facing and enduring martyrdom.  
In the end, admiration for Perpetua must be held in tension with an acknowledgement of 
the ambivalence in her representation. 
 The Gospel of Mary counters this portrayal strongly by representing Mary 
Magdalene as a steadfast apostle who is able to share the words of the Savior and 
encourage others to face any possible persecution fearlessly but without necessarily 
subjecting her body to such violence or glorifying it in and of itself.  As Karen King 
summarizes,  
for the Gospel of Mary bodily distinctions are irrelevant to spiritual character 
since the body is not the true self.  Even as God is non-gendered, immaterial, and 
transcendent, so too is the true Human self. . . . Rejecting the body as the self 
opened up the possibility of an ungendered space within the Christian community 
in which leadership functions were based on spiritual maturity (emphasis 
added).145
                                                   
145 King, Gospel of Mary of Magdala, 88–89. See also “Prophetic Power,” 32–33, where King does not 
necessarily see this phenomenon in positive terms. King also comments on the fact that while the Gospel of 
Mary advocates courage in the face of persecution, it does not glorify suffering in and of itself. The text 
does “not ascribe any redemptive value to suffering. It is preaching the gospel that gives life; persecution is 
only an unfortunate, if inevitable, result of that activity because there are powers that oppose the gospel in 
the world. Believing the truth of the gospel leads people away from suffering by teaching them to 
overcome the passions and defeat the powers by putting on the perfect Human” (Gospel of Mary of 
Magdala, 127). Furthermore, “the Gospel of Mary does not teach that people need to suffer in order to gain 
salvation . . . There is no intrinsic value in the atoning death of Christ or the martyrdom of believers or the 
punishment of souls” (127). Finally, “people do not need to be saved from sin, but from error, anguish, and 
terror. . . . one is redeemed from suffering not by suffering. . . . Jesus became a human being not in order to 
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Just as our recovery of the texts discussed in chapter three allows us to see the way in 
which some groups challenged the discourse of a suffering self (both individually and 
collectively), our recovery of the way in which the author of the Gospel of Mary 
represents Mary Magdalene disrupts the monolithic focus on the glorification primarily 
of women who willingly subject their bodies to violence and texts implying that suffering 
must accompany Christian virtue.  This chapter does not seek to minimize or dismiss the 
courage of Perpetua and other martyrs.  However, it is important to put representations 
such as that of Mary Magdalene in the Gospel of Mary alongside those of the martyrs so 
that it is possible for us to understand that Christian virtue need not necessarily walk hand 
in hand with suffering and that early Christian texts represent a fuller range of 
possibilities for faithful witness.146
Perhaps the task of Christians today, as they take stock of this tradition and its 
defects, is not merely to vilify its inhumanity but rather to cherish the hard-won 
fruits of transcendence and spiritual personhood, won at such a terrible price of 
the natural affections of men and the natural humanity of women.  Without 
disregarding these achievements, we must rather find out how to pour them back 
into a full-bloodied Hebrew sense of creation and incarnation, as male and female, 
 Doing so is one way of addressing the task Rosemary 
Radford Reuther believes one of the most important for those who affirm the Christian 
tradition:  
                                                                                                                                                       
suffer as an atoning sacrifice for human sin, but to bring the revelation of saving truth. In a theology like 
this one, martyrdom can be seen as a rational and even necessary alternative to denying Christ, but at the 
same time there is no enthusiasm for it, since martyrdom does not itself bring salvation. . . . God does not 
desire human suffering; in his compassion he wants to save people from it” (165–66). 
146 In “Beyond the Canonical and the Apocryphal Books, the Presence of a Third Category: The Books 
Useful for the Soul,” HTR 105, no. 2 (2012): 125–37, François Bovon argues that texts should not be 
divided into merely two categories—canonical and apocryphal. In so doing, he argues that “an unfortunate 
polarization among evangelical and liberal scholars occurs (125–26).” He reminds us that in antiquity, 
while certain books were considered to be “disputed,” they were nonetheless considered “profitable” and 
“useful for the soul” (128). 
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but who can now be fully personalized autonomous selves and also persons in 
relation to each other, not against the body, but in and through the body.147
Ultimately, the Gospel of Mary has not been suppressed.  The insights it offers 
may be helpful as our generation makes ethical choices.  As Karen King comments, 
 
Christian doctrine and practice are not fixed dogmas that one can only accept or 
reject; rather Christians are required to step into the story and work together to 
shape the meaning of the gospel in their own time.  Because human passions and 
love of the world incline people to error, discerning the truth requires effort, and it 
insists that communities of faith take responsibility for how they appropriate 
tradition in a world too often ruled by powers of injustice and domination.148
Reading across the spectrum of early Christian texts allows us to see that there are 
various ways to interpret the teachings of our tradition.  By analogy, we reflect on the 
possibility that there are diverse possibilities for faithful interpretations of spiritual 
traditions and religious practices in a pluralistic world.  It is imperative that we examine a 
wide range of possible ways to witness to the faith—by reading the Martyrdom of 
Perpetua along with the Gospel of Mary and many other texts in order that the kind of 
understanding needed in a pluralistic world may emerge.   
 
Unpacking “Gnosticism” 
The categorization of texts such as the Gospel of Mary as gnostic149 has been 
most unhelpful for exploring these issues.150
                                                   
147 See Ruether, “Misogynism and Virginal Feminism in the Early Church,” 291. 
 In particular, it has been virtually impossible 
148 King, Gospel of Mary of Magdala, 189–90. 
149 Esther A. de Boer’s discussion in The Gospel of Mary (82–83) is especially helpful. 
150 This term itself has come into question. See Williams, Rethinking “Gnosticism”, 1996); King, What Is 
Gnosticism?, 2003. The issues for jettisoning, retaining, or modifying the term are explored thoroughly in 
the essays in Antti Marjanen, ed. Was There a Gnostic Religion? (Publications of the Finnish Exegetical 
Society 87; Helsinki: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005). Prominent scholars such as Ismo Dunderberg 
prefer to use terms that delineate a specific group (such as Valentinian). See Dunderberg, Beyond 
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to see the full range of attitudes regarding the care of the soul in the various forms of 
early Christianity.  Instead, the discourse has promoted a false dichotomy (or binary 
opposition) between orthodoxy and heresy.  These categories have been inaccurately 
characterized as consisting merely of doctrinal differences.  As discussed throughout this 
dissertation, the group who emphasized the kind of care of the soul (conflating body and 
soul) that merged with a glorification of martyrdom and morphed into doctrines 
emphasizing the fleshly resurrection of the body within the framework of an apocalyptic 
world view triumphed, but for Christians in a wide range of groups, the resurrected Jesus 
was the great physician, the one who could effect healing of the soul in both this life and 
the next.   
If we fail to recognize the importance of the care of the soul in antiquity and in 
early Christian thought, it is difficult to recognize the significance of the way ancient 
writers represent women such as Mary Magdalene and Perpetua.  Moreover, if we 
dichotomize orthodoxy and heresy, we may well fail to see the way in which texts portray 
Christian women as steadfast, self-controlled witnesses for their faith across the spectrum 
in the various early Christianities.  By using a discursive approach, the past comes into 
                                                                                                                                                       
Gnosticism, 2008. Recently, David Brakke has argued for using the term but only for those which contain a 
certain kind of creation myth usually termed Sethian, these “Sethian” texts being only some of those 
labeled gnostic by the heresiologists. In supporting this thesis, he provides an excellent overview of this 
issue (The Gnostics: Myth, Ritual, and Diversity in Early Christianity [Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2010]). Most recently, April D. DeConick has pointed to the clear existence of notions of spirituality 
(rather than a religion per se) that ancient people would have recognized as gnostic. See “Crafting Gnosis: 
Gnostic Spirituality in the Ancient New Age” (paper presented at the annual meeting of the SBL, Chicago, 
19 November 2012). DeConick’s position is also useful in reclaiming the value of these texts.  However,  
the use of gnostic has serious implications for the persistence of notions regarding the supposed existence 
of clear binary oppositions such as orthodoxy and heresy in the early Christianities. There is also continued 
marginalization of the texts that are labeled as such. The term does not function as a mere technical 
distinction for scholars to parse in the world outside the academy.  
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sharper focus, and the voices of bold and courageous Christian witnesses from a wide 
diversity of early Christian groups begins to emerge.   
Indeed, when we view Mary and Perpetua in terms of this Greco-Roman 
philosophical emphasis, particularly the Stoic emphasis, on the therapy of the emotions, 
we understand the very positive manner in which these figures are represented in the 
Gospel of Mary and the Martyrdom of Perpetua and Felicity.151
In texts that have until recently been dismissed as unorthodox, however, Mary 
Magdalene emerges as a disciple and leader due to her steadfast courage, one who 
exhibits the characteristics of a person completely healed of the passions of fear and 
anger.  In these texts, her character often functions as a contrast to that of Peter, one still 
struggling to overcome these emotions.  Just as the rediscovery of the texts discussed in 
chapter three allows us to see the way in which certain early Christians interrupted and 
 By examining the history 
of Christianity with respect to the practice of the care of the soul rather than via the 
distractions of doctrinal debates regarding orthodox and Gnostic conceptions of the 
resurrection of the fleshly body of the Christian believer (and indeed, doctrinal debates 
about the nature of Christ’s own body, and his suffering, death, and resurrection) or 
doctrinally focused debates about “orthodoxy” and “Montanism,” new understandings of 
the value of these women as role models in the twenty-first century emerges.   
                                                   
151 Esther A. de Boer has argued persuasively that the Gospel of Mary reflects the influence of Stoicism 
rather than any Gnosticism per se. She comments insightfully:  
Stoic philosophy had a major impact on culture and society in the first and second centuries. Every level of 
the population was deeply influenced by it, and it also influenced the church. Before the early church 
begins to feel at home with Platonism in the third century, there is a period in the first and second centuries 
from Clement of Rome to Clement of Alexandria, in which categories of Stoic philosophy are favourably 
regarded as a means of explaining the gospel in the culture of the time. The Gospel of Mary should perhaps 
be seen as a testimony of creative mission (59) (emphasis added). 
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challenged the discourse of the “suffering self” (including the glorification of martyrdom), 
so the rediscovery of texts that were unknown in the world until they came to light in the 
late nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries allows us to see the significance of the way 
that Mary Magdalene is represented, disrupting a monolithic discourse in which the only 
Christian heroines are those who willingly subject their bodies to violence and represent 
an ideal in which Christian virtue and suffering must go hand in hand.   
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
Often, it takes months or years to unwind the twisted thread of the discussion of 
an important point, a thread that may have been in the process of becoming 
twisted over centuries.   Many false starts are made, and many tentative analyses 
and organizations of the discussions must be proposed, before any real light is 
thrown on the subject.1
Such a statement succinctly summarizes the situation with regard to exploring the 
false binary opposition of “orthodoxy” and “heresy” which has dominated discussions of 
the history of the early Christianities particularly with respect to untangling the scholarly 
debate over what exactly constituted “Gnosticism” in the ancient world.
 
2  In 1931, a 
German scholar named Walter Bauer published a work leading to a paradigm shift in the 
study of Christian history by arguing that in certain places, “heresy” had preceded 
“orthodoxy.”3  Such thinking has been instrumental in leading scholars to question the 
idea that heresy was a deviation from an original orthodoxy.4
                                                   
1 Mortimer J. Adler and Charles Van Doren, How to Read a Book: The Classic Guide to Intelligent 
Reading (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1972), 405. 
  Bauer’s work, 
2 Four seminal works in this area are Williams, Rethinking “Gnosticism”, 1996); King, What is 
Gnosticism?, 2003); Marjanen, Was There a Gnostic Religion?, 2005; Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 
2008). 
3 Bauer, Orthodoxy and Heresy, 1971. 
4 In the Panarion (or Medicine Chest), itself a work dedicated to delineating and refuting “heresies”, 
Epiphanius claims: “Here I can begin my treatment of the subject of sectarianism, and I shall briefly 
explain how it arose. How else but in the same way in which tribes arose from the proliferation of the 
different languages, various nations emerged to correspond with each tribe and clan, and every nation chose 
its own king to head it, and the result was the outbreak of wars, and conflicts between clashing nations . . . 
So too at this time we have been discussing. Since there had been a change in Israel’s one religion, and the 
scripture of the Law had been transferred to other nations—I mean to Assyrians, the ancestors of the 
colonist Samaritans—the division of Israel’s opinion also resulted. And then error arose, and discord 
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Rechtgläubigkeit und Ketzerei im ältesten Christentum (or Orthodoxy and Heresy in 
Earliest Christianity) languished unread amidst the strife of Nazi Germany and WWII, 
receiving wider recognition only after it was translated into English in the U.S. in 1971.5
The discovery of over forty early Christian texts near Nag Hammadi, Egypt in the 
mid-twentieth century has also played a seminal role in this process.
 
However, over the past forty years, it has led to reassessments of positions “which have 
been in the process of becoming twisted over centuries.”   
6
                                                                                                                                                       
began to sow seed from the one true religion in many counterfeit beliefs, as each individual thought, and 
thought that he was proficient in scripture and could expound it according to his own will (Panarion 8.9.1–
9.4) (emphasis added).” See Frank Williams, The Panarion of Epiphanius of Salamis: Book I (Sects 1–46) 
(Boston: Brill, 2009).  Adapted by Todd Berzon, Columbia University. Even earlier, Irenaeus declared, 
“the Church, believes . . . as if she had but one soul, and one and the same heart, and she proclaims them, 
and teaches them, and hands them down, with perfect harmony, as if she possessed only one mouth. For, 
although the languages of the world are dissimilar, yet the import of the tradition is the same” (Haer. 
1.10.2). Such statements encapsulate the perspective that has dominated Christian theology for centuries.  
Often, scholars have simply accepted such a point of view without questioning it critically.  It is this kind of 
characterization which Bauer’s work deconstructs. 
  These are texts 
neglected, lost, or suppressed for centuries which complement and shed light on the ways 
in which various groups of Christians were interpreting the life, death, resurrection, and 
5 Helmut Koester has provided a summary of the historical circumstances surrounding the publication and 
reception of Bauer’s work in “The Impact of Walter Bauer’s ‘Orthodoxy and Heresy’ ” (paper presented at 
the annual meeting of the SBL, Chicago, November 17, 2012). Some scholars have critiqued the particulars 
of Bauer’s work.  See, for example, Thomas A. Robinson, The Bauer Thesis Examined: The Geography of 
Heresy in the Early Christian Church (Lewiston, NY: E. Mellen, 1988). Nonetheless, his thesis remains a 
guiding principle for the investigation of the early Christianities. 
6 Most of the texts have Christian themes although a work of Plato is included as well.  Scholars are still 
debating why these particular texts were grouped together, the order they were grouped in, and why they 
were deposited in the desert sands of Egypt. Originally, scholars surmised that they were hidden by 
someone at a nearby monastery perhaps when such texts were banned, but this is mere speculation.  
Recently, Nicola Denzey hypothesized that the texts could have been part of a burial collection.  This is 
also simply speculation, but her argument helps us to see how tenuous our knowledge of how and where 
the finding of the texts actually is. See Denzey, “‘The Beauty that Came to Me in the Books’ (NHC 
VI.6.54),” 2011. It is crucial not to impose a false sense of unity, coherence, or purpose on the collection as 
the themes and perspectives of the texts vary widely.  In addition, even the original location of the materials 
is unclear.  The local Egyptian man who claimed to have discovered them has changed his account over 
time; thus, much about the discovery remains unclear.  See chapter three for more in-depth discussion of 
these issues. 
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teachings of Jesus and envisioning living forms of Christian faith.   Their discovery 
allowed scholars to actually compare and contrast perspectives previously delineated only 
in the work of heresiologists and those who opposed the ideas expressed in these works. 
As discussed in chapter one, the philosophical ideas of Michel Foucault provide a 
framework for unraveling some of the threads in the tangles and twists of early Christian 
histories.   In lectures given at the Collège de France shortly before he died, Michel 
Foucault postulated that truer understanding of Greco-Roman philosophies could be 
reached by thinking in terms of what the various schools taught not about abstract 
knowledge but rather about “the care of the soul/self” (indeed using these two terms 
synonymously).7
permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain 
number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way 
of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of 
happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality.”
  Often such care involved engaging in therapeutic practices referred to 
as the “therapy of emotions.”  Such disciplines were designed to free one from 
enslavement to passions such as fear and anger.  Emotional stability, or “immovability,” 
was represented as a chief virtue.   Foucault refers to these practices of spiritual 
transformation as “technologies of the self” which  
8
Foucault attributed our failure to recognize the importance of the care of the soul 
in ancient texts to the distorting influence of the medieval separation of theology and 
spirituality.  In the modern period, too, he argued that an emphasis on the rational and 
 
                                                   
7 Foucault, Hermeneutics of the Subject, 2001. 
8 See Foucault, “Technologies of the Self,” 18.  Foucault has built on the work of his colleague, Pierre 
Hadot who discusses ancient philosophy as a “way of life” in which various philosophical schools 
emphasized diverse “spiritual exercises” to aid in spiritual transformation.  These exercises are akin to 
Foucault’s “technologies of the self.” This point is discussed in chapter one. 
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empirical has completely eclipsed our understanding of the role that spiritual practices 
played in ancient Greco-Roman philosophical schools.  Nonetheless, he argued for re-
conceptualizing our understanding of Greco-Roman philosophies by once again 
exploring the prominence of these themes in ancient texts. 
This dissertation has explored the way in which the history of the period of the 
early Christianities could be re-conceptualized along the same lines if we were to think 
not in terms of knowledge or doctrine per se, but in terms of the ways in which various 
groups were conceiving of the proper way to care for the self.  In particular, it has been 
an inquiry into how our categorization of some groups as proto-orthodox and others as 
“heretical,” particularly those deemed “Gnostic,” might shift.    
The second-century context of the persecution of the Christians by the Romans 
has proven fertile ground for exploring these questions.  By juxtaposing texts from Nag 
Hammadi (the Apocalypse of Peter and the Testimony of Truth), fragments from 
Basilides and Valentinus, and a text from the Codex Tchacos (the Gospel of Judas) with 
those of the “Apostolic Fathers” which come from a wide variety of genres (epistles, 
martyr acts, a homily, an apocalypse, a post-resurrection dialogue, dialogues between 
Jesus and his disciples, and others), in and of itself a Foucauldian practice,9
                                                   
9 Elizabeth Clark also discusses the value of using a wide variety of genres: Elizabeth Clark, Reading 
Renunciation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 2. 
 I have argued 
that key intra-Christian debates involved varying attitudes to the practice of the care of 
the soul and specifically, to martyrdom.  
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In particular, chapter two discussed the ways in which the proto-orthodox 
represented martyrdom as a process of identity-formation10 and practice in “patient 
endurance,” in actuality, as a kind of care of the soul which, in some cases, goes hand in 
hand with the idea of martyrdom as an imitation of Christ’s sacrifice and a belief in a 
fleshly resurrection as well as notions of apostolic authority.  In some cases, the writing 
by or about the martyrs themselves functioned as a “technology of the self.”11  In a 
newspaper interview, Foucault once said, “Christian culture has developed the idea that if 
you want to take care of yourself in the right way you have to sacrifice yourself.”12
On the other hand, those in a variety of other Christian groups (all too often 
labeled Gnostic) disrupted the increasingly predominant discourse of the glorification of 
 In this 
respect, the dissertation has built on the work of Judith Perkins, Elizabeth Castelli, Nicola 
Denzey, Candida Moss, and others who discuss the representation of martyrdom in these 
philosophical terms (though they seldom invoke the term, the “care of the soul,” 
specifically) and also in terms of the way in which martyrdom became a discourse which 
emphasized the ideas mentioned above, representing the meaning of martyrdom in a quite 
particular way and glorifying it.  In particular, the dissertation has explored these themes 
in 1 Clement, the Letters of Ignatius, the Letter of Polycarp to the Philippians, and the 
Martyrdom of Polycarp.  
                                                   
10 The work of Judith Perkins was seminal in stimulating reflection in this way. See Perkins, The Suffering 
Self, 1995. 
11 The work of Elizabeth Castelli was crucial in introducing the idea that such writing functioned in this 
way. See Castelli, Martyrdom and Memory, 2004).  Of course, it is crucial to remember that while the text 
may represent itself as containing the actual words or writing of a person such as Ignatius, Polycarp, or 
Perpetua. 
12 See “The Power and Politics of Michel Foucault,” an interview with Michel Foucault in the Daily 
Californian (April 22, 1983): 20, cited in Bernauer, Michel Foucault’s Force of Flight, 180, n. 92, 230.  
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martyrdom while simultaneously arguing for care of the self in terms more consonant 
with the traditional therapy of emotions (particularly in its Stoic incarnation).  Chapter 
three has examined these texts, specifically the Apocalypse of Peter and the Testimony of 
Truth (both among those found near Nag Hammadi), two fragments preserved only in the 
writings of Clement of Alexandria—one attributed to Basilides and one attributed to 
Valentinus, and the Gospel of Judas (made accessible to the public by National 
Geographic only in 2006).  These texts urge courage in the face of persecution, but they 
do not frame the meaning of martyrdom in the same way that the proto-orthodox do.  In 
addition, they do not pose a unified position regarding the significance and function of 
martyrdom, but rather a variety of responses to the issue of persecution.13
As Candida Moss says,  
   
Where fissures appear, they do not, as Clement would have it, break down upon 
lines of orthodoxy and heresy, or even into tidy geographically bounded models. 
These texts intersect with one another to make, unmake, and remake early 
Christianity.14
Such an examination also leads us to see that the distinction between elite and 
popular forms of religion is itself a false binary which close reading of the texts elides.  
 
The acts of the martyrs are not theological treatises, but we can also read them for the 
philosophical insights they contain regarding the care of the soul.  At the same time, the 
supposedly elite texts of the “Gnostics” show concern for “the little ones,” an insistence 
that none be led astray through false interpretations or promises, and an interest in 
                                                   
13 There is also variation within the proto-orthodox position.  Candida Moss’s books are extremely helpful 
in highlighting this, her arguments also serving to show the variety across the board within and among 
various groups of early Christians.  She herself states emphatically that texts previously deemed Gnostic 
are “ripe for reconsideration” (Moss, Ancient Christian Martyrdom, 158) and reads them alongside those 
that have always been a part of the orthodox Christian tradition. 
14 Moss, Ancient Christian Martyrdom, 165. 
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providing moral exhortation helpful to those wishing to utilize the example and the 
teachings of Christ for the care of the soul. Thus, there is value in reading them in terms 
of the ways that they complement each other rather than the ways they oppose each other.  
Finally, chapter four has compared and contrasted the representations of two 
important Christian women, Mary Magdalene, the apostle to the apostles, and Perpetua of 
Carthage, who was martyred in the early third century of the Common Era.  Both are 
represented in terms consonant with those who have successfully engaged in the therapy 
of emotions.  The Gospel of Mary represents Mary Magdalene as the one who has 
successfully negotiated the path of freedom from the passions.  She is able to encourage 
the other disciples to face any persecution boldly while sharing a vision of the final 
ascent of the soul to a state of rest in the Divine.  Moreover, she demonstrates 
“immovability” in her emotional and spiritual stability.  Likewise, the Passion of 
Perpetua and Felicity, represents Perpetua as facing martyrdom courageously, serving as 
a leader, and encouraging the other Christians imprisoned at the same time. The portrayal 
of her death shares much in common with the depictions of Greek heroines who died a 
“noble death” (although, interestingly, these other cases of noble death serve to reinforce 
the existing social norms, not to transgress them as Perpetua does by renouncing her 
family ties).   
Perpetua’s bravery, however, is extolled only in the context of willingness, even a 
desire, to subject her body to violence.  Indeed, in the proto-orthodox tradition, women’s 
leadership in any other way was ultimately prohibited and their voices silenced.  Thus, it 
is crucial to complement the representation of Perpetua’s means of caring for the soul 
with that of the representation of Mary Magdalene. The latter disrupts a discourse in 
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which Christian heroines are often those who willingly subject their bodies to violence 
and represent an ideal in which Christian virtue and suffering must go hand-in-hand. 
This dissertation has focused on understanding intra-Christian conflicts and 
deconstructing a false binary opposition between heresy and orthodoxy primarily in the 
context of the second century of the Common Era, a period in which conflicts and 
divisions became quite clear and the labeling of others as “Gnostics” or “heretics” 
became pronounced.  For example, Irenaeus’ lengthy Adversus Haereses, or Against 
Heresies (ca. 180 C.E.), dates from this period.  However, the implications of the 
dissertation are also relevant in the context of both intra- and interfaith conversations 
today.  In the postmodern era, many readily acknowledge the insights of Kant’s First 
Prolegomena regarding the limits of idealism and empiricism, the limits of human reason, 
and the impossibility of achieving certainty regarding the metaphysical.  In addition, 
given the insights of the linguistic turn and the way in which it has shaped historiography, 
we understand the futility of the dry, dead ends of doctrinal debates. We realize that texts 
are representations, not documentations.  However, the need for a care of the soul which 
will inform our ethical commitments and our collective solutions to the problems of the 
twenty-first century may be just as relevant for us as it was for the ancients.  If we are 
willing to read extra-canonical texts which supplement our understanding of the ways in 
which Christians adapted the notion of the care of the soul to meet the spiritual needs of 
their own times, both a better understanding of the history of the early Christianities and 
insights relevant for postmodern spirituality may emerge. James W. Bernauer, one of 
Foucault’s most insightful interpreters, argues:  
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While confinements are the central experiences that Foucault’s work describes, 
the ardent desire of his thought was to facilitate flight from them. He certainly 
recognized the cages within which human life and thought are exercised, and he 
possessed an acute skepticism about those modern windows of knowledge that 
promised a way out, but that in fact, by not breaking with the logic of 
confinement, would always remain windows of prisons. The ‘within’ that he 
shows thought to occupy is the decisive moment for the act of thinking itself, for 
it is to recognize both its prisons and the illusory character of the authorized exits 
from them.  If Foucault is able to imagine the walls of confinement giving way, it 
is because he envisioned a new horizon for the practice of thought.15
 
 
He then declares, “[t]he distinct experiments in thinking that Foucault fashioned were 
meant to indicate through very concrete experiences the powerful movement of escape 
that thought is.16
Re-thinking the history of the early Christianities by re-conceptualizing them as 
offering competing, sometimes complementary visions of the care of the soul rather than 
a history of doctrine characterized by a false binary opposition between heresy and 
orthodoxy might be a means of escape in a postmodern, pluralistic age. As Bernauer goes 
on to say, 
 
[In] his methods of historical analysis  . . . [Foucault] proposes three  . . . 
directions for the practice of intellectual responsibility, a practice that entails a 
work we do to ourselves along the axes of discourse, power, and self. There is a 
shift of focus from what we supposedly do to language to an examination of what 
language does to us. This line of inquiry stresses our responsibility for the support 
we lend to the unchallenged dominance of specific discourses, whether this 
support be shown in our acceptance of fellowships of experts with authoritative 
control over a discourse, or in our justification of certain institutional patterns for 
the dissemination of a discourse.17
 
  
                                                   
15 Bernauer, Michel Foucault’s Force of Flight, 16. 
16 Bernauer, Michel Foucault’s Force of Flight, 16. 
17 Bernauer, Michel Foucault’s Force of Flight, 19. 
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Continuing to accept a paradigm in which the history of Christianity is the history of a 
false binary opposition between “orthodoxy” and “heresy” in which the discrediting of 
“Gnostics” plays a major role seems in this sense, a failure to exercise responsibility of 
the kind Foucault urges. 
Bernauer also discusses Foucault’s revolt against enslavement to prevailing 
discourses: “This breath of life or force of resistance, this Foucaultian spirituality, bears 
witness to the capacity for an ecstatic transcendence of any history that asserts its 
necessity.”18
                                                   
18 Bernauer, Michel Foucault’s Force of Flight, 180–81. 
 Such a statement exquisitely captures the potential that a juxtaposition of 
the voices of the Apostolic Fathers, the texts of Nag Hammadi, and others bring to our 
understanding of the early Christianities.  We no longer need to buy into a discourse in 
which “orthodoxy” and “heresy” are asserted as necessary components of the telling of 
Christian history.  We are free to unravel the twisted threads of our past and knit them 
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